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THE 

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TAXATION 

C.  B. 
FILLEBROWN 

PRICE  : 

TWENTY-FIVE 

CENTS 

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THE  A  B  C  OF  TAXATION 


A  B  C  of  Taxation 

With  Boston  Object  Lessons,  Private 

Property  in  Land,  and  Other 

Essays  and  Addresses 


By 
C.    B.   FILLEBROWN 

President    Massachusetts    Single  Tax  League 
Third   'Edition^ 


Garden  City  New  York 

Doubleday,  Page  &  Company 

1912 


^\3 


\'\(^ 


ALL  RIGHTS    RESERVED,   INCLUDING   THAT  OT  TRANSLATIOS 
INTO   FOREIGN    LANGUAGES,    INCLUDING    THE   SCANDINAVIAN 


COPYRIGHT,    1909,  BY   C.    B.    FILLEBROWN 
PUBLISHED,   FEBRUARY,    I909 


PREFACE 

Twelve  years  of  zealous  study  and  discussion  of 
the  subject  of  taxation  have  brought  me  at  last  to 
what  should  have  been  my  starting  point  — what,  as 
it  now  appears  to  me,  should  be  the  starting  point  of 
every  student,  to  wit:  the  recognition  that  invest- 
ments in  land  are  exempt  from  taxation.  The  desire 
to  make  the  path  smoother  and  shorter  for  those  who 
follow  me  is  the  reason  for  bringing  together  in  a 
single  volume  these  hitherto  scattered  miscellanies. 

Notwithstanding  their  desultory  form,  these  essays, 
discussions,  and  illustrations  present  what  are  in  my 
judgment  the  fundamental  issues  in  the  field  of  taxa- 
tion, and  I  am  proud  to  say  that  most  of  the  specific 
views  herein  expressed  have  had  the  substantial 
approval  of  a  majority  of  the  prominent  teachers  of 
political  economy. 

Although  most  of  the  matter  contained  in  this 
volume  has  previously  appeared  in  print,  any  value 
that  it  ever  had  is  here  enhanced  by  revision  of  figures 
and  conclusions  to  date.  When  referring  to  Henry 
George's  views,  I  have  taken  pains  to  give  what  I 
believe  to  have  been  his  final  judgments,  making  the 
writer  of  mature  age  the  interpreter  of  his  own  earlier 
masterpiece. 

!  welcome  this  opportunity  to  record  my  lasting 
gratitude  to  all  of  the  many  friends  who  from  first  to 
last  have  helped  to  steady  a  wavering  hand,  and  I 


vl  PREFACE 

cannot  refrain  from  acknowledging  my  special  obliga- 
tions to  the  Hon.  Charles  Francis  Adams;  Professor 
F.  Spencer  Baldwin,  Boston  University;  Professor 
Charles  J.  Bullock,  Harvard  University;  the  Rt.  Rev. 
William  Byrne,  D.  D.,  thirty  years  Vicar-General 
of  Archbishop  Williams,  of  Boston;  Professor  Thomas 
N.  Carver,  Harvaid  University;  Professor  Henry  R. 
Seager,  Columbia  University;  Professor  E.  R.  A.  Selig- 
man,  Columbia  University;  the  late  Thomas  G.  Shear- 
man ;  Professor  George  Ray  Wicker,  Dartmouth  College ; 
and  John  Buckley  Willis,  A  M.,  for  their  invaluable 
criticism  and  encouragement. 

C.    B.    FiLLEBROWN. 

Boston,  January^  igog. 


IN    FOUR    PARTS 


Part      I.     The  A  B  C  of  Taxation. 

Part     II.     Three    Boston    Object    Lessons 
IN  Taxation. 

Part  III.     Private    Property  in    Land,  and 
other  Essays  and  Addresses. 

Part   IV.    Appendix. 


CONTENTS 


APPENDIX 


PAGE 


Preface v 

CHAPTER 

1.    A.    Ground  Rent  a  Social  Product      .  3 
II.     B.    A  Tax  Upon  Economic  Rent  Can- 
not be  Shifted 31 

III.  C.    The    Selling    Value    of     Land     an 

Untaxed  Value  ....        36 

IV.  First    Boston   Object    Lesson  —  Winter 

Street  and  the  Single  Tax.     ( Illus- 
trated)          55 

V.     Second  Boston  Object   Lesson  —  Wash- 
ington   Street    and    the  Single  Tax. 

(Illustrated) 66 

VI.     Third  Boston  Object  Lesson  —  Q)rnhill 

and  the  Single  Tax.     ( Illustrated  )        79 
VII.     Private  Property  in  Land 
VIII.    Justice  of  the  Single  Tax 
IX.    The  Single  Tax  and  the  Farmer 
X.     Public  Utilities — Regulation  by  Taxa 

tion 

XI.     Inheritance  and  Income  Taxes 
XII.    The  Single  Tax        .... 


95 

108 


122 

132 
148 
153 


A.  Ethics  of  the  Single  Tax:    Its  Breadth 

and  Catholicity 167 

B.  Tolstoy  and  Henry  George       .        .        .168 

C.  The  Disproportionate  Treatment  of  Agri- 

cultural Rents  by  Economists    .        .       171 


viii  THE  A  B  C  OF  TAXATION 


D.  Statement  of  the  Rev.  Edward  McGIynn       173 

E.  A  Protest  Against  Unjust  Taxation        .       184 

F.  Agreements  in  Political  Economy    .        .       187 

G.  Details   of    One  Hundred   and  Twenty 

Boston  Property  Sales        .        .        .190 

H.     Details  of  Seven  Hundred  and  Fifty-one 

Boston  Rentals  .        .        .       .193 


PART   I. 

THREE    GENERIC    PECULIARITIES 
OF   LAND 

Chapter     I. 

A.  Ground   Rent   a  Social  Product. 

Chapter    IL 

B.  A  Tax  Upon   Economic  Rent  Cannot 

BE  Shifted. 

Chapter  III. 

C.  The   Selling  Value  of  Land   an    Un- 

taxed V/xuii. 


Chapter  I 


A 


THE  FIRST  GENERIC  PECULIARITY  OF  LAND 

GROUND    RENT    A    SOCIAL    PRODUCT 

GROUND     RENT,     WHAT     LAND      IS     WORTH     ANNUALLY 
FOR    USE,    IS    A    CREATION     OF     THE     COMMUNITY, 

A     SOCIAL     PRODUCT ALL      LOCAL     TAXES      ARE 

SPENT    UPON    THOSE     THINGS     WHICH     MAKE     AND 
MAINTAIN    GROUND    RENT 

I.— Definition  of  Ground  Rent* 

(i)  "Ground  rent  is  what  land  is  worth  for  use." 
Strictly  speaking,  the  "worth  for  use"  attaches 
not  to  the  land  itself,  but  to  scores  of  things  exterior 
to  the  land  and  through  it  available  for  use,  so  that, 
as  applied  to  urban  land,  the  following  would  be 
more  accurate: 

(2)  Ground  rent  is  the  annual  valuef  of  the  exclusive 
use  and  control  of  a  given  area  of  land,  involving  the 
enjoyment  of  those  rights  and  privilegesj  pertaining  to 

*  See  Appendix  F. 

t  The  rental  value  and  the  capital  value  of  land  differ  in  that  the  one 
represents  what  land  is  worth  for  use  during  any  limited  period,  while  the 
other  represents  what  it  is  worth  for  "perpetual"  use. 

I " Rights  and  privileges"  are  here  used  in  their  legal  and  not  in  a  moral  sense. 

3 


4  THE  A  B  C  OF  TAXATION 

the  land  which  are  stipulated  in  every  title  deed,  and 
which,  enumerated  specifically,  are  as  follows:  right 
and  ease  of  access  to  water,  health  inspection,  sewer- 
age, fire  protection,  po'ice,  schools,  libraries,  museums, 
parks,  playgrounds,  steam  and  electric  railway  service, 
gas  and  electric  lighting,  telegraph  and  telephone 
service,  subways,  ferries,  churches,  public  schools, 
private  schools,  colleges,  universities,  and  public  build- 
ings —  utilities  which  depend  for  their  efficiency  and 
economy  on  the  character  of  the  government;  which 
collectively  constitute  the  economic  and  social 
advantages  of  the  land;  and  which  are  due  to 
the  presence  and  activity  of  population  and  are 
inseparable  therefrom. 

II.—The  Nature  of  Ground  Rent 

As  defined  by  Mr.  Shearman,  ground  rent  is,  in  its 
nature,  "a  tribute  which  natural  laws  levy  upon  every 
occupant  of  land  as  the  market  price  of  all  the  social  as 
well  as  natural  advantages  appertaining  to  that  land, 
including  necessarily  his  just  share  of  the  cost  of 
government."  It  is  found  operative  in  every  civilized 
country,  automatically  collecting  "from  every  citizen 
an  amount  almost  exactly  proportionate  to  the  fair 
and  full  market  value  of  the  benefits  which  he  derives 
from  the  government  under  which  he  lives  and  the 
society  which  surrounds  him."  It  is  a  tribute,  "a  tax, 
just,  equal,  full,  fair,  paid  for  full  value  received." 
"It  is  not  merely  a  tax  which  justice  allows;  it  is  one 
which  justice  demands.  It  is  not  merely  one  which 
ought  to  be  collected;  it  is  one  which  infallibly  will 
be  and  is  collected.  It  is  not  merely  one  which  the 
State  ought  to  see  collected;  it  is  one  which,  in  the 


GROUND  RENT  A  SOCIAL  PRODUCT       5 

long  run,  the  State  cannot  prevent  being  collected. 
Seldom  has  there  been  a  more  beau- 
tiful illustration  of  the  wise  yet  relentless 
working  of  natural  law  than  in  the  proved  im- 
possibility of  justly  collecting  any  tax  other  than 
upon  ground  rent.  It  shows  that  nature  makes 
it  impossible  to  execute  justly  a  statute  which 
is  in  its  nature  unjust."  This  definition  of  Mr. 
Shearman  is  offered  as  one  difficult  to  be  improved 
or  condensed. 

Such,  it  may  be  added,  is  the  nature  of  rent  — 
ground  rent  —  that  all  the  public  and  private  improve- 
ments of  a  community  to-day  are  reflected  in  the  land 
values  of  that  community.  Not  only  this,  but  the 
value  of  all  those  ideal  public  improvements  conceived 
of  as  being  possible  under  Utopian  conditions  would 
be  similarly  absorbed,  as  it  were,  in  the  ground, 
would  be  reflected  in  its  site  value.  Stand  before  a  big 
mirror  and  you  will  see  your  image  perfectly  reflected 
before  you.  If  you  are  a  man  scantily,  shabbily 
clad,  so  is  the  image  in  the  glass.  The  addition 
of  rich  and  costly  attire  is  imaged  in  the  glass. 
Load  yourself  with  jewels  and  fill  your  hands 
with  gold:  in  the  mirror,  true  to  nature,  is  the 
image  and  likeness  of  them  all.  Not  more  perfectly, 
nor  more  literally,  is  your  image  reflected  in  the 
mirror  than  are  public  improvements  reflected  in 
the  value  of  the  land. 

One  peculiarity  in  the  nature  of  ground  rent  to  which 
we  urge  your  attention  is  the  subtle  relation  existing 
between  this  natural  income  and  the  artificial  outgo 
of  the  public  taxes  —  a  relation  not  unlike  that  of 
cause  and  effect,  by  which  the  wise  expenditure  of  the 


6  THE  A  B  C  OF  TAXATION 

tax  contributes,  in  a  manner  especially  direct,  to  the 
element  of  ground  rent. 

Simple  illustrations  may  help  to  open  the  mind 
to  a  consideration  of  whatever  may  seem  novel 
or  strange  in  the  re-statement  of  a  familiar  truth. 
For  instance:  The  cook  turns  the  crank  of  her 
coflfee  mill;  the  whole  coffee  that  was  in  the 
hopper  comes  out  ground  coflfee,  but  it  is  coflfee 
just  the  same.  The  Minneapolis  miller  lets  on  the 
water  that  turns  the  crank  of  his  flour  mill;  the 
wheat  that  goes  into  the  hopper  comes  out  flour, 
wheat  in  a  more  subtle  form.  The  people  turn  the 
crank  of  a  great  tax  mill ;  the  taxes  that  go  into  the 
hopper  come  out  ground  rent,  no  tax  quality  lost,  no 
rent  ingredient  added. 

Or  again:  The  myriad  springs  and  rivulets  of  the 
great  Mississippi  are  continuously  delivering  them- 
selves in  one  great  river  to  the  sea.  Suppose  that  some 
day  you  should  read  in  the  weather  bulletin  that 
nature  had  decided  to  suspend  the  regular  return  of 
these  waters  in  clouds  and  rain  and  dew  to  their 
point  of  departure.  How  long  would  it  be  before 
the  Mississippi  Valley  would  be  as  parched  and 
dry  as  the  Desert  of  Sahara,  or  the  North  End  of 
the  city  of  Boston,  or  the  East  Side  of  the  city  of 
New  York  ? 

Or,  more  pertinent  still,  because  more  vital:  The 
constant  round  of  taxes  and  ground  rent  is  the  blood 
circulation  of  the  body  politic.  When  the  heart  throws 
out  the  life  blood  through  the  arteries,  if  that  blood 
does  not  return  through  the  veins,  the  patient  dies  — 
not  of  heart  failure,  but  from  loss  of  blood.  When  the 
public  heart  charges  the  arteries  of  the  land  with  ground 


GROUND  RENT  A  SOCIAL  PRODUCT       7 

rent,  if  that  ground  rent  does  not  return,  the  body 
politic  is  prostrated  or  enervated  by  loss  of  blood.  The 
body  politic  to-day,  like  a  man  with  a  ravenous 
appetite,  is  cleaning  its  plate  of  all  the  millions  a  year 
that  it  can  earn,  and  mortgaging  the  future  for  nearly 
as  much  more,  always  eating,  yet  always  hungry,  and 
simply  because  the  best  part  of  its  millions  of  dollars' 
worth  of  arterial  life  blood,  instead  of  coming  back  to 
the  public  heart,  ebbs  rapidly  away  through  severed 
blood  vessels  in  the  private  appropriation  of  ground 
rent. 

These  illustrations  of  the  miscarriage  of  a  bene- 
ficent provision  seem  to  hint  strongly  at  the  true 
theory  of  ground  rent,  as  waiting  to  be  naturally 
developed  under  a  natural  law,  and  as  a  natural 
social  product. 

III.— The  Operation  of  Ground  Rent 

Critical  consideration  is  invited  to  Mr.  Shearman's 
statement  that  the  operation  of  ground  rent  is  to 
exact  from  every  user  of  land  the  natural  tribute 
which  he  ought  to  pay  in  return  for  the  perpetual 
public  and  social  advantages  secured  to  him  by  his 
location,  a  part  of  which  natural  tribute  now  goes 
to  the  State  in  the  form  of  a  tax,  and  the  remainder 
to  the  landlord  in  the  form  of  rent.  Objection  to 
monopolies  and  special  privileges  is  that  they  partici- 
pate in  the  private  appropriation  of  an  undue  share  of 
this  natural  tribute,  and  while  recognising  that  in 
the  end  all  quasi-public,  as  well  as  all  public  service, 
should  be  at  the  least  pracricable  cost  to  the  people, 
it  is  held  that  meantime  whatever  monopoly  is  enjoyed 
should  be  obliged,  through  taxation,  to  repay  to  the 


8  THE  A  B  C  OF  TAXATION 

public  a  full  and  fair  equivalent  for  the  privilege 
conceded  to  it. 

The  monopolies  and  special  privileges  which  should 
properly  share  with  land  values  the  burden  of  taxa- 
tion, may  be  partially  enumerated  as  follows:  the 
private  appropriation  of  natural  resources  such  as 
gold,  silver,  copper,  iron,  and  coal  mines,  oil  fields, 
and  water  powers;  all  franchises  of  steam  and  electric 
railways;  all  other  public  franchises,  granted  to  one 
or  several  persons  incorporated,  from  which  all  other 
people  are  excluded,  and  which  include  all  "rights, 
authority,  or  permission  to  construct,  maintain,  or 
operate  in,  under,  above,  upon,  or  through  any  streets, 
highways,  or  public  places,  mains,  pipes,  tanks,  con- 
duits, or  wires,  with  their  appurtenances  for  conducting 
water,  steam,  heat,  light,  power,  gas,  oil,  or  other 
substance,  or  electricity  for  telegraphic,  telephonic, 
or  other  purposes."* 

The  reforms  contemplated  by  the  single  tax  would 
leave  the  State  and  the  individual  to  deal  together 
exactly  as  individuals  deal  with  one  another  in  ordinary 
business.  Persons  desiring  special  privileges  would 
rent  them  from  the  State  or  the  municipality,  just  as 
they  now  rent  them  from  individuals  and  corporations, 
and  on  similar  terms,  fixed  from  year  to  year.  When 
paid  for  in  this  way,  the  special  privilege  feature 
would  be  eliminated.  Then  there  really  would  be  no 
special  privileges,  and  there  would  be  need  of  no  other 
taxation.  Hence,  we  say,  the  least  the  public  can 
do  is  to  tax  and  collect  upon  these  special  privileges, 
including  ground  rent,  a  sum  sufficient  to  defray 
all  public  expenses. 

*  Quoted  from  the  Ford  Franchise  Tax  Act  of  New  York. 


GROUND  RENT  A  SOCIAL  PRODUCT       9 

The  value  of  these  special  privileges  is  held  to  be 
ground  rent,  which  in  turn  is  held  to  be  very  largely, 
if  not  entirely,  a  social  product. 

IV.— The  Office  of  Ground  Rent 

The  true  office  of  ground  rent  is  that  of  a  board 
of  equalisation  —  equalisation  of  taxation,  of  dis- 
tribution, and  of  opportunity.  The  tendency  of  an 
increase  in  the  tax  upon  ground  rent  is  not  only  to 
equalise  taxation  and  distribution,  but  to  equalise 
the  opportunity  of  access  to  what  is  erroneously  called 
the  land,  which  of  itself,  even  in  a  city,  would  be  of 
little  or  no  use  if  it  had  a  perpetual  fifty-foot  tight 
board  fence  around  it.  In  this  clear  distinction 
between  land  and  land  value,  which  cannot  be  too 
critically  noted,  may  there  not  be  found  an  explosion 
of  the  notion  that  a  man  has  a  right  to  the  private 
appropriation  of  ground  rent,  because  his  father 
bought  and  paid  for  the  land  fifty  or  one  hundred 

years  ago? 

The  question  is:  When  he  bought  the  land  fifty 
or  one  hundred  years  ago,  did  he  buy  and  pay  for 
the  land  value  of  to-day?  In  1686  a  company  having 
five  shares  and  five  stockholders  bought  a  lot  of 
land  in  Philadelphia  for  I5.  In  1900  the  same  com- 
pany, with  its  five  shares  and  five  stockholders,  sold 
the  value  of  the  same  land  for  $1,000,000.  Does  it 
sound  reasonable  to  say  that  for  one  pound  steriing 
in  1686  these  five  men  bought  and  paid  for  the 
$1,000,000  land  value  of  1900,  with  its  ground 
rent  of  $40,000  a  year?  Would  not  such  a  sale 
in  1686  of  goods  to  be  delivered  two  hundred  and 
fourteen  years  later  be  dealing   in   futures  with   a 


10  THE  A  B  C  OF  TAXATION 

vengeance?  True  it  is  that  the  land  sold  to-day 
is  the  same  land  bought  in  1686.  But  it  is  just 
as  true  that  its  value  to-day  is  not  the  value  of 
the  land  itself,  but  is  the  value  of  the  rights  and 
privileges  pertaining  thereto,  and  exterior  to  the  land 
itself.  The  demand  that  enhances  land  value  is  not 
for  land  itself,  but  for  the  command  of  these  same 
rights  and  privileges. 

Land  value  being  a  social  creation,*  and  rent  being 
socially  maintained,  equal  access  to  the  rights  and 
privileges  pertaining  to  the  land  can  be  promoted 
by  the  taxation  of  ground  rent  alone,  and  by  this 
means  only.  Ground  rent,  the  natural  tax  feeder, 
extracts  from  the  user  of  land  the  exact  measure  of 
his  advantage  over  other  men  in  his  exclusive  enjoy- 
ment of  rights  and  privileges  pertaining  to  his  own 
location,  and  the  whole  tendency  of  the  taxation 
of  ground  rent  is  to  equalise  participation  in  these 
common  rights  and  privileges,  by  commuting  into 
dollars  and  cents,  which  can  be  divided,  those  indivis- 
ible advantages  of  location,  which  can  only  be  enjoyed 
individually.    Whatever  of  rent  goes  into  the  public 


♦  Professor  J.  B.  Clark,  then  of  Smith  College,  now  of  Columbia  University, 
said,  in  a  discussion  at  Saratoga,  N.  Y.,  in  1890: 

"The  community  has  created  the  value  that  resides  in  land,  and  whoever 
usurps  the  ownership  of  it  deals  a  blow  at  the  community.  What  is  more,  he 
strikes  at  the  basis  of  the  civil  order,  since  governments  have  been  evolved 
in  and  through  the  effort  to  secure  to  each  producer  the  value  that  he  brings  into 
existence,  and  it  is  anarchic  in  principle  to  habitually  counteract  this  effort. 

"Of  the  wealth  that  resides  in  land,  the  State  is  certainly  the  creator  and  the 
original  and  lawful  owner.  As  a  sovereign  it  has  a  certain  ultimate  owner- 
ship of  all  property.  Treasures  of  every  kind  are,  in  the  last  analysis,  its  own. 
As  the  creator,  not  of  the  substance  of  the  earth,  but  of  the  value 
residing  in  it,  the  State  has  a  producer's  immediate  right  to  use  and  dispose 
of  its  product.  If  any  theory  depreciates  either  the  State's  reserved  right 
over  all  wealth  or  its  special  producer's  claim  to  the  wealth  residing  in  land,  so 
much  the  worse  for  that  theory." 


GROUND  RENT  A  SOCIAL  PRODUCT     ii 

treasury  tends  to  a  fairer  distribution  of  produce  in 
wages  earned.  Whatever  of  taxation  is  transferred 
from  other  wealth  to  ground  rent  leaves  so  much  more 
wealth  to  be  distributed  in  wages. 

Again,  it  is  submitted  that  the  true  office  of  ground 
rent  is  to  offer  a  communal  shoulder  suited  to  bear 
all  the  burden  of  common  needs,  leaving  produce  — 
current  wealth  —  to  be  distributed,  as  fast  as  pro- 
duced, in  wages  and  interest,  the  total  volume  of 
which  will  always  be  increased  by  the  amount  of  rent 
appropriated  through  the  taxation  of  whatever  of 
economic  rent  there  is  in  special  privilege. 

Ground  rent  being  a  social  product,  is  not  its  private 
appropriation  a  special  privilege? 

v.— The  Cause  of  Ground  Rent 

The  dimensions,  as  well  as  the  continuous  character 
of  the  contribution  made  by  the  people  to  the  growth 
and  volume  of  ground  rent,  are  seldom  measured  — 
by  many  persons  hardly  suspected.  Almost  anything 
else  that  he  owns,  except  land,  a  man  may  appropriate, 
destroy,  tear  down,  burn  down,  remove,  consume, 
change  in  form,  wear  out.  To  the  land  itself  he  cannot 
do  any  of  these  things.  The  value  of  its  use  is  ground 
rent,  an  annual  value,  which  is  all  that  the  owner  of 
land  can  consume  each  year.  The  land  value  itself 
survives,  and  usually  intact.  People  speak  of  owning 
land,  because  they  or  their  fathers  have  bought  and 
paid  for  it. 

A  simple  illustration  will  indicate  how  a  dispro- 
portionate reliance  may  be  placed  upon  this  argument, 
considered  in  the  light  of  all  the  causes  contrib- 
uting to  the  value  of  land.     Suppose,  for  instance, 


12  THE  A  B  C  OF  TAXATION 

that  a  vacant  lot  was  bought  fifty  years  ago  for 
|i,ooo,  which  to-day  is  worth  1 10,000.  The  chances 
are  that  when  the  purchaser  paid  his  original  1 1,000, 
the  people,  in  one  capacity  or  another,  paid  for 
the  same  year  I50  to  maintain  that  purchase  value, 
and  that  for  forty-nine  years  thereafter  the  people 
have  paid  in  annual  arithmetical  progression  up  to 
I500  for  the  present  year.  The  purchaser  paid  1 1,000 
in  one  payment.  The  people  have  paid  during  the 
fifty  years  an  average  of  $250  a  year  to  maintain  this 
value.  On  the  part  of  the  people  it  has  been  not 
unlike  a  continuous  purchase  in  the  proportion  of 
I250  a  year  of  the  people's  tax  money  to  I50  a  year  of 
the  purchaser's  interest  money. 

In  addition  to  whatever  income  the  purchaser  has 
received,  he  possesses  to-day  $10,000  worth  of  land, 
while  the  people  possess  nothing  except  an  outgo  of 
5  per  cent  in  maintenance,  offset  in  small  part  by  an 
income  of  li  per  cent  in  tax.  Such  an  inheritance 
would  usually  be  counted  worse  than  nothing.  Is  it 
not  reasonable  that  the  community  should  derive 
profit  from  its  part  in  this  transaction,  by  appropriat- 
ing to  its  own  use  the  one-half  at  least  of  that  ground 
rent  that  is  manifestly  created  by  the  simple  expendi- 
ture of  its  taxes?  Why  should  not  taxes,  all  of  which 
are  spent  upon  the  land,  be  taken  from  the  land?* 

*  E.  Benjamin  Andrews,  formerly  President  of  Brown  University,  said  at 
Saratoga,  N.  Y.,  in  1890: 

"To  turn  the  golden  stream  of  economic  rent  partly  or  mostly  into  the 
State's  treasury,  where  it  would  relieve  the  public  of  taxation  in  burdensome 
forms,  seems  to  be  extraordinarily  desirable.  I  by  no  means  concur  in  all  the 
reasons  which  many  assign  for  this;  nor  should  I  expect  from  it,  even  if  carried 
to  Mr.  George's  length,  more  than  half  the  benefits  to  society  which  he  antici- 
pates. Still  the  proposition  to  lay  the  main  tax  on  land  impresses  me  as  just, 
safe,  accordant  with  the  best  canons  of  public  finance,  and  in  fact,  every  way 
excellent." 


GROUND  RENT  A  SOCIAL  PRODUCT      13 

Ground  rent  may  be  said  to  result  from  at  least 
three  distinct  causes,  all  connected  with  aggregated 
social  activity: 

(1)  Public  expenditure:  All  wise  public 
expenditures  are  direct  feeders  of  ground  rent. 
Streets,  lights,  water,  sewerage,  fire  and  police  systems, 
public  schools,  libraries,  museums,  parks  and  play- 
grounds, all  contribute  to  enhance  the  value  of  land, 
and  a  corresponding  depreciation  would  follow  the 
abolition  of  any  of  these  systems.  It  follows,  there- 
fore, that  expenditure  for  maintaining  these  services 
constitutes  the  maintenance  of  ground  rent,  if  not 
in  a  literal  sense,  at  least  in  an  all-sufficient  common 
sense. 

(2)  Quasi-public  expenditure:  In  the  same  way, 
the  expenditure  by  the  municipality  or  by  private 
corporations  for  steam  and  electric  railways,  gas  and 
electric  lights,  telegraph  and  telephone  facilities, 
subways  and  ferries,  contributes  to  the  value  of  land, 
at  least  to  the  extent  of  their  actual  cost. 

(3)  Private  expenditure:  Equally,  and  by  parity 
of  reasoning,  private  or  voluntary  social  expenditure 
for  churches,  private  schools,  colleges  and  universities, 
all  private  buildings,  apartment  houses,  stores,  and 
office  buildings,  contributes  to  ground  rent,  the  annual 
value  of  land. 

In  an  enumeration  of  the  causes  of  ground  rent, 
population  is  usually  the  one  first  named.  But  a 
passive  population  gives  little  value  to  land;  it  is 
rather  the  activities  consequent  upon  the  character 
of  population  that  create  the  value. 

It  is  generally  conceded  that,  as  a  matter  of  fact, 
ground  rent  is  what  land  is  worth  annually  for  use; 


14  THE  A  B  C  OF  TAXATION 

but  it  is  of  far  greater  importance  to  understand 
clearly  what  is  the  source  of  ground  rent,  and  especially 
to  what  extent  it  may  be  regarded  as  a  social  product. 
Inasmuch  as  all  the  contributions  representing  these 
activities,  so  far  as  enumerated,  are  from  the 
treasuries  of  the  people,  it  is  correct  and  proper 
to  say  that  ground  rent  is  chiefly  and  peculiarly  a 
social  product. 

From  one  point  of  view  (that  of  demand)  it  may 
be  said  that  the  value  of  all  commodities  is  a  social 
product.  But  when  we  come  to  consider  the  other 
side  of  the  value  problem,  we  find  that  most  other 
commodities,  e.  g.,  houses,  increase  or  decrease  at  man's 
will,  according  to  the  principle  of  cost,  the  value  being 
a  resultant  of  a  balancing  of  social  desire  against 
social  cost. 

With  land  it  is  more  generally  true  that  the 
quantity  either  cannot  be  increased  at  all  or  can 
be  increased  only  at  increasing  cost;  and  hence  the 
practical  determinant  of  the  value  of  land  is  almost 
entirely  in  the  social  and  private  activities  that  make 
the  use  of  land  desirable. 

VI. — The  Maintenance  of  Ground  Rent 

So  far  as  the  cost  of  streets,  lights,  water, 
sewerage,  fire,  police,  schools,  libraries,  museums, 
parks,  play-grounds,  steam  and  electric  railways, 
gas  and  electric  lights,  telegraph  and  telephone 
companies,  subways,  ferries,  churches,  private 
schools,  colleges,  universities,  public  buildings,  well 
appointed  houses,  stores,  and  office  buildings  is 
what  constitutes  the  cost  value  of  the  land,  just 
so    far     the     maintenance    of    all     this     public    or 


GROUND  RENT  A  SOCIAL  PRODUCT     15 

social     service     constitutes     the     maintenance     of 
ground  rent. 

A  simple  illustration  may  help  to  an  appreciation 
of  the  absurd  absence  of  a  true  economy  in  tax  affairs 
to-day.  A  landlord  owns  a  factory  which  requires 
steam  power,  and  which  is  useless  and  worthless 
without  it.  Another  man  owns  a  steam  plant,  and 
furnishes  steam  to  factories  at  so  much  per  horse  power. 
The  man  who  hires  and  uses  the  factory  pays  factory 
rent  to  his  landlord,  who  furnishes  the  factory,  and 
steam  rent  to  the  man  who  furnishes  the  steam.  He 
would  smile  if  you  should  talk  to  him  about  paying 
his  steam  rent  to  the  landlord  who  does  not  furnish  it. 
In  vivid  contrast  with  this  sensible  performance  we 
may  take  the  case  of  another  landlord  who  owns  a 
store,  requiring  public  service  and  convenience,  and 
useless  without  it.  The  municipality  owns  and  runs 
a  public  service  plant,  and  furnishes  public  service 
at  a  cost  of  so  much  per  thousand  dollars'  worth. 
The  man  who  hires  and  uses  the  store  pays  store  rent 
to  his  landlord,  who  furnishes  the  store,  but,  by  a' 
strange  perversion,  he  pays  his  public  service  rent 
to  the  same  landlord.  Should  he  not  pay  his  public 
service  rent  to  the  public  that  furnishes  it? 

Inasmuch  as  all  these  contributions  to  its  main- 
tenance, so  far  as  enumerated,  are  from  the  treasuries 
of  the  people,  what  can  ground  rent  possibly  be,  if 
it  is  not  a  social  product? 

VII.— An     Illustration:     The    Ground     Rent    of 
Boston 

A  dense  skepticism  and,  indeed,  a  denser  ignorance, 
seem  to  obtain  even  in  regard  to  the  simple  fact  that 


l6  THE  A  B  C  OF  TAXATION 

there  is  such  a  thing  as  ground  rent,  and  yet 
much  more  in  regard  to  what  is  the  volume  of 
ground  rent.  It  has  been  questioned  whether  the 
ground  rent  of  the  City  of  Boston,  for  instance, 
under  the  single  tax,  with  the  accompanying 
shrinkage  in  speculative  values,  would  exceed 
to-day  5  per  cent  on  the  assessed  valuation  of 
land,  or  132,000,000.  Indications  are  that  the 
net  rent  of  the  land  itself  might  not,  but  our 
investigations  are  directed  to  ascertaining  not  the 
net,  but  the  gross,  ground  rent,  which  is  net  rent 
plus  the  taxes. 

In  a  systematic  attempt  to  dispel  these  clouds  of 
ignorance  and  skepticism — now  to  be  found  in  sur- 
prisingly high  places — and  to  demonstrate  beyond 
a  reasonable  doubt  about  how  much  gross  ground 
rent  there  is  in  the  city  of  Boston,  actual  sales  for 
the  year  1902  and  actual  rentals  have  been  collected 
from  official  sources. 

One  hundred  and  twenty  pieces  of  real  estate*  in 
various  sections  of  the  city  are  shown  to  have  been  sold 
at  prices  averaging  one-fifth  higher  than  their  assessed 
valuation,  indicating  that  at  least  in  these  one  hundred 
and  twenty  cases  the  valuations  were  less  than  five- 
sixths  of  the  selling  price. 

Landlords  and  real  estate  men  are  the  best  judges  of 
the  following  calculation  which,  taking  into  account 
the  fact  that  the  prices  given  in  these  tables  are  those 
indicated  by  the  revenue  stamps  on  deeds,  assumes 
that  the  buildings  sold  for  one-third  more  than  their 
assessed  valuation: 


♦  An    exhibit    of    these    specimen    cases    in    detail    will    be    found    in 
Appendiz   G. 


GROUND  RENT  A  SOCIAL  PRODUCT     17 

Deducting  from  the  total  ©f  prices  indicated  by  the 

footingof  the  120  sales  ....     ^7,291,375 

Four-thirdsof  assessed  valuation  of  buildings  .       2,772,933 

Would  give  perhaps  a  fair  estimate  of  what  the 

land  sold  for       ......     $4,518,442 

To  this  it  is  necessary  to  add  the  capitaHsed  tax 
upon  the  land  for  the  same  year,  1900, 
>^3>758>6oox  $14.70  (the  number  of  dollars 
tax  per  thousand)  x  20  (the  number  of  years* 
purchase) i^i, 105,028 

In  order  to  get  the  gross  capitalised  ground  rental   . 

value  of  the  land ;$5,623,47o 

Of  which  the  assessed  valuations  were  only  two- 
thirds. 

Seven  hundred  and  fifty-one  rentals*  of  estates, 
together  with  their  assessed  valuations,  averaging 
147,680  each,  were  also  obtained  from  reliable 
sources.  In  the  total  for  these  it  is  found  that 
the  net  rent  is  5  per  cent  (4.8),  and  the  gross 
rent — net  rent  plus  taxes — is  6  per  cent  of  the 
assessed  valuation.  That  is  to  say,  the  net  value, 
based  upon  net  income  to  the  owner,  corresponds 
with  the  assessed  valuation,  and  is  five-sixths  of  the 
gross  value,  based  upon  what  the  user  pays  for  the  land. 
It  is  probable  that  these  estates  are  in  the  aggregate 
improved  to  less  than  one-half  of  their  normal  efficiency, 
and  hence  the  income  which  they  now  yield  is  less  than 
5  per  cent  of  the  price  that  they  would  actually  sell  for. 

In  the  absence  of  contradictory  or  correcting 
testimony,  it  is  fair  to  ask  the  reader  to  accept  these 
lists  of  120  sales  and  751  estate  rentals  respectively  as 
an  indication  of  the  ratio  existing  between  assessed 
valuation  and  selling  value. 

*  An  exhibit  of  these  snecimpn  cases  in  detail  will  be  found  in  Appendix  H. 


i8  THE  A  B  C  OF  TAXATION 

Based  upon  the  foregoing  ratio,  the  following  con- 
servative estimate  of  the  gross  land  value  of  Boston  is 
submitted  for  scrutiny  and  criticism: 

A   CONSERVATIVE    CALCULATION    OF    BOSTON's    GROUND    RENT 

If  the  assessed   valuation*  of  Boston's   land 

for  1907,  v^hich  is  in  round  numbers  .         $653,000,000 

Is   five-sixths   of  its    selling   value,   then   the 

addition  of  one-fifth        ....  130,600,000 

Would  give  us  as  the  net  selling  value       .  .        J^783,6oo,ooo 

Adding   to   this   the   capitalised   value   of  the 

amount  of  tax  now  on  the  land,  $15.90 

per      thousand      on      $653,000,000,      or 

$10,382,000  at  twenty  years' purchase**   .  207,600,000 

Would  give  us  as  the  true  capitalised  ground 

rental  value.  .....        $991,200,000 

Add  moderate  estimate  for  franchises,  say         .  108,800,000 

And  we  should  have  as  a  basis  of  assessment 

under  the  single  tax  a  total   capitalised 

ground-rental  value  of  at  least.  .  .     $1,100,000,000 

At  5  per  cent    this  would  indicate  for  Boston 

a  ground  rent  of     .        .  .  .  .  $55,000,000 

or  considerably  more   that   double   the   total  taxes 
of  Bos  ton.  t 

♦The  official  figures  arc: 

Valuation  Rate  Tax 

Land $652,995,300  $15.90  $10,382,700 

Buildings 417,869,400  15.90  6,646,200 

Personalty 242,606,857  iS-9o  3^  57  AiS 

Si,3 13471,557  $20,886,335 
t  Boston's  income  from  taxation  for  1907  was: 

Land  values $10,382,628 

Buildings  and  other  improvements  ......  6,644,121 

Personal  estate 3,857^449 

Polls 369,966 

Corporation  taxes           ........  1,087,793 

Liquor  licences 1,079,  5^5 

Boston's  total  city  tax  (including  state  tax)         ....     $23,421,542 

•*See  p.  24,  lines  21-24  and  p.  32,  lines  8-13,  and  p.  41  (g). 


GROUND  RENT  A  SOCIAL  PRODUCT     19 

Even  if  $5,000,000  be  deducted  from  this  $55,000,000 
for  error  in  estimate,  there  will  still  be  left  $50,000,000, 
or  more  than  double  the  amount  of  present  taxes. 

It  is  believed  that  sufficient  reason  is  found  for  taking 
in  taxation  five-tenths,  instead  of  two-tenths,  in  the 
fact  that  since  ground  rent  is  a  social  product  its  taxa- 
tion is  in  no  way  a  burden  upon  business  or  industry. 

Having  now  finished  the  special  task  of  trying  to 
explain  ground  rent  in  its  leading  features,  it  is  a 
privilege  to  offer  a  few  words  of  tribute — and  sugges- 
tion— to  those  landlords  who  are  open  to  a  discussion 
of  this  vexed  question  of  taxation. 

Next  to  that  of  the  farmer,  the  province  and  function 
of  the  landlord  would  seem  to  be  one  of  the  greatest 
in  its  importance  to  his  fellow-men.  The  farmer  is 
the  commissary  of  subsistence;  the  landlord  is  quarter- 
master of  the  camp.  The  farmer  feeds  the  world; 
the  landlord  houses  the  world.  Besides  being  the 
natural  housers  and  the  natural  tax  gatherers,  the 
landlords  are  also  the  natural  assessors.  ''Nobody 
runs  after  the  assessor  to  tell  him  what  property  is 
worth.  Everybody  runs  after  the  landlord  to  tell 
him  what  his  land  is  worth."  With  this  triple  respon- 
sibility and  privilege  of  housing  and  tax  collecting  and 
tax  assessing,  landlords  ought  to  be,  as,  if  they  paid 
all  the  taxes,  they  would  be,  the  natural  guardians  of 
the  public  treasury  against  wastefulness  and  mis- 
application, for  the  simple  reason  that  ground  rent, 
while  increased  by  every  wise  outlay,  is  decreased  by 
every  unwise  expenditure. 

There  remain  to  be  considered  five  points  of  special 
appHcation  to  the  landlord's  interest,  viz. : 

The  taxation  of  real  estate  only;  the  tax  imposed  by 


20  THE  A  B  C  OF  TAXATION 

time;  corresponding   exemptions;   the   exemption   of 
assessed  value;  and  the  single  tax  as  an  income  tax. 

VIII.— The  Taxation  of  Real  Estate  Only 

Every  single  taxer,  no  doubt,  may  be  relied  upon  to 
vote  for  the  concentration  of  all  taxes  upon  real  estate 
(land  and  buildings),  as  a  rapid  transit  measure  toward 
his  preferred  exemption  of  buildings  also.  Such  a 
course  would  secure  a  basis  for  honest  assessment  and 
collection,  and  would  eliminate  the  possibility  of 
evasion,  but  how  much  of  an  advance  would  this  be 
toward  a  just  equalisation  of  the  burden?  The  land- 
lord of  a  new  building  would  still  be  paying,  as  he  does 
now,  the  taxes  of  an  adjoining  landlord  of  old  buildings 
or  of  none  at  all.  He  would  be  worse  off  by  his  dis- 
proportionate share  of  taxes  transferred  from  personal 
property. 

If  Smith  owns  land  and  buildings  in  equal  amount  he 

will  pay,  for  each  $i  ,000  of  land,  taxes  upon  .         .     $2,000 

If  Jones  owns  land  with  worthless  buildings,  or  none 
at  all,  he  will  pay,  for  each  $1,000  of  land,  taxes 
upon       .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .       1,000 

If  Brown  owns  his  own  house,  worth  three  times  as 
much  as  his  land,  he  will  pay,  for  each  $1,000  of 
land,  taxes  upon        ......       4,000 

Under  the  theory  that  taxes  are  absorbed  in  main- 
taining the  value  of  the  land,  as  indicated  by  the  equal 
or  even  greater  price  that  land  often  commands  when 
practically  unimproved  rather  than  improved,  it  is 
held  that  the  proportion  of  advantage  afforded  by  the 
public  outlay  is  fairly  represented  by  the  value  of  the 
land.  If  this  theory  is  sound,  then  neither  Smith,  who 
pays  twice  as  much  as  Jones,  nor  Brown,  who  pays 
four  times  as   much,  has  any  greater  command  per 


GROUND  RENT  A  SOCIAL  PRODUCT     21 

$1,000  than  has  Jones  over  the  facilities  afforded  by 
society  for  the  promotion  of  private  business. 

IX.— The  Tax  Imposed  by  Time 

A  representative  real  estate  man  of  Boston  has  said 
that  the  lifetime  of  the  best  new  buildings  in  the  city 
cannot  be  figured  to  exceed  two  score  years,  and  that 
with  swiftly  accelerating  changes  they  will  have  to 
give  way  in  forty  years  to  a  new  and  better  order. 
Granting  these  facts,  if  during  the  forty  years  the  new 
buildings  shall  yield  to  the  landlord  interest  upon  their 
cost  and  2^  per  cent  annually  for  depreciation,  he  is 
at  no  disadvantage  from  the  necessity  of  tearing  down 
and  building  greater,  while  both  labour,  which  builds 
buildings,  and  business,  which  uses  buildings,  will  be 
greatly  benefited  by  such  a  process.  What  a  paradise 
any  American  city  might  be  made  if  built  over  new 
every  forty  years!  Yet  the  users  of  the  buildings 
can  well  afford  to  pay  24  per  cent  a  year  for  such 
a  luxury. 

Any  sensible  readjustment  and  equalisation  of 
taxation  should  take  this  annual  depreciation  directly 
into  account  as  a  tax  imposed  by  time  upon  all  pro- 
ducts of  labour,  a  tax  so  heavy  as  to  seem  an  instant 
excuse  for  exempting  them  from  all  other  taxes. 

On  the  other  hand,  while  time  is  engaged  in  the 
destruction  of  the  building,  it  is  occupied  in  the  con- 
struction of  the  land  value. 

A  conspicuous  example  of  the  contrariety  of  this 
time  agency  is  found  in  the  biography  of  a  once  modern 
building  that  in  1870  supplanted  a  colonial  residence 
which  for  several  years  previous  to  1809  was  the 
residence  of  John  Quincy  Adams. 


22 


THE  A  B  C  OF  TAXATION 


AN  OBJECT  LESSON 

Growth  of  Land   Values   vs.   Decay  of  Buildings 


The  Hotel  Boylston,  S.  E.  corner  of  Eoylston  and  Tremont  Streets,  Boston, 
known  also  as  the  Charles  Francis  Adams  Building,  on  the  site  of  the  present 
Hotel  Touraine. 


Valuation 


Labour 


1.  Labour  constructs  the  building  as  a  basis  of  taxation. 

2.  Labour  pays  its  taxes,  insurance,  and  repairs. 


3.  Labour,  at  the  end  of  twenty-five  years, builds  a  new  building  in  place  of 
the  old  one  which  has  entirely  disappeared;  that  is,  it  renews  the  very  basis 
itself  of  taxation  for  another  twenty-five  years. 


THE  LAND 

Increased  in  value  in  twenty-five  years 
more  than  threefold 


Land 

1.  Land  starts  with  a  basis  made  by  other  people's  labour. 

2.  Land  apparently  pays  its  taxes  at  same  rate  as  the  building,  but  pays  no 
insurance  or  repairs. 

3.  Land,  at  end  of  twenty-five  years,  has  increased  its  basis  threefold  through 
other  people's  labour,  and  its  income  in  proportion.  Under  the  present 
crooked  system,  the  distribution  of  untaxed  wealth  is  according  to  special 
privilege;  its  taxation,  according  to  ability  (i.  e.,  according  to  production). 
Under  straight  single  tax  it  would  be  the  very  reverse.  The  distribution  would 
be  according  to  ability  (i.  e.,  according  to  production)  while  taxation  would  be 
according  to  special  privilege.  It  is  this  right-about-face  in  taxation  to  which 
this  illustration  is  addressed. 


GROUND  RENT  A  SOCIAL  PRODUCT      23 

The  inequality  of  the  present  system  of  taxation  is 
apparent  in  the  following  calculation  (based  upon  the 
above  assumption  of  2J  per  cent  depreciation) 
regarding  the  land  and  buildings  of  Boston  for 
the  last  twenty  years,  bearing  in  mind,  that  it  is  not 
the  rent,  either  of  buildings  or  land,  that  is  under 
consideration,  but  only  the  effect  of  taxes  and  deprecia- 
tion upon  the  one,  and  the  opposite  effects  of  taxes 
and  appreciation  upon  the  other. 

BUILDINGS 

The  valuation  of  Boston's  buildings  In  1887 

was J^223,ooo,ooo 

If  time's  annual  tax  or  depreciation  of  2^  per 

cent    (besides  the  city's  tax  of    i^  per  cent 

which  is  paid  by  the  owner  only  when  he  is 

also  the  tenant)  has  been  for  twenty  years 

50  per  cent  or 111,500,000 

Then  the  value  of  same  buildings  in  1907  is  only      ^111,500,000 

LAND 

The  valuation  of  Boston's  land  in  1887  was        .       $322,000,000 
Time's  average  net  annual  appreciation  has 

been   (after  paying  city's  tax  of  l^  per  cent) 

for  each  year  5  per  cent  and  for  twenty  years 

more  than  100  per  center    ....         331,000,000 

And  the  value  of  the  same  land  in  1907  is  .       $653,000,000 

Thus  the  increase  in  the  valuation  of  land 
in  tvN'enty  years  is  nearly  50  per  cent  more 
than  was  the  valuation  of  all  the  buildings 
twenty  years  ago. 

Five  per  cent  on  this  twenty  years*  increase  of 
§331,000,000  ivould  be  116,650,000,  which,  added  to  the 
$4,300,000  assessed  upon  the  land  in  1887,  would  be 
§20,900,000,  as  compared  with  Boston  s  taxes  of 
121,254,000  in  1907. 

Those  who  agree  with  John  Stuart  Mill  that  it  would 
be  sound  public  policy  and  no  injustice  to  land  owners 


24  THE  A  B  C  OF  TAXATION 

to  take  for  public  purposes  the  future  increase  in  ground 
rent  will  be  interested  to  note  what  an  opportunity  for 
putting  such  a  plan  in  operation  in  Boston  is  shown  by 
the  above  figures  to  have  been  lost  twenty  years  ago. 

X. — Corresponding  Exemptions 

In  any  calculation  of  the  effect  of  the  imposition  of 
all  taxes  upon  ground  rent,  it  must  be  borne  in  mind 
that  the  landlords,  who  are  the  owners  of  the  ground 
rents,  also  own  buildings  and  other  improvements  upon 
the  land,  together  with  a  large  per  cent  of  the  personal 
property,  so  that  they,  as  a  class,  would  fmd  the 
additional  tax  upon  their  land  offset  by  the  exemption 
of  buildings  and  personal  property. 

XI. — The  Exemption  of  Assessed  Values 

One  reason  why,  under  a  just  system  of  taxation, 
large-hearted  landlords  would  cheerfully  offer  their 
necks  to  the  tax  yoke  is  the  fact  that  so  far  as  concerns 
their  investment  in  land  most  of  them  are  now  privileged 
to  be  entirely  exempt.  In  other  words,  the  present 
tax  is  not  a  tax  burden  upon  them,  even  though  this 
fact  is  not  to  their  prejudice.  But  while  it  is  true  that 
the  capitalised  value  of  any  tax  on  land  is  deducted 
from  its  selling  price,  and  that  any  purchaser,  after  the 
tax  is  once  imposed,  gets  his  land  tax  free,*  so  that 
the  landowners  of  Boston  who  have  bought  their 
holdings  since  the  present  tax  rate  was  reached  are 
practically  exempt  from  taxation,  it  is  also  true  that 

♦A  tax,  as  a  first  lien,  is  practically  a  first  mortgage  to  which  any  regular 
mortgage  must  be  second.  The  cflect  of  the  tax  in  the  first  case  and  the 
mortgage  interest  in  the  second  case  upon  the  selling  value  of  land  is  exactly 
the  same.  When  the  State  imposed  a  tax  of  $io  upon  a  lot  of  land  hitherto 
untaxed  and  worth  $i,ooo,  the  effect  upon  the  selling  value  was  the  same 
as  though  it  had  taken  a  f.rst  mortgage  of  $2Cxd,  leaving  to  the  owner  as  the 
selling  value  an  equity  of  J) 800. 


GROUND  RENT  A  SOCIAL  PRODUCT     25 

the  appreciation  in  the  value  of  their  land  may  be 
fairly  reckoned  as  an  offset  to  the  imposition  of  any 
new  tax  upon  it. 

This  present  exemption,  however,  is  not  offered  as 
a  reason  for  additional  taxation,  but  rather  as  a 
justification  for  taking  the  opportunity  to  transfer 
the  present  load  from  the  head  and  the  tail  to  the  back 
and  shoulders  of  the  horse.  As  an  anti-single-tax 
professor  of  political  economy  happily  puts  it:  "The 
beauty,  to  my  mind,  of  a  tax  upon  land  values  is  that 
in  a  few  years  nobody  pays  it." 

XII.— The  Single  Tax  as  an  Income  Tax 

An  income  tax  has  always  been  a  favourite  form  of 
tax,  because  it  has  been  regarded  as  well  calculated  to 
bear  upon  "  each  according  to  his  ability."  The  taxa- 
tion of  ground  rent  would  surely  be  the  purest  possible 
exemplification  and  application  of  the  principle  of  the 
income  tax,  because  it  would  fall  upon  all  those  in- 
comes which  are  unearned,  which  are  in  their  nature 
perpetual,  and  which  are  amply  able  to  bear  the 
whole  burden  of  taxation.  Of  course,  such  an  income 
tax  should  have  impartial  application.  A  large  un- 
earned income  should  be  taxed  at  the  same  rate  as  a 
small  income  of  the  same  nature  and  derived  from  the 
same  source.  If  it  is  right  that  corporations  or  other 
aggregations  of  capital  should  engage  in  business 
enterprises  for  profit  upon  equal  terms  with  indi- 
viduals, then  it  is  right  that  an  impartial  income 
tax  should  impose  at  least  the  same  rate  upon  the 
many  million  dollar  incomes  of  the  railroads  and  the 
coal  operators,  and  United  States  steel  companies, 
as  upon  smaller  unearned  incomes  of  one,  five,  or 
ten  thousand  dollars,  derived  from  the  same  source. 


26  THE  A  B  C  OF  TAXATION 

If  eight  hundred  and  fifty  industrial  combinations  or 
trusts  have  a  capital  stock  of  nine  billions,  of  which 
five  billions  are  represented  by  common  stock  —  and 
that  common  stock,  water  —  it  means  that  every  i  per 
cent  (150,000,000)  or  every  5  percent  ($250,000,000) 
received  in  dividends  on  this  common  stock  is,  as  an  in- 
come from  rent,  unearned  by  the  people  who  receive  it. 
An  income  from  special  privilege  is  usually  part  and 
parcel  with  an  income  from  rent,  and,  as  such,  belongs 
to  the  class  of  unearned  incomes.  As  ground  rent 
is  a  social  product,  its  private  appropriation  is  a  special 
privilege,  which  affords  large  private  profit  at  public 
expense.  Why  not,  then,  at  least  tax  such  a  privilege 
upon  what  it  is  worth? 

The  gross  income  of  the  owners  of  the  land  of 

Boston  in  the  form  of  ground  rent  is        .  .       ^55,000,000 

Or  ^90  per  capita. 

And  there  is  now  taken  in  taxation  only      .  .         10,300,000 

Hence  the  amount  that  is  distributed  annually 
in  unearned  incomes  (if  rent  is  an  unearned 
income)  is ^^44,700,000 

This  amount  is  equivalent  to  $75  per  capita  for  the 
600,000  population,  or  to  I375  for  each  of  the  120,000 
families  of  five  persons  each. 

Boston's  total  taxes  for  the  year  1907  amounted  to 
$40  per  capita.  If  all  of  this  $40  had  been  taken  from 
the  above  $90  there  would  still  have  been  left  to  the 
landlords  I50  of  ground  rent  per  capita  (equivalent  to 
$250  for  each  of  the  120,000  families),  besides  the 
exemption  of  $660,000,000  of  buildings,  personal 
property,  and  polls. 

Is  it  even  apparently  fair  to  let  so  much  common 
wealth  escape  taxation  at  the  expense  of  individual 
wealth? 


GROUND  RENT  A  SOCIAL  PRODUCT     27 

The  fifty-five  millions  are,  we  submit,  the  "income" 
in  very  truth  earned  by  the  city  and  people  of  Boston 
—  created  by  their  actual  labour  and  actual  expendi- 
ture. Under  the  single  tax  Boston  would  pay  all  its 
current  expenses  out  of  this  legitimate  $55,000,000 
income  of  its  own,  earned  by  itself,  instead  of  allow- 
ing four-fifths,  or  $45,000,000,  of  this  amount  to  be 
divided,  through  the  channel  of  special  privilege,  into 
unearned  incomes,  thus  aggravating  those  inequalities 
in  distribution  of  wealth  which  people  are  wont  to 
declaim  against  as  partial  and  wrong. 

While  that  part  of  the  ground  rent  of  Boston  that 
goes  to  individuals  may  be  said  to  be  unearned  by 
them,  the  whole  of  it  can  hardly  be  said  to  be  unearned, 
because,  having  been  produced  by  society,  it  may 
truthfully  be  said  to  be  earned  by  society,  and  hence 
it  may  go  to  it  as  its  wages,  just  as  properly  as  his 
earnings  go  to  the  individual  who  works  for  wages. 
If  a  railroad  has  the  special  privilege  of  a  monopoly 
in  the  transportation  of  coal  from  the  Pennsylvania 
coal  mines,  or  in  the  transportation  of  people,  why 
not  tax  the  railroad  in  proportion  to  the  value  of  its 
franchise?  The  private  monopoly  of  a  natural 
resource  is  a  special  privilege.  If  the  private  owner- 
ship of  the  two  or  three  billion  tons  of  unmined  anthra- 
cite coal  is  a  special  privilege,  why  not  tax  it  what 
others  would  give  for  the  privilege  of  mining  and 
marketing  it,  thus  making  all  the  people  sharers  in 
what  is  called  a  natural  bounty?  If  the  private  appro- 
priation of  a  billion  dollars'  worth  of  iron  ore  is  a 
special  privilege,  would  it  not  be  "proportionate  and 
reasonable"  for  its  owners  to  pay  in  taxation  one- 
half  at  least  of  the  value  of  that  privilege?  It  is 
becoming  common  to  scold  about  trusts  and  monopo- 


28  THE  A  B  C  OF  TAXATION 

lies,  coal  barons,  oil  magnates,  and  railroad  kings, 
but  many  people  do  not  think  of  the  perfectly  natural 
resort  of  taxing  them  to  the  same  extent  that  other 
people  are  being  taxed. 

This  bugbear  of  monopoly  is  the  central  point 
at  which  numberless  palliatives  are  ineffectively  aimed. 
Taxation,  it  will  be  found,  is  the  only  "power  to 
destroy"  what  there  is  of  wrong,  and  the  only  "power 
to  build  up"  what  is  right  in  these  conditions. 

XIII. — The  Opinions  of  Economists 

Concerning  the  first  generic  peculiarity  of  land, 
the  following  statements  gleaned  from  some  of  the 
world's  greatest  thinkers  in  the  field  of  economics 
and  public  finance,  who,  however,  have  approached 
the  subject  from  another  point  of  view,  support  the 
contention  of  this  chapter  that  the  value  of  land  is  a 
social  product: 

"  Both  ground  rents  and  tlie  ordinary  rent  of  land  are  a 
species  of  revenue  which  the  owner,  in  many  cases,  enjoys 
without  any  care  or  attention  of  his  own.  Though  a  part  of 
this  revenue  should  be  taken  from  him  in  order  to  defray  the 
expenses  of  the  State,  no  discouragement  will  thereby  be  given 
to  any  sort  of  industry.  The  annual  produce  of  the  land  and 
labour  of  the  society,  the  real  wealth  and  revenue  of  the  great 
body  of  the  people,  might  be  the  same  after  such  a  tax  as  before. 
Ground  rents,  and  the  ordinary  rent  of  land,  are,  therefore, 
perhaps  the  species  of  revenue  which  can  best  bear  to  have  a 
peculiar  tax  imposed  upon  them. 

**  Ground  rents  seem,  in  this  respect,  a  more  proper  subject 
of  peculiar  taxation  than  even  the  ordinary  rent  of  land.  The 
ordinary  rent  of  land  is,  in  many  cases,  owing  partly  at  least  to 
the  attention  and  good  management  of  the  landlord.  A  very 
heavy  tax  might  discourage  too  much  this  attention  and  good 
management.     Ground  rents,  so  far  as  they  exceed  the  ordinary 


GROUND  RENT  A  SOCIAL  PRODUCT     29 

rent  of  land,  are  altogether  owing  to  the  good  government  of  the 
sovereign,  which,  by  protecting  the  industry  either  of  the  whole 
people,  or  of  the  inhabitants  of  some  particular  place,  enables 
them  to  pay  so  much  more  than  its  real  value  for  the  ground 
which  they  build  their  houses  upon;  or  make  to  its  owner  so 
much  more  than  compensation  for  the  loss  which  he  might 
sustain  by  this  use  of  it.  Nothing  can  be  more  reasonable  than 
that  a  fund  which  owes  its  existence  to  the  good  government  of 
the  State,  should  be  taxed  peculiarly,  or  should  contribute 
something  more  than  the  greater  part  of  other  funds,  toward 
the  support  of  that  government." — Adam  Smith,  "  Wealth  of 
Nations,"  Book  F.,  Chapter  11. ,  Part  2,  Art,  I. 

"The  ordinary  progress  of  a  society  which  increases  in 
wealth  is  at  all  times  tending  to  augment  the  incomes  of  land- 
lords; to  give  them  both  a  greater  amount  and  a  greater  propor- 
tion of  the  wealth  of  the  community,  independently  of  any 
trouble  or  outlay  incurred  by  themselves.  They  grow  richer, 
as  it  were  in  their  sleep,  without  working,  risking,  or 
economising." — John  Stuart  Mill,  ^^ Principles  of  Political 
Economy,"  Book  V.,  Chapter  IL,  Sec.  5,  Par.  2. 

"  Ground  rent  is  the  advantage  accruing  to  landowners  from 
the  use  of  certain  uncreated  or  socially  created  powers  and 
utilities  connected  with  land,  including,  besides  mere  fertility 
of  soil,  also  mineral  wealth,  water    privileges,    location,    etc. 

"Let  a  considerable  number  of  human  beings  settle  in  a 
new  country:  special  value  instantly  attaches  to  particular 
localities,  and  this  with  no  act  of  creation  save  the  act  of  the 
people  in  coming  there.  .  .  .  Such  dearness,  springing 
though  it  does  from  a  sort  of  human  agency,  is  not  the  product 
of  conscious  doing  on  the  part  of  any  one  person.  In  bringing 
it  into  being,  A,  B,  and  C  were  instruments,  not  agents." — 
Andrews,  ""Institutes  of  Economics,"  p.  168,  and  footnote. 

"The  utility  of  a  piece  of  land  may  be  increased  by  the 
natural  growth  of  the  community,  when  no  labour  is  exerted 
directly  to  increase  the  usefulness  of  the  particular  tract  of 


30  THE  A  B  C  OF  TAXATION 

ground/' — Bullock^  *^  Introduction  to  the  Study  of  Economics  " 
p.  Ii6. 

"The  growth  of  the  city  occasions  unusual  expenditures;  the 
growth  of  the  city  also  creates  unusual  values.  Why  should 
not  the  values  which  the  city  creates  go  to  bear  the  expenses 
which  the  city  occasions  ? 

"The  volume  of  traffic  on  a  street  railway  increases  with  the 
increase  in  municipal  population,  and  the  receipts  of  the 
company  on  this  account  grow  more  rapidly  than  do  the  operat- 
ing expenditures  which  the  increased  traffic  occasions.  .  .  . 
Now  it  is  this  income  to  which  a  franchise  tax  should  address 
itself.  .  .  .  One  might,  then,  say  that  by  means  of  the 
franchise  tax  the  State  taxes  its  social  earnings  from  the  capital 
which  it  has  created,  but  which  for  reasons  of  public  policy  it 
assigns  to  private  parties  for  administration." — Adams, 
*' Science  of  Finance,"  pp.  JO^  and  380, 

XI V . — Conclusion 

Throughout  this  chapter  the  impelling  aim  has 
been  to  invite  and  promote  the  understanding  of 
ground  rent,  an  agency  clear  to  few,  very  obscure  to 
many,  but  as  subtle  and  powerful  in  the  social  orga- 
nism as  is  the  life-blood  in  the  human  organism. 

Legislatures  and  Congresses  are  prevented  by  incon- 
venient distance  from  revising  and  improving  the 
planetary  laws,  but  they  busy  themselves  with  the 
enactment  of  statute  after  statute  designed  to  keep 
men  and  women  in  their  natural  orbits.  Discerning, 
as  we  surely  do,  a  natural  law  in  the  material  world, 
established  by  a  Law-giver  greater  than  any  state  or 
nation,  we  urge  simply  a  repeal  one  by  one  of  all 
artificial  tax  laws,  putting  upon  the  statute  book 
instead  a  single  one  —  an  enacting  clause  to  this 
natural  law  —  under  which  every  American  city  may 
begin  at  once  to  administer  the  single  tax  remedy. 


Chapter  II 


B 


THE  SECOND  GENERIC  PECULIARITY  OF  LAND 

A  TAX  UPON  ECONOMIC  RENT  CANNOT  BE 
SHIFTED 

A  TAX  UPON  GROUND  RENT  CANNOT  BE  SHIFTED  UPON 
THE  TENANT  BY  INCREASING  THE  RENT.  IF  IT 
COULD,  THE  SELLING  VALUE  OF  LAND  WOULD  NOT 
BE  REDUCED,  AS  IT  NOW  IS,  BY  THE  CAPITALISED 
TAX  THAT  IS  IMPOSED  UPON  IT 

THE  question  is  whether,  if  a  new  tax  should  be 
put  upon  land,  the  owner  would  not  escape  by 
adding  it  to  his  tenant's  rent? 

It  is  not  a  suificient  answer  to  quote  the  authorities: 
the  query  still  remains,  what  are  the  arguments  upon 
which  the  authorities  rely?  Following  is  an  attempt 
at  the  clear  statement  which  these  arguments  deserve. 

Ground  rent,  "what  land  is  worth  for  use,"  is  deter- 
mined, not  by  taxation,  but  by  demand.  Ground 
rent  is  the  gross  income,  what  the  user  pays  for  the 
use  of  land;  a  tax  is  in  the  nature  of  a  charge  upon 
this  income,  similar  to  the  incumbrance  of  mortgage 
interest.  It  is  a  matter  of  every-day  knowledge  that 
even  though  land  be  mortgaged  nearly  to  its  full  value, 
no  one  would  think  for  a  moment  that  the  owner  could 


32  THE  A  B  C  OF  TAXATION 

rid  himself  of  the  mortgage  interest  that  he  has  to  pay 
through  raising  his  tenant's  rent  by  a  corresponding 
amount.  Mortgage  interest  is  a  lien  held  by  an 
individual;  similarly  a  tax  may  be  clearly  conceived 
as  a  lien  held  by  the  State.  Both  affect  the  relation 
between  the  property  owner  and  lien  holder;  neither 
has  any  bearing  upon  the  relations  between  owner  and 
tenant.  "Tax"  is  simply  the  name  of  that  part  of  the 
gross  ground  rent  which  is  taken  by  the  State  in  taxa- 
tion, the  other  part  going  to  the  owner;  the  ratio  these 
two  parts  bear  to  one  another  has  no  effect  upon  the 
gross  rent  figure,  which  is  always  the  sum  of  these  two 
parts,  viz.,  net  rent  plus  tax.  The  greater  the  tax,  the 
smaller  the  net  rent  to  the  owner,  and  vice  versa. 
Ground  rent  is,  as  a  rule,  "all  the  traffic  will  bear"; 
that  is,  the  owner  gets  all  he  can  for  use  of  his  land, 
whether  the  tax  be  light  or  heavy.  Putting  more  tax 
upon  land  will  not  make  it  worth  any  more  for  use,  will 
not  increase  the  desire  for  it  by  competitors  for  its 
tenancy,  will  not  increase  its  market  value. 

To  illustrate,  let  us  consider  the  case  of  a  piece  of 
land  for  which  the  landowner  gets  |i  ,000  rent  from  the 
man  who  uses  it. 

First :  The  owner,  let  us  say,  pays  over  to  the  city 
in  taxes  1 100  of  this  $1,000  rent.  Is  there  any  indi- 
cation that  this  $100  tax  has  any  influence  in  fixing 
the  present  rent  at  1 1,000? 

Second:  Let  us  suppose  that  next  year  the  city 
decides  to  take  another  $100  of  the  $1 ,000  rent  in  taxes. 
Could  the  owner  then  add  the  $200  tax  to  the  tenant's 
rent,  making  it  $1,200? 

Third:  Let  us  suppose  that  the  following  year  the 
tax  is  increased  by  another  $100  and  so  on,  by  an  annual 


RENT  TAX  CANNOT  BE  SHIFTED        33 

increase,  until,  for  extreme  illustration,  the  tax  is 
$1,000,  an  amount  equal  to  the  entire  rent;  would  such 
a  condition  make  it  possible  for  the  owner  to  raise  his 
tenant's  land  rent  to  |2,ooo? 

These  questions  would  seem  to  answer  themselves 
in  the  negative,  and  thus  bring  us  to  a  fair  conclusion 
in  the  matter. 

What  the  Authorities  Say  of  This  Second 
Generic  Peculiarity  of  Land,  That  a  Tax 
upon  Its  Rent  Cannot  Be  Shifted 

"The  weight  of  authority  upon  such  a  question  is  worthy  of 
attention,  although  by  no  means  decisive.  Now,  while  a  few 
respectable  and  sincere  students  of  economic  science  hold  to  the 
doctrine  of  transferability  of  the  ground-rent  tax  to  the  tenants, 
no  one  will  dispute  that  an  overwhelming  weight  of  authority 
both  in  numbers  and  in  reputation,  scout  that  doctrine  as 
absurd.  Not  only  the  entire  school  of  Ricardo  and  Mill,  but 
also  nine-tenths  or  more  of  other  economic  writers  make  it  a 
fundamental  doctrine  of  their  science  that  such  a  tax  never  can 
be  transferred  to  tenants."  —  Thomas  G.  Shearman^  ^^Natural 
Taxation,"  pp.  I2g-IJ2. 

"Though  the  landlord  is  In  all  cases  the  real  contributor,  the 
tax  is  commonly  advanced  by  the  tenant,  to  whom  the  landlord 
is  obliged  to  allow  it  in  payment  of  the  rent." — Adam  Smith, 
''health  of    Nations,"   Book   F.,  Chapter  II.,  Part  2,  Art  I. 

"A  land  tax,  levied  in  proportion  to  the  rent  of  land,  and 
varying  with  every  variation  of  rent,  is  in  effect  a  tax  on  rent; 
and  such  a  tax  will  not  apply  to  that  land  which  yields  no 
rent,  nor  to  the  produce  of  that  capital  which  is  employed  on  the 
land  with  a  view  to  profit  merely,  and  which  never  pays  rent; 
it  will  not  in  any  way  affect  the  price  of  raw  produce,  but  will 
fall  wholly  on  the  landlords." — Ricardo,  ''Principles  of  Political 
Economy  and  Taxation,"  McCulloch's  edition,  p.  lOJ. 


34  THE  A  B  C  OF  TAXATION 

"A  tax  on  rent  would  affect  rent  only;  it  would  fall  wholly  on 
landlords,  and  could  not  be  shifted.  The  landlord  could  not 
raise  his  rent,  because  he  would  have  unaltered  the  difference 
between  the  produce  obtained  from  the  least  productive  land  in 
cultivation,  and  that  obtained  from  land  of  every  other  quality.'* 
— Ricardoy  ^'Principles  of  Political  Economy  and  Taxation," 
Chapter  X.,  Section  62. 

"A  tax  on  rents  falls  wholly  on  the  landlord.  There  are  no 
means  by  which  he  can  shift  the  burden  upon  any  one  else. 
.  .  .  A  tax  on  rent,  therefore,  has  no  effect  other  than  its 
obvious  one.  It  merely  takes  so  much  from  the  landlord  and 
transfers  it  to  the  State."— Jo^n  Stuan  Mill,  ''Principles  of 
Political  Economy"  Book  V.,  Chapter  III.,  Section  2. 

"The  power  of  transferring  a  tax  from  the  person  who  actually 
pays  it  to  some  other  person  varies  with  the  object  taxed.  A 
tax  on  rents  cannot  be  transferred.  A  tax  on  commodities  is 
always  transferred  to  the  consumer."  —  Thorold  Rogers, 
"Political  Economy"  2nd  edition.  Chapter  XXL,  p.  28^. 

"A  land  tax  levied  in  proportion  to  the  rent  of  land,  and 
varying  with  every  variation  of  rents  .  .  .  will  fall  wholly 
on  the  landlords." — "Walker,  "Political  Economy,"  edition  of 
1887,  p.  413,  quoting  Ricardo  approvingly. 

"A  tax  laid  upon  rent  is  borne  solely  by  the  owner  of  land.'* 
— B  as  com.  Treatise,  p.  ISQ- 

"Some  of  the  early  German  writers  on  public  finance,  such  as 
Sartorius,  Hoffman,  and  Murhard,  went  so  far  as  to  declare 
that,  because  of  this  capitalisation,  a  land  tax  is  no  tax  at  all. 
Since  it  acts  as  a  rent  charge  capitalised  in  the  decreased  value 
of  the  land,  they  argue,  a  land  tax  involves  a  confiscation  of  the 
property  of  the  original  owner.  On  the  other  hand,  since  the 
future  possessors  would  otherwise  go  scot  free,  it  becomes 
necessary  to  levy  some  other  kind  of  a  tax  on  them." — E.  R.  A. 
Seligman,  "Incidence  of  Taxation,"  p.  139. 


RENT  TAX  CANNOT  BE  SHIFTED       35 

"The  incidence  of  the  ground  tax,  in  other  words,  is  on  the 
landlord.  He  has  no  means  ot  shifting  it;  for,  if  the  tax  were 
to  be  suddenly  abolished,  he  would  nevertheless  be  able  to 
extort  the  same  rent,  since  the  ground  rent  is  fixed  solely  by 
the  demand  of  the  occupiers.  The  tax  simply  diminishes  his 
profits." — E.  R.  A.  Seligman,  "Incidence  of  Taxation,'*  pp. 
244,  245. 

"If  land  is  taxed  according  to  its  pure  rent,  virtually  all  writers 
since  Ricardo  agree  that  the  tax  will  fall  wholly  on  the  land- 
owner, and  that  it  cannot  be  shifted  to  any  other  class,  whether 
tenant-farmer  or  consumer.  .  .  .  The  point  is  so 
universally  accepted  as  to  require  no  further  discussion.  .  .  . 
A  permanent  tax  on  rent  is  thus  not  shifted  to  the  consumer,  nor 
does  it  rest  on  the  landowner  who  has  bought  since  the  tax 
was  imposed." — E.  R.  A.  Seltgmany  "Incidence  of  Taxation/* 
pp.  222,  223. 

**With  these  assumptions,  it  is  quite  clear  that  the  tax  on 
economic  rent  cannot  be  transferred  to  the  consumer  of  the 
produce,  owing  to  the  competition  of  the  marginal  land  that 
pays  no  rent,  and  therefore  no  tax,  nor  to  the  farmer,  since 
competition  leaves  him  only  ordinary  profits. 

The  amount  of  each  particular  rental  depends  upon  units 
of  surplus  produced  (varying  to  any  extent  according  to  the 
superior  natural  conditions),  and  on  the  marginal  price,  which 
is  independent  of  these  superior  conditions,  and  accordingly, 
a  tax  that  strikes  the  surplus  only,  remains  where  it  first  falls." 
— Nicholson,  "Principles  of  Political  Economy,"  Book  V., 
Chapter  XL,  Sections  I  and  4. 


Chapter  III 


c 


THE  THIRD  GENERIC  PECULIARITY  OF  LAND 

THE  SELLING  VALUE  OF  LAND  AN  UNTAXED 
VALUE 

EVERY  LANDOWNER  IS  EXEMPT  FROM  TAXATION  ON 
HIS  INVESTMENT,  TO  THE  EXTENT  OF  THE  TAX 
TO  WHICH  HIS  LAND  WAS  SUBJECT  AT  TIME  OF 
HIS  PURCHASE,  AND  THEREFORE,  PRACTICALLY 
SPEAKING.  NEARLY  ALL  LAND  IS  TO-DAY  OWNED 
FREE  OF  ANY  TAX   BURDEN 

The  purpose  of  the  following  illustration*  is  to 
make  clear  by  means  of  iteration  and  reiteration 
two  facts,  viz. : 

Fact  I.  The  land  ownerf  of  to-day  who  has  pur- 
chased since  the  present  tax  was  imposed  escapes 
taxation  upon  his  investment. 

Fact  1 1.  The  burden  of  a  land  tax  cannot  be  made 
to  survive  a  change  of  ownership. 


*  The  statements  and  arguments  used  in  this  illustration  deal  only  with  the 
general  principles  of  taxation,  and  assume  such  conditions  as  prevail  in  the 
United  States,  including  for  instance,  lack  of  universality  and  uniformity  in 
taxation.      Single  tax  terms  and  arguments  are  studiously  excluded. 

■j-  Care  is  taken  to  designate  owner  and  user  in  their  respective  capacities, 
■whether  they  be  two  persons,  or  two  combined  in  one. 

36 


VALUE  OF  LAND  AN  UNTAXED  VALUE  37 

The  illustration  is  intended  to  show  the  effect  in  a 
normal  or  advancing  community  of  mortgage  interest 
and  taxes  upon  the  market  value  and  cost  to  the  user 
of  a  lot  of  land  and  a  house  respectively  having  equal 
purchase  and  rental  value.,  and  each  subject  to  the 
same  mortgage  interest  and  taxes. 

first:  the  land 

Proposition  i. — Let  it  be  supposed  that  you  want  a 
piece  of  urban  land  that  is  worth  I300  a  year  to  you  for 
use.  You  can  afford  to  pay  $300  a  year  and  no  more, 
and  it  can  be  had  at  an  annual  cost  of  $300  a  year. 

Let  us  then  proceed  to  acquire  this  piece  of  land, 
exercising  diligence  and  caution  to  profit  by  each  step 
in  the  transaction. 

(a)  At  the  very  outset  the  question  arises,  what  is 
the  thing  for  which  you  are  proposing  to  pay  I300? 
Surely  it  is  not  the  soil  itself,  because  it  is  a  question 
of  a  building  site,  which  could  be  had  out  in  the  country 
for  little  or  nothing.  It  is  not  merely  the  area  upon 
which  to  dig  a  hole  in  the  ground,  wall  it  about,  and 
erect  a  building,  for  the  same  space  can  be  had  else- 
where for  a  song.  In  short,  it  is  not  the  earth's  sur- 
face; it  is  not  the  inherent  capabilities  of  the  soil; 
it  is  not  light  and  air,  or  other  bounties  of  nature 
resident  in  that  lot  of  land;  it  is  not  natural 
resources  of  which  you  are  thinking  as  worth  to 
you  I300  a  year. 

Q})  But  what  you  are  going  to  pay  for  is  the  accom- 
panying and  incidental  use  of  a  great  many  expensive 
things  outside  of  the  piece  of  land,  things  which  you 
will  need  and  must  have,  which  you  cannot  afford  to 


38  THE  A  B  C  OF  TAXATION 

provide  at  your  own  expense,  but  for  the  use  of  which 
you  can  afford  to  pay  in  proportion  as  you  use  them. 
It  is  these  outside  things,  available  by  their  proximity, 
for  which  you  are  called  upon  to  pay  I300  a  year. 
To  enumerate  some  of  them  specifically,  they  are,  in 
a  town  or  city  lot,  right  and  ease  of  access  to  water, 
health  inspection,  sewerage,  fire  protection,  police, 
schools,  libraries,  museums,  parks,  play-grounds,  steam 
and  electric  railway  service,  gas  and  electric  lighting, 
telegraph  and  telephone  service,  subways,  ferries, 
churches,  public  schools,  private  schools,  colleges, 
universities,  public  buildings  —  utilities  which  depend 
for  their  efficiency  and  economy  on  the  character  of 
the  government;  which  collectively  constitute  the 
economic  and  social  advantages  of  the  land;  and 
which  are  due  to  the  presence  and  activity  of  popu- 
lation, and  are  inseparable  therefrom,  including  the 
benefit  of  proximity  to  and  command  of  facilities  for 
commerce  and  communication  with  the  world  —  an 
artificial  value  created  primarily  through  public 
expenditure  of  taxes.  In  practice,  the  term  "land" 
is  erroneously  made  to  include  destructible  elements 
which  require  constant  replenishment;  but  these 
form  no  part  of  this  economic  advantage  of  situation 
or  site  value. 

(c)  In  other  words,  you  are  to  pay  I300  a  year  for  the 
value  of  what  the  law  calls  the  "  rights  and  privileges 
thereto  pertaining,"  specified  in  every  deed  of  land 
conveyance.  This  I300  is  ground  rent,  "what  the 
land  is  worth  for  use." 

Proposition  2. —  Assuming  this  piece  of  land  to  be 
free  from  all  charges  and  incumbrances,  and  assuming 
the  current  rate  of  interest  to  be  5  per  cent  per  annum, 


VALUE  OF  LAND  AN  UNTAXED  VALUE  39 

you  would  purchase  the  lot  for  $6,000,  because  interest 
upon  that  sum  would  amount  to  the  stipulated  $300  a 
year.  But  if,  on  the  contrary,  the  lot  hears  a  mortgage 
of  |2,ooo,  upon  which  the  annual  interest  charge  is  $100, 
then  the  lot  will  cost  you  14,000. 

(a)  The  mortgage  interest  charge  of  $100  reduces 
the  selling  price  of  the  land  by  the  amount  of  the  mort- 
gage, $2,000,  and  you  will  buy  the  land,  not  at  $6,000, 
but  at  $4,000,  the  value  of  the  equity  remaining  after 
mortgage  interest  has  been  paid. 

ih)  By  purchasing  title  you  will  assume  the  mort- 
gage and  will  pay  the  mortgage  interest,  $100,  but 
that  $100  will  not  come  out  of  your  $200,  the  net 
income  from  your  investment  of  $4,000;  it  will  come 
out  of  the  gross  income,  the  ground  rent,  $300.  It  is 
a  part  of,  and  not  an  addition  to,  the  ground  rent. 
You  will  pay  the  interest,  but  you  will  not  bear  it, 
because  you  will  have  bought  yourself  clear  of  the 
burden. 

(c)  The  lot  will  thus  cost  you  annually  for  use, 
interest  on  your  purchase  price  ($4,000  at  5  per  cent) 
$200,  plus  mortgage  interest  ($2,000  at  5  per  cent) 
$100,  equal  in  all  to  $300,  all  that  the  land  is  worth 
for  use,  use  being  the  only  relation  of  land  to  man  with 
which  economics  has  reasonable  concern. 

Proposition  3.  —  But,  besides  being  subject  to  a 
mortgage  of  $2,000,  assume  further  that  this  lot  of  land 
is  subject  also  to  an  old  tax"^  of  $100,  which  charge  the 
purchaser  must  also  assume.  You  will  then  purchase 
the  land  not  at  $4,000,  but  at  $2,000. 

(a)  As  already  seen,  the  mortgage  interest  charge  of 

*  By  the  term  "old  tax"  is  intended  the  tax  in  force  at  time  of  last  purchase; 
by  "new  tax"  one  imposed  since  last  change  of  ownership. 


40  THE  A  B  C  OF  TAXATION 

$100  reduces  the  selling  price  of  the  land  by  the  amount 
of  the  mortgage,  |2,ooo.  It  is  equally  true  that  the 
tax  charge  of  |ioo  reduces  it  by  the  same  amount, 
$2,000;  the  mortgage  and  the  tax  together  therefore 
reduce  it  by  $4,000;  and  you  will  buy  the  land  at 
$2,000,  the  value  of  the  equity  which  remains  after 
both  mortgage  interest  and  tax  have  been  paid.  This 
$2,000  is  the  capitalisation  of  the  annual  value  of  the 
lot  to  you  after  all  charges  have  been  met. 

{b)  In  purchasing  you  will  assume  both  mortgage 
interest  and  tax  and  will  pay  them,  but  you  will  pay 
them  out  of  the  gross  income  of  $300,  and  not  out  of 
the  net  income  of  $100  from  your  investment  of  $2,000. 
Therefore  no  part  of  the  $2,000  which  you  pay  for 
the  equity  will  be  taken  from  you  in  taxation,  either 
as  principal  or  interest. 

(c)  The  lot  of  land  will  thus  cost  you  for  use:  in- 
terest on  your  purchase  price  ($2,000  at  5  per  cent), 
$100;  plus  mortgage  interest  ($2,000  at  5  per  cent), 
$100;  plus  taxes,  $100;  and  these  together  aggregate 
$300,  what  the  land  is  worth  for  use,  the  same  as  before. 

(d)  It  follows  then  that,  under  the  present  system, 
assuming  free  competition,  the  selling  value  of  land 
is  an  untaxed  value,*  and  land  owners  who  invest 
to-day  are  exempt  from  taxation  —  not  indeed  upon 
their  land,  but  upon  its  annual  net  or  income  value 
to  them,  or,  in  other  words,  upon  their  investment. 
The  gross  value  is  the  taxed  value.  The  net  value  is  an 
untaxed  value. 

(e)  As  this  exemption  of  the  present  owner  holds 

*  Assessors  make  use  of  the  selling  value  of  land  as  the  basis  for  their  levy 
because  it  is  more  easily  ascertainable  than  the  gross  value,  but  in  reality  and 
effect  the  levy  is  upon  the  gross  value,  which,  if  land  were  not  taxed  at  ally 
would  be  also  the  selling  value. 


VALUE  OF  LAND  AN  UNTAXED  VALUE  41 

true  to-day,  so  it  will  be  true  in  future  cf  each  ncv/ 
purchaser  subsequently  to  the  imposition  of  any  new 
tax.  It  is  in  the  very  nature  of  things  that  the  burden 
of  a  land  tax  cannot  be  made  to  survive  a  change  of 
ownership. 

(/)  This  is  equally  true  of  a  bond,  but  it  is  assumed 
that  a  tax  levy  should  be  not  upon  intangible  stocks  and 
bonds  legally  conceived  as  property,  but  only  upon 
tangible  goods  and  estates.  It  is,  to  be  sure,  just  as 
true  that  a  man  who  builds  a  house  to  rent  pays  no 
tax  on  his  investment,  but  for  a  different  reason.  The 
tax,  in  that  case,  is  shifted  upon  the  user  in  increased 
house  rent,  except  so  far  as,  by  discouraging  building, 
it  is  reflected  in  lower  wages  for  building.  But  an  old 
tax  upon  the  land  is  a  burden  neither  upon  present 
owner  nor  user.  The  tax  on  land  is  "absorbed," 
that  on  the  house  is  "shifted."* 

(g)  We  cannot  too  soon  or  too  rigidly  fix  in  mind  the 
fact  that  this  ground  rent  of  $300  is  the  governing 
factor  in  the  situation;**  that  it  is  a  tax  laid  not  by  the 
State  but  by  nature,  v/hich  every  man  must  pay  for 
the  use  of  land,  either  to  a  private  owner  as  rent,  or  to 
the  State  as  a  tax,  or  to  both.  No  statute  or  ordi- 
nance can  increase  or  reduce,  exempt  from,  or  abolish 
the  payment  of  this  "economic  rent,"  or  ground  rent, 
to  somebody.  Its  amount  is  neither  fixed  nor  affected 
by  the  tax  that  is  put  upon  it,  whether  large  or  small. 
Taxing  it  cannot  increase  it ;  cannot  decrease  it ;  cannot 
abolish  it.  Its  amount  may  always  be  calculated 
by  this  simple  formula:  ground  rent  equals  interest 

*  Landlords  who  own  and  let  both  land  and  tenement  houses,  apartment 
houses,  and  business  blocks  thereon,  est  ape  the  burden  of  the  tax  on  their 
land,  and  at  the  same  time  shift  upon  their  tenants  the  building  tax,  thus 
avoiding  all  share  in  the  tax  burden. 

**This  is  indeed  the  point  from  which  the  whole  discussion  proceeds. 


42  THE  A  B  C  OF  TAXATION 

on  purchase  price,  plus  interest  on  any  mortgage,  plus 
taxes. 

Proposition  4.  —  Neither  a  tax  upon  ground  rent,  nor 
the  ground  rent  itself,  adds  anything  to  the  cost  of  land 
for  use. 

(a)  Economic  rent,  ground  rent,  measures  the  value 
of  all  public,  quasi-public,  and  social  service.  If  the 
whole  ground  rent  is  not  a  burden,  but  merely  an 
equivalent  for  social  values  received,  neither  can  interest 
and  taxes,  two  of  the  parts  of  which  ground  rent  in  our 
illustration  is  composed,  be  a  burden  upon  the  user. 
A  tax  upon  rent  comes  out  of  rent,  which,  as  has  been 
explained,  is  the  natural  tax  that  every  user  has  to 
pay  to  some  one,  and  hence  it  subtracts  nothing  from 
wages  and  adds  nothing  to  the  cost  of  living. 

Proposition  5.  —  You  cannot  pay  $6,000  for  the  land 
and  in  addition  pay  either  the  mortgage  interest  of  %\oo 
or  the  tax  of  |ioo,  because  that  would  make  land  cost 
you  I400  per  annum  which  hy  our  assumption  is  worth 
only  I300. 

(a)  The  tax  upon  land  cannot  be  added  to  the  ground 
i-gnt — which  is  kept  at  its  maximum  by  market 
demand  —  but  is  a  part  of,  and  must  come  out  of, 
ground  rent.  If  it  could  be  added,  that  fact  would 
itself  indicate  that  the  ground  rent  was  $400  instead  of 
$300,  which  is  contrary  to  supposition.  Land  worth 
only  $300  a  year  cannot  be  made  worth  I400  a  year  by 
putting  a  tax  of  1 100  upon  it. 

(6)  Let  it  not  be  forgotten  that  ground  rent,  in  the 
sense  in  which  the  word  is  used,  is  the  same  homo- 
geneous thing,  one  and  indivisible,  the  world  over  — 
what  land  is  worth  for  use.  It  is  rent  —  or  use  value 
—  not  cost  of  construction  or  cost  of  production  — 


VALUE  OF  LAND  AN  UNTAXED  VALUE  43 

that  fixes  the  price  of  land.  Economic  rent  is  the 
initial  and  governing  factor  from  which  all  calculations 
must  proceed. 

second:   the  house 

Proposition  6.  —  The  lot  having  been  acquired,  let  it 
he  supposed  thai  you  are  in  need  of  a  house,  and  that 
such  a  house  as  you  want  would  cost  to  build  §6,000, 
or,  in  interest,  $300  a  year,  the  same  as  the  annual  cost  of 
the  land. 

(a)  You  will  observe  at  once  that  the  problem  of 
the  house  is  quite  different  from  that  of  the  land.  The 
cost  of  acquiring  land  depends  primarily  upon  its 
rent.  Conversely,  the  rent  of  a  house  depends 
primarily  upon  its  cost.  Builders  will  not  build 
houses  unless  they  can  get  interest  on  the  cost  of 
construction.  Competition  among  builders  will  not 
allow  one  builder  normally  to  get  more  than  interest 
on  cost  of  construction. 

Proposition  7. —  //  such  a  house  were  free  of  tax,  but 
mortgaged  for  |2,ooo,  it  would  cost  you  to  buy  only 
§4,000,  and  it  would  cost  you  to  use,  as  in  case  of  the 
land,  interest  on  purchase  price  (4,000  at  5  per  cent) 
I200,  plus  interest  on  mortgage  ($2,000  at  5  per  cent) 
§100,  making  §300  as  before. 

(a)  The  mortgage  upon  a  house,  like  that  upon 
land,  will  add  nothing  to  the  cost  of  the  house  for  use. 

Proposition  8  —  Btit  you  fi^id  that  such  a  house  is 
subject  also  to  a  tax  of  $100,  which  you  will  have  to  pay 
in  addition  to  the  above  §300,  interest  on  purchase  and 
mortgage,  making  the  house  cost  you  for  use  altogether 
$400,  instead  of  §300  a  year,  or  %\oo  more  on  account 
of  the  tax. 


44  THE  A  B  C  OF  TAXATION 

(a)  Unlike  the  tax  upon  land,  the  tax  of  ?ioo  upon 
the  house  cannot  come  out  of  the  $300  rent  (house 
rent  or  interest)  except  indirectly  through  its  effect 
upon  wages  as  before  mentioned,  because  house  rent 
cannot  normally  be  less  than  interest  on  the  actual 
cost  of  building  the  house;  it  must  instead  be  paid 
by  the  user  of  the  house,  over  and  above  his  interest, 
making  his  house  rent,  the  annual  cost  of  his  house 
for  use,  $400  instead  of  I300. 

(b)  To  repeat:  a  house  rent,  otherwise  $300,  is 
increased  to  $400  by  a  tax  of  $100  on  the  house.  In 
contrast  with  this,  you  may  either  take  off  a  present 
tax  of  1 1 00  from  the  land,  or  you  may  increase  that 
tax  to  |2oo,  and  in  neither  case  will  the  cost  of  the 
land  to  the  user  be  affected.  Take  off  the  $100  tax 
from  the  house,  and  the  cost  of  the  house  to  the  user 
will  be  reduced  from  I400  to  I300  a  year;  of  land  and 
house  together,  from  I700  to  |6oo. 

Proposition  9. —  The  moral  of  this  illustration  is 
that  you  get  for  use  annually  I300  worth  of  land  for  I300, 
and  a  house  costing  I300  for  $400.  In  other  words,  a 
tax  upon  land  is  a  part  of,  is  included  in,  and 
comes  out  of,  ground  rent,  and  is  no  burden  to  the 
user:  while  a  tax  upon  a  house  is  a  clear  addition 
to  house  rent,  and  comes  principally  out  of  the  user 
of  the  house. 

To  recapitulate:  (i)  It  has  been  shown  that  a 
house  tax  of  |ioo  that  has  been  regularly  levied 
takes  in  taxation  |ioo  a  year  of  the  user's  income. 

(2)  It  has  been  shown  that  a  land  tax  of  $100 
takes  in  taxation  no  part  of  the  income  of  the  user  or 
present  owner,  provided  that  he  purchased  the  land 
after  the  tax  was  imposed. 


VALUE  OF  LAND  AN  UNTAXED  VALUE  45 

The  beauty  of  this  illustration  is  that  (in  a  classi- 
fication which  excludes  duplication  by  certificates  or 
mere  legal  evidences  of  property,  like  stocks,  bonds, 
etc.,  and  includes  only  actual  tangible  property) 
while  land  stands  as  always  for  everything  except  the 
products  of  labour,  a  house  is  here  made  to  stand  as 
the  representative  of  any  and  all  products  of  individual 
labour,  that  is,  for  everything  except  land,  and  the 
illustration  thus  becomes  all  inclusive. 

If  you  have  had  the  patience  to  follow  it  under- 
standingly  you  may  rest  assured  that  you  have  mas- 
tered a  basic  principle  of  taxation,  and  have  solved  one 
of  the  most  perplexing  problems  of  political  economy. 

What  the  Authorities  Say  of  This  Third  Generic 
Peculiarity  of  Land,  viz..  That  Its  Selling 
Value  Is  an  Untaxed  Value. 

"The  land  tax,  which  is  next  on  the  list,  should  equally  cause 
but  little  controversy.  It  is  persistently  claimed  as  a  burden 
upon  land,  or  land  owners;  but  this  will  not  bear  scrutiny  when 
we  inquire  out  of  whose  income  the  tax  is  paid,  or  what  way  it 
causes  pressure,  so  that  its  reduction  or  abolition  would  be  a 
benefit  to  the  community. 

"As  a  fixed  charge  upon  land  for  generations,  it  is  now  past  all 
controversy  a  rent-charge.  In  many  instances  it  has  long  since 
been  redeemed,  the  property  having  subsequently  changed 
hands;  in  others,  inheritors  of  property  have  acquired  it  under 
the  burden,  and  have  calculated  their  income  minus  the  tax, 
while  purchasers,  in  buying,  invariably  allow  for  it.  To  reduce" 
(abolish  ?)  "it  now  would  be  to  present  the  landowners  of 
England  with  a  capital  sum  of  nearly  ;^30,ooo,ooo.  Their 
estates,  relieved  of  the  burden,  would  become  at  once  so  much 
more  valuable,  and  if  they  did  not  sell,  they  would  pocket  an 
additional  income  which  they  never  inherited  or  paid  for." — Sir 
Robert  Gijferiy  "Essays  in  Finance y*  First  Series,  p.  2^2. 


46  THE  A  B  C  OF  TAXATION 

"But  whatever  may  be  thought  of  the  legitimacy  of  making 
the  State  a  sharer  in  all  future  increase  of  rent  from  natural 
causes,  the  existing  land  tax  (which  in  this  country  [England] 
unfortunately  is  very  small)  ought  not  to  be  regarded  as  a  tax, 
but  as  a  rent-charge  in  favour  of  the  public;  a  portion  of  the 
rent,  reserved  from  the  beginning  by  the  State,  which  has  never 
belonged  to  or  formed  part  of  the  income  of  the  landlords,  and 
should  not,  therefore,  be  counted  to  them  as  part  of  their  taxation, 
so  as  to  exempt  them  from  their  fair  share  of  every  other  tax. 
As  well  might  the  title  be  regarded  as  a  tax  on  the  landlords; 
as  well,  in  Bengal,  where  the  State,  though  entitled  to  the  whole 
rent  of  the  land,  gave  away  one-tenth  of  it  to  individuals,  retain- 
ing the  other  nine-tenths,  might  those  nine-tenths  be  considered 
as  an  unequal  and  unjust  tax  on  the  grantees  of  the  tenth.  That 
a  person  owns  part  of  the  rent  does  not  make  the  rest  of  it  his 
just  right,  injuriously  withheld  from  him.  The  landlords 
originally  held  their  estates  subject  to  feudal  burdens,  for  which 
the  present  land  tax  is  an  exceedingly  small  equivalent,  and  for 
their  reHef  from  which  they  should  have  been  required  to  pay  a 
much  higher  price.  All  who  have  bought  land  since  the  tax 
existed  have  bought  it  subject  to  the  tax.  There  Is  not  the 
smallest  pretence  for  looking  upon  it  as  a  payment  exacted  from 
the  existing  race  of  landlords. 

"These  observations  are  appHcable  to  a  land  tax  only  in  so 
far  as  It  Is  a  peculiar  tax  and  not  when  it  is  merely  a  mode  of 
levying  from  the  landlords  the  equivalent  of  what  Is  taken  from 
other  classes.  In  France,  for  example,  there  are  peculiar 
taxes  on  other  kinds  of  property  and  income  (the  mohilier  and 
the  patente)y  and  supposing  the  land  tax  to  be  not  more  than 
equivalent  to  these,  there  would  be  no  ground  for  contending 
that  the  State  had  reserved  to  Itself  a  rent-charge  on  the  land. 
But  wherever  and  in  so  far  as  Income  derived  from  land  Is 
prescrlptively  subject  to  a  deduction  for  pubUc  purposes,  beyond 
the  rate  of  taxation  levied  on  other  incomes,  the  surplus  Is  not 
properly  taxation,  but  a  share  of  the  property  in  the  soil,  reserved 
by  the  State.    In  this  country  there  are  no  peculiar  taxes  on  other 


VALUE  OF  LAND  AN   UNTAXED  VALUE     47 

classes,  corresponding  to,  or  intended  to  countervail,  the  land- 
tax.  The  whole  of  it,  therefore,  is  not  taxation  but  a  rent- 
charge,  and  is  as  if  the  State  had  retained,  not  a  portion  of  the 
rent,  but  a  portion  of  the  land.  It  is  no  more  a  burden  on  the 
landlord,  than  the  share  of  one  joint  tenant  is  a  burden  on  the 
other.  The  landlords  are  entitled  to  no  compensation  for  it, 
nor  have  they  any  claim  to  its  being  allowed  for,  as  part  of  their 
taxes.  Its  continuance  on  the  existing  footing  is  no  infringe- 
ment of  the  principle  of  equal  taxation." — Mill,  ''Principles 
of  Political  Economy^'  Volume  II.,  Book  V.,  Chapter  II., 
Section  6. 

"A  more  difficult  and  disputable  point  arises  in  connection 
with  the  incidence  of  a  long  continued  land  tax.  Here  it  is 
said  that  the  tax  is  really  a  deduction  from  property.  As  land 
is  sought  for  its  revenue,  what  lowers  its  revenue  lowers  its 
selling  price,  and  therefore  a  land  tax  falls  altogether  on  the 
possessor  at  the  time  of  its  imposition.  Subsequent  acquirers 
take  the  land  subject  to  the  burden,  and  pay  a  lower  price  in 
consequence.  This  process  of  "amortisation,"  as  it  has  been 
called,  makes  the  subsequent  removal  of  the  tax  undesirable; 
the  persons  who  have  lost  by  its  estabHshment  are  not  the  same 
as  those  who  gain  by  its  remission.  A  purchaser  has  got  land 
cheaper,  and  gains  a  further  advantage  by  escaping  the  tax; 
in  fact  he  is  allowed  for  it  twice  over,  once  at  the  time  of  purchase 
and  again  at  that  of  remission. 

"The  element  of  truth  in  this  theory,  which  has  received  much 
favour,  appears  to  be  the  following:  (i)  as  previously  pointed 
out,  when  a  land  tax  becomes  definitely  fixed  so  that  it  can  be 
foreseen,  or  even  capitalised  and  redeemed,  there  is  no  inaccuracy 
in  speaking  of  it  as  a  charge  on  land,  which  lowers  its  selling 
price;  it  is  just  the  same  as  a  mortgage,  and  is  so  regarded  by 
purchasers." — Bastable,  ''Public  Finance"  (iQOj),  page  440 

"If  a  certain  tax  islevied  and  it  is  expected  that  itwill  continue 
to  be  levied  indefinitely  in  the  future,  it  will  reduce  the  selling 


48  THE  A  B  C  OF  TAXATION 

value  of  the  land  by  the  amount  of  the  capitahsed  value  of  the 
tax.  The  future  owner  will,  therefore,  be  able  to  buy  it  so  much 
cheaper  that  he  will  reaUse  as  large  a  percentage  on  his  invest- 
ment as  though  the  tax  had  never  been  levied." — Thomas  N. 
Carver y  Tale  Review y  Nov.  l8g6. 


A  recent  College  and  University  text  book*  makes 
reference  to  the  argument  of  this  illustration,  as  re- 
stated in  Chapter  XI I.,  in  the  following  comment: 

Many  present-day  followers  of  Henry  George  find  in  this 
principle  of  amortisation  at  once  a  justification  and  a  method  of 
securing  for  society  all  economic  rent.  Under  present  condi- 
tions, they  say,  a  man  who  buys  land  wholly  escapes  taxation 
upon  it.  Consequently,  in  order  to  make  landowners  pay  as 
much  as  other  people  we  should  have  to  increase  the  tax  upon 
land  by  a  rate  equal  to  that  paid  by  the  average  tax  payer  as 
often  —  say  every  thirty  years —  as  the  land  of  the  community 
changes  holders.  In  this  way  the  State  could  gradually  and  with 
justice  absorb  all  economic  rent. 

But  this  whole  chain  of  reasoning  is  fallacious  for  three 
reasons: 

{a)  This  capitalisation  takes  place  only  to  the  extent 
that  the  tax  on  land  is  exclusive  and  unequal,  and  modern 
taxes  upon  land  are  not  of  this  nature. 

{h)  In  so  far  as  this  programme  of  the  single  taxers  were 
anticipated  and  understood,  it  would  visit  the  whole  burden 
of  the  "reform"  upon  present  owners,  instead  of  being  dis- 
tributed over  several  generations.  Subsequent  purchasers 
would  discount  these  periodic  increases  of  the  tax  and  pay  to 
owners  for  their  land  only  the  present  value  of  the  rapidly 
vanishing  income  from  land.  Land  would  be  valued  simply  as 
a  terminable  annuity. 


♦  "Outlines  of  Economics,"  Revised  Edition,  by  Richard  T.  Ely.     The 
Macmillan  Company,  1908,  pp.  621,  622. 


VALUE  OF  LAND  AN  UNTAXED  VALUE  49 

(c)  This  whole  doctrine  overlooks  the  inevitable  con- 
sequence that,  if  "the  selling  value  of  land  is  an  untaxed  value" 
and  "if  the  burden  of  a  land  tax  cannot  be  made  to  survive 
a  change  of  ownership,"  these  facts  would  so  increase 
the  demand  for  land  that  the  profits  from  its  purchase 
and  ownership  would  not  exceed  profits  in  other  lines  of 
investment." 

Let  us  examine  these  points  one  by  one. 

(a)  It  is,  as  I  understand,  admitted  by  all  econo- 
mists that  in  the  United  States  (the  country  now  under 
consideration)  the  tax  on  land  is  everywhere  exceed- 
ingly unequal,  and,  especially  in  the  large  cities,  almost 
exclusive. 

Either  the  capitalisation  of  the  land  tax  is  a  fact  or 
it  is  not.  If  it  is  a  fact  it  is,  with  its  corollaries,  the 
most  vital  fact  of  all  those  bearing  upon  the  material 
welfare  of  the  race,  and  ought  not  to  be  brushed  aside 
in  three  short  unsupported  sentences  like  the  above, 
all  of  which  are  substantially  contrary  to  the  mass  of 
evidence  assembled  in  these  chapters. 

But  the  capitalisation  of  the  land  tax  in  the  United 
States  is  a  settled  fact,  and  hence  not  debatable;  a 
business  condition  of  every-day  knowledge  in  the  buy- 
ing and  seUing  and  assessment  of  land.  It  is  out  of 
the  domain  of  theory,  and  not  dependent  upon  any 
abstract  speculation  concerning  an  exclusive  and 
unequal  tax. 

For  the  sake  of  illustration :  First.  Let  it  be  assumed 
that  there  are  two,  and  only  two,  fields  open  to 
investment,  viz.,  land  paying  5  per  cent  on  purchase 
price  and  bonds  paying  5  per  cent  on  purchase  price 
(because  either  by  exemption  or  by  evasion  they  es- 
cape taxation).     What  is  it  that  fixes  the  above  rate 


50  THE  A  B  C  OF  TAXATION 

of  5  per  cent  prevailing  to-day  in  both  cases?  Is  it  not 
supply  and  demand?  When  there  is  a  surplus  of  capital, 
rates  are  depressed;  when  a  scarcity  of  capital,  rates 
are  advanced.  The  question  is,  What  and  how  has 
taxation  to  do  with  this  5  per  cent  rate  of  interest? 

Again :  Let  it  be  assumed  that  a  way  has  been  found 
to  exact  from  all  bonds  a  tax  of  $25  per  thousand,  or 
one-half  the  income.  Inviting  investment,  there  would 
then  be,  land  paying  5  per  cent,  bonds  paying  2^  per 
cent,  and  what  would  happen?  If  the  interest  rate  is 
5  per  cent  owners  of  bonds  will  continue  to  hold  them 
for  an  income  of  2^  per  cent  or  they  will  sell  at  approxi- 
mately half  price,  but  as  loans  are  renewed  borrowers 
will  have  to  pay  the  market  rate  of  interest,  what 
capital  is  worth  for  use,  plus  the  tax.  The  rate  of 
interest  will  still  be  fixed,  as  now,  by  supply  and  de- 
mand, and  not  by  taxation.  What  has  taxation  to 
do  with  the  general  interest  rate  more  than  with  the 
gross  ground  rent  of  land?  The  idea  that  if  a  uniform 
rate  of  tax  were  imposed  and  collected  from  all  incomes 
it  would  lower  the  rate  of  interest  is  admitted  to  be 
highly  speculative  and  seems  to  fmd  contradiction  in 
every  money  market.  As  to  the  statement  that  mod- 
ern taxes  upon  land  are  not  virtually  exclusive  and 
unequal,  how  can  this  possibly  be  true  when  the 
alleged  bane  of  the  present  system  is  that  more  than 
three-quarters  of  personal  property  escapes  taxation? 

(b)  The  proposed  plan  of  ''some  of  the  present-day 
followers  of  Henry  George"  is  set  forth  in  the  same  text 
book  in  the  main  correctly,  and  admirably,  as  above, 
except  that  their  specific  recommendation  is  limited 
to  absorbing  only  enough  economic  rent  to  meet  all 
public   expenses,  an  object  which   might   be  accom- 


VALUE  OF  LAND  AN  UNTAXED  VALUE  51 

plished  gradually  and  almost  imperceptibly  in  one 
generation.  The  execution  oj  this  particular  plan  would 
involve  an  increase  in  the  rate  year  by  year  sufficient 
to  take  in  taxation  annually  an  additional  i  per  cent 
only  of  the  gross  ground  rent  for  thirty  years,  or  one 
generation.  An  average  of  about  20  per  cent  of  gross 
ground  rent  is  now  taken  in  taxation,  as  for  instance 
in  Boston.  If  an  additional  i  per  cent  should  be  taken 
each  year  for  thirty  years,  it  would  amount  finally 
to  30  per  cent,  which,  added  to  the  20  per  cent  already 
taken,  would  make  50  per  cent,  or  one-half,  which  is 
about  the  average  proportion  that  present  taxes  bear  to 
ground  rent. 

By  this  plan,  at  the  end  of  thirty  years  the  burden 
of  |i  5  (ij  per  cent)  per  thousand  on  present  valuation, 
now  borne  by  the  occupier,  will  have  been  placed  on 
the  land  holder,  and  this  transfer  of  burden  would,  even 
if  land  did  not  meantime  increase  in  value,  reduce  the 
selling  value  of  his  land,  every  $1,000  to  I700.  Mean- 
time, few  land  owners  would  suspect  the  change,  much 
less  be  prejudiced  by  it. 

But  if  a  thirty-year  bond  is  at  a  premium,  and 
worth  one  hundred  and  fifteen  dollars  to-day,  and 
will  be  worth  only  one  hundred  dollars  or  par  at 
maturity,  does  the  whole  burden  of  the  vanishing 
fifteen  dollars  premium  fall  upon  the  "present 
owners"?  The  new  million  dollar  office  building  will 
probably  be  worth  little  or  nothing  in  three  generations, 
but  this  whole  burden  of  ninety  years  natural  decay  is 
not  visited  upon  "present  owners."  The  immediate 
reduction  of  i  per  cent  (or  one  point  on  the  stock 
board)  in  value  of  land  would  not  greatly  depress  selling 
value,  while  increased  taxes  and  consequent  deprecia- 


52  THE  A  B  C  OF  TAXATION 

tion  of  ten,  twenty,  or  thirty  years  hence  are  very 
slightly  discounted  to-day. 

Therefore,  the  assertion  that  the  above  programme 
"would  visit  the  whole  burden  of  the  reform  upon 
present  owners  "  is  erroneous  and  confusing,  especially 
when  the  burden  of  a  three  hundred  dollar  thirty  years' 
depreciation  is  offset  by  an  appreciation  of  perhaps 
more  than  $1,500  (as  is  the  case  in  Boston)  which 
offset  is  rightfully  a  part  of  the  economic  situation. 
Many  laws,  tariff  laws  among  others,  do  not  pretend 
to  insure  against  sporadic  cases  of  possible  injustice 
but  the  universal  law  remains  that,  with  civilisation, 
the  value  of  land  increases. 

(c)  The  statement  of  the  book  on  this  point  comes 
far  short  of  covering  the  actual  condition.  The  facts 
that  the  "selling  value  of  land  is  an  untaxed  value" 
and  that  "the  burden  of  a  land  tax  cannot  be  made  to 
survive  a  change  of  ownership"  have  indeed  so  increased 
the  demand  for  Boston  land  that  in  value  probably 
more  than  three-quarters  of  it  is  to-day  in  dead  hands 
or  in  the  hands  of  trustees  and  syndicates  which  can- 
not die,  all  of  whom  refuse  to  loosen  their  grip  upon 
this  "preferred  stock"  except  at  exorbitant  speculative 
prices  which  would  yield  income  far  under  other  lines 
of  investment. 


PART  IL 

THREE    BOSTON    OBJECT   LESSONS 
IN  TAXATION 

Chapter  IV. 
Winter  Street  and  the  Single  Tax. 

Chapter  V. 
Washington   Street  and  the  Single  Tax. 

Chapter  VI. 
Cornhill  and  the  Single  Tax. 


Chapter  IV 
FIRST    BOSTON    OBJECT     LESSON 

WINTER  STREET  AND  THE  SINGLE  TAX* 

SHOULD     THERE     BE     A   NORMAL   RATIO   BETWEEN   THE 
VALUE   OF   LAND  AND  THE   VALUE    OF    BUILDINGS? 

THE  following  text,  diagram, tpictures,  and  tables 
are  designed  to  illustrate  the  absurd  ratio 
existing  between  the  values  of  land  and  buildings, 
and  the  possible  application  of  the  single  tax  principle 


MAP  OF  WINTER  STREET  SHOWING  ESTATES  NUMBERED 

Total  area  of  lots  83,522  square  feet,  or  one  and  eight-tenths  acres.  Total 
length  of  street  485^  feet.  The  numbers  in  small  figures  on  this  plan  are 
the  street  numbers;  the  numbers  in  large  figures  are  the  square  feet  of 
area  in  each  lot. 


♦The  statements  contained  in  this  chapter  are  adapted  from  an  address  at 
a  banquet  given  by  the  Massachusetts  Single  Tax  League  in  the  Hotel  Vendome, 
October  5, 1899,  to  Representative  Business  Men  of  Boston.   This  was  the  tenth 


tThe  illustrations  I  to   VI,    contained    in    original    Chapters    IV,    V    and    VI,    arc 
omitted  from  this  paper  edition, 

55 


56  THE  A  B  C  OF  TAXATION 

to  one  of  the  most  important  business  thoroughfares 
in  the  heart  of  the  shopping  district  of  Boston,  an 
impressive  lesson  in  the  inequahties  of  the  present 
system  of  taxation. 

In  this  and  the  following  object  lessons  the  valua- 
tions, unless  otherwise  noted,  are  those  of  1907.  The 
total  valuations  on  both  sides  of  Winter  Street  includ- 
ing the  estates  on  the  Tremont  and  Washington  Street 
corners  were : 

LAND 


1898 

1907 

$5,142,600 

8,272,000 

$61 .57  per  sq.  ft. 
97.50  per  sq.  ft. 

BUILDINGS 

$2,681,989  per  acre 
4,247,100  per  acre 

1898 

1907 

$675,000 
605,200 

$8.08  per  sq.  ft. 
7.l3per  sq.ft. 

^   353,836  per  acre 
310,582  per  acre 

Showing  for  nine  years  an  increase  of  58  per 
cent  in  land,  and  a  decrease  of  11  per  cent  in 
buildings. 

The  assessed  valuation  of  the  estate  at  the  southwest 
corner  of  Winter  and  Washington  Streets  (Fig.  I),  was 
in  1907,  1557,000,  of  which  119,400  was  for  buildings. 
The  land  alone,  1,955  square  feet,  increased  from 
$342,000,  1 1 75  per  square  foot,  in  1898,  to  $537,600, 

banquet  in  a  series  of  seventeen  given  by  the  League  during  the  years  1897-1903 
to  the  following  bodies:  (i)  Patrons  of  Husbandry;  (2)  Association  of 
Massachusetts  Assessors;  (3)  Labour  Organisations;  4)  Massachusetts 
Woman's  Suffrage  Association;  (5)  New  England  Free  Trade  League; 
(6)  The  Massachusetts  Clergy;  (7)  Young  Men's  Christian  Association; 
(8)  Boards  of  Charities  and  Corrections;  (9)  Representative  Taxationists; 
(10)  Representative  Business  Men;  (11)  Twentieth  Century  Club;  (12) 
Real  Estate  Men;  (13)  The  Catholic  Clergy;  (14)  Members  Boston  Merchants' 
Association;  (15)  Political  Economists;  (16)  Professional  Economists;  (17) 
Landlords  of  Boston,  followed  by  (18)  A  Dinner-Discussion  of  the  Economic 
Club  of  Boston,  and  (19)  Lorimer  Hall,  Finale. 


FIRST  BOSTON  OBJECT  LESSON         57 

$275  per  square  foot,  in  1907.  This  assessed  valuation 
of  $275  per  square  foot  for  land  is  the  highest  in  Boston. 
In  1893  the  estate  had  been  sold  for  1350,000.  The 
present  building  was  erected  in  1881,  but  it  is  no 
distinct  improvement,  in  height  or  otherwise,  over 
its  predecessor.  Is  it  reasonable  that  the  owner 
of  this  land  should  in  fourteen  years  realise  an 
increase  on  his  investment  of  59  per  cent  ($207,000 
on  1350,000),  and  business  reap  little  apparent 
advantage  in  accommodation  during  twice  or  thrice 
that  time? 

In  1907  the  estate  was  paying  the  owner  an  income 
of  about  125,000.  The  Transit  Commission  took  this 
estate  by  eminent  domain,  and  settled  for  it  in  1908  for 
$630,000  or  I320  per  square  foot  for  the  land  and  build- 
ings. After  appropriating  subway  station  accommo- 
dations, it  leased  the  balance  of  the  estate  for  the 
sum  of  $28,000  a  year  and  taxes,  or  $36,000  as  long 
as  no  taxes  are  assessed.  This  is  a  return  of  about 
4^  per  cent  net  on  the  purchase  price  of  $630,000, 
on  which  sum  the  city  is  paying — as  the  money  was 
borrowed — about  4  per  cent. 

What  Better  Buildings  Mean 

Query.  Is  it  not  a  fact  that  with  up-to-date 
buildings,  having  ample  rear  courts  for  the  receipt 
and  shipment  of  goods,  business  might  be  far  better 
accommodated,  and  Winter  Street  be  made  20  feet 
wider  in  the  bargain?  Would  not  up-to-date  build- 
ings on  Winter  Street  at  least  double  the  business 
accommodations,  and  hence  be  equivalent  to  doub- 
ling the  area  of  the  land? 

The  limited  land  space  of  Winter  Street  commands 


58  THE  A  B  C  OF  TAXATION 

a  high  price  because  its  area  cannot  be  increased. 
The  limited  floor  space  of  Winter  Street  com- 
mands a  high  average  price  because  its  area  has 
not  been  increased. 

How  Capital  Is  Handicapped 

Query.  If  capital  is  the  friend  of  labour  why 
does  it  not  build  better  buildings  on  Winter  Street? 
Simply  because  it  cannot  get  at  the  land.  The  land 
owner,  being  unable  or  indisposed  to  build,  and  unwill- 
ing to  sell  his  land,  there  is  no  inducement  to  capital 
to  put  up  lasting  buildings  to  be  forfeited  at  the  end 
of  the  lease.  When  business  from  compulsion  builds 
for  itself  in  this  way,  it  puts  up  the  cheapest  building 
that  will  answer  for  the  time  being,  instead  of  what 
is  best  for  all  time.  The  one  hundred  and  seventy- 
five  or  more  concerns  on  Winter  Street  are  in  the 
merchandise,  and  not  in  the  building,  business.  Such 
building  is  exceedingly  disadvantageous  to  large  con- 
cerns and  impossible  to  small  ones. 

Query.  Were  the  land  holder  and  the  business  man 
of  Winter  Street  "created  free  and  equal"?  The 
extensive  alterations  and  improvements  in  Shepard, 
Norwell  Co.'s  stores  (Fig.  Ill),  as  in  many  other  cases, 
have  been  paid  for  by  the  tenants,  who  have  also  paid 
all  taxes  on  them.  At  the  expiration  of  the  usual 
twenty-year  lease,  all  these  improvements  revert  to 
the  owners  of  the  land.  Is  it  fair  that  the  land 
owner  should,  in  the  disposal  of  his  land,  have 
the  benefit  of  the  sharpest  kind  of  competition, 
while  the  business  man  is  debarred  from  all  kind 
of  competition  in  the  obtaining  of  new  buildings? 
Is  it  not  about  time  that  all  Winter  Street  build- 


FIRST  BOSTON  OBJECT  LESSON         59 

ings  should,  in  a  comprehensive  sense,  be  "altered 
to  suit  tenants"? 

A  Striking  Illustration  of  a  Common  Fact 

The  land  in  Winter  Street,  which  was  assessed  at  less 
than  $4  per  square  foot  in  1850,  was  assessed  in  1907 
at  $130  per  square  foot.  During  the  fifty-seven 
years  intervening,  the  income,  above  taxes,  from 
the  land,  in  rent  and  appreciation  has  amounted 
to  an  average  of  150  per  cent  annually  on  the 
investment  of  1850. 

Three  Burdens  for  Business   and   None  for  the 

Landlord 

Query.  Is  that  a  constitutionally  "just  and 
reasonable"  system  of  taxation  which  constrains 
the  business  man  of  Winter  Street  to  erect  at 
his  own  expense  a  basis  of  taxation,  pay  the 
tax  itself,  and  then  turn  over  without  consider- 
ation the  very  basis  itself  to  the  pocket  and 
profit  of  another  man?  Should  not  the  land  be 
taxed  until  it  is  at  least  as  profitable  to  use  it  as 
to  hold  it  out  of  use? 

Leading  Questions 

Query.  Why  should  not  Winter  Street,  with  its 
concentrated  business  and  highest  land  values  in 
Boston,  have  the  best  buildings,  with  the  best  attain- 
able equipment,  elevators,  ventilation,  heat,  light, 
water,  sanitation,  etc.? 

Query.  Wherever  business  has  up-to-date  accom- 
modations, as  in  the  Excnange  Building  on  State 
Street   and  the  new  Tremont  Building  on  Tremont 


6o  THE  A  B  C  OF  TAXATION 

Street,  is  it  not  a  fact  that  the  value  of  the  buildings 
approximately  equals  or  exceeds  the  value  of  the 
land?  Should  not  the  value  of  the  buildings  at  least 
keep  some  sort  of  pace  with  the  increasing  value  of 
the  land?  It  is  not  asserted  that  Winter  Street  ought 
to  have  buildings  worth,  like  the  land,  I97.50  per 
square  foot,  but  that  I7.13  per  foot  is  too  low  and 
means  a  great  detriment  to  business. 

Query.  If  estate  holders  in  their  quest  of  profits 
had  been  as  dependent  on  buildings  as  on  land  during 
the  past  forty  years,  would  Winter  Street,  the  centre 
of  business  and  of  highest  land  values,  ever  have 
lacked  building  accommodations  of  a  value  approx- 
imating much  more  closely  to  that  of  the  land  than 
has  been  the  case? 

Query.  If  the  income  from  the  land  of  Winter 
Street,  including  appreciation,  were  no  greater  than 
the  income  from  up-to-date  buildings,  would  the 
business  of  Winter  Street  tolerate  to-day  its  seventh- 
rate  accommodations? 

Query.  Was  the  land  of  Winter  Street  made  for 
the  use  of  business  or  for  the  speculative  profit  of  the 
land  owner?* 

Is  the  business  of  land  owning  pure  and  simple 
deserving  of  so  much  consideration  as  to  merit  encour- 
agement at  the  expense,  and  to  the  detriment,  of 
industry  and  enterprise?  If  not,  is  not  the  present 
system  of  exempting  it  from  the  burden  of  taxation 
unwise  and  indefensible? 

A    modern    eight    story    building    covering    the 


*  By  land  owner  is  meant  any  man  in  his  capacity  as  owner  of  land  only, 
independently  of  his  capacity  as  owner  of  buildings  and  improvements  or 
anything  else. 


FIRST  BOSTON  OBJECT  LESSON         6i 

location  of  A.  Stowell  &  Co.  (Fig.  VI)  would  afford 
to  business  four  times  as  much  floor  space  as 
now  at  one-quarter  the  present  average  rental  per 
square  foot. 

The  ground  rent  of  5  per  cent  on  $130,  the  assessed 
valuation,  would  be  I6.50  per  square  foot.  The 
rent  of  a  building  eight  stories  in  height,  costing  $50 
per  square  foot,  would  be  I2.50  per  square  foot,  mak- 
ing ground  rent  and  rent  of  building  together  §9  per 
square  foot.  Subtracting  from  this  $9  three-quarters 
($6.75)  for  ground  floor  and  basement,  there  is  left 
for  the  remaining  seven  floors  $2.52  per  square  foot, 
or  32  cents  per  square  foot  for  each  floor.  Upon  the 
area  of  4,630  square  feet  at  $6.75  per  square  foot, 
this  means  a  total  rental  for  ground  floor  and 
basement  of  $31,253,  and  for  the  other  seven  floors 
$10,417,  or  an  average  of  $1,488  each.  This 
figure  is  probably  much  under  what  such  floors 
would  actually  command. 

This  estate  occupied  by  A.  Stowell  &  Co.  costs 
the  city  of  Boston  just  as  much  in  the  way  of 
public  service  as  it  would  with  the  fmest  possible 
building.  It  is  this  constant  expenditure  for  public 
service  that  maintains  the  value  of  the  land,  while 
adding  nothing  to  the  value  of  the  buildings. 
Further,  maintenance  is  not  all.  The  present  value 
of  the  land  has  been  paid  for,  dollar  for  dollar,  by 
the  people  of  Boston.  Why  should  not  this  estate 
pay  taxes  in  proportion  to  the  taxes  that  are  spent 
upon  it? 

Query.  Is  it  reasonable  that  the  business  of  A. 
Stowell  &  Co.  should  be  required  to  pay  $30,000 
ground     rent     (5    per   cent   on    $600,000    worth    of 


62  THE  A  B  C  OF  TAXATION 

land)     in     order     to     secure     floor     space     worth 
1 1 2,000   a   year? 

What  Does  the  Business  Man  Think  of  It  ? 

The  following  facts  and  figures  are  given  for  business 
men  to  consider,  being  careful  to  avoid  hasty  con- 
clusions, and  to  remember  that  the  more  nearly  the 
value  of  buildings  approaches  the  value  of  the  land 
the  better  it  appears  to  be  for  business. 

Comparison  by  Counties 

Massachusetts  has  fourteen  counties.  In  every 
one  of  thirteen  of  these  counties  the  assessed  value 
of  the  buildings  exceeds  and  in  most  cases  largely 
exceeds  the  assessed  value  of  the  land.  In  the  one 
other  county,  Suffolk  (Boston,  Chelsea,  Revere,  and 
Winthrop),  containing  49  per  cent  of  the  whole  land 
value  of  the  state,  the  buildings  fall  far  below  the  land 
in  value. 

The  Small  Towns 

Again,  eighty-eight  towns  (out  of  Massachusetts*s 
354  cities  and  towns),  having  lowest  valuations,  show 
average  assessments  as  follows:  of  buildings,  $130,000; 
of  land,  $145,000.  A  single  tax  assessment  based 
upon  site  value  of  uncultivated  land  and  exempting 
not  only  buildings,  but  all  other  farm  improve- 
ments, would  reduce  this  average  land  value  for 
these  eighty-eight  towns,  so  far  as  they  represent 
farm  land  for  assessment,  from  $145,000  to  prob- 
ably less  than  $75,000.  The  following  figures  show 
Winter  Street  in  company  with  the  three  smallest 
of  these  towns: 


FIRST  BOSTON  OBJECT  LESSON  63 


BUILDINGS                   LAND  RATIO 

Mashpee           .         ,        .        $46,530        $140,020  33-100 

Peru         ....          22,680            84,825  27-100 

Florida     ....          30,790           119,246  25-100 

Winter  St.,  Boston    .         .        605,200       8,272,000  7-100 

For  the  ODunty  of  Suffolk,  which  contains  the  City 
of  Boston,  as  well  as  for  the  state,  no  such  discrepancy 
appears.    Following  are  the  figures: 

BUILDINGS                          LAND  RATIO 

County  of  Suffolk        $444,441,725    $673,208,750  66-100 

Other  13  counties            949,283,781       679,071,599  140-100 

Whole  state      .     .     $1,393,725,486  $1,352,280,349  loi-ioo 

Twelve  Cities  and  Towns 

In  the  twelve  following  large  cities  and  towns  the 

value   of   the  buildings  greatly  exceeds  that  of  the 
land. 

BUILDINGS                             LAND  RATIO 

Lenox $2,306,500        $i,73h375  133-100 

Pittsfield 8,685,715           6,971,255  124-100 

North  Attleborough    .       2,411,210           1,256,613  191-100 

Gloucester     ....       9,388,650           7,886,470  1 19-100 

Haverhill 12,392,960           9,772,050  126-IOO 

Lawrence 22,854,800         18,587,850  123-100 

Lynn 29,892,705        23,238,785  128-100 

Holyoke 18,194,860         15,456,380  11 7-100 

Springfield     ....     37,188,415         36,131,445  103-100 

Cambridge    ....     49,245,700         39,989,600  123-100 

Lowell 33*293,590        26,389,020  126-100 

Newton 27,590,325         22,878,475  120-100 

Total.     .     .     .     $253,445,430    $210,289,318  120-100 

Seventeen  Cities  and  Towns 

In  the  following  seventeen  cities  and  towns,  repre- 
sentative of  their  class,  the  valuation  of  the  buildings 
is  in  the  average  double  that  of  the  land: 


64  THE  A  B  C  OF  TAXATION 

BUILDINGS  LAND  RATIO 

Athol ^2,324,908  ;^i, 204,097  193-100 

Clinton 4,246,230  1,967,307  215-100 

Abington 1,749,697  634,610  275-100 

Plymouth 5,477,025  2,206,250  248-100 

Amherst 1,839,225  899,535  204-100 

Chicopee 6,115,900  2,221,270  275-100 

Amesbury 2,841,815  1,397,681  203-100 

Newburyport      .     .     .  5,269,850  2,379,600  221-100 

Adams 2,598,950  1,085,300  239-100 

North  Adams     .     .     .  7,257,210  4,827,075  150-100 

Attleborough      .     .     .  SAl^^Z^S  3»474,395  158-100 

Taunton 11,024,365  5,214,520  211-100 

Easthampton     .     .     .  3,412,906  408,720  836-100 

Rockland 2,346,350  891,323  263-100 

Chelsea 14,600,570  8,922,300  163-100 

Blackstone    ....  1,244,065  760,410  163-100 

Gardner 3,767,096  1,395,618  270-100 

Total   ....     1^81,595,727      ^39,890,011         205-100 

An  Enormous  Discrepancy 

Query.  Why  is  the  value  of  the  buildings 
on  Winter  Street,  $605,200,  so  insignificant  as 
compared  with  the  land  value  of  Winter  Street 
$8,272,000?  Is  it  not  because  the  present  system 
of  taxation  (by  making  partly  improved  real 
estate  the  choicest  of  all  investments )  enables  the 
owner  to  get  on  such  an  investment  a  far  larger 
percentage  of  revenue,  with  buildings  thirty  to 
sixty  years  old? 

Under  the  present  system  the  buildings  of 
Winter  Street  yield  in  taxation  only  about  one- 
thirteerth  as  much  as  the  land,  so  that  with 
the  very  moderate  advance  in  rate  from  $15.90 
to  $17  per  thousand  upon  the  land  alone  of 
Winter  Street  its  business  might  to-day  have 
thirteen  times  as  good  accommodations  in  untaxed 


FIRST  BOSTON  OBJECT  LESSON  65 

buildings,  and  the  city  lose  nothing  in  taxes    from 
that  locality? 

A  Tax  That  Defeats  Itself 

Query.  Do  not  the  above  questions  indicate  not 
only  that  the  taxation  of  buildings  has  defeated  itself 
by  discouraging  the  increase  of  buildings  to  be  taxed, 
but  also  that  the  city  is  deprived  of  a  much  larger 
revenue  by  thus  preventing  the  large  increase  of  land 
value  in  the  whole  neighbourhood  adjoining,  which 
would  follow  the  erection  of  eight  million  dollars 
worth  of  buildings  on  Winter  Street? 

Winter  Street  is  the  centre  of  the  highest  land  values 
of  Boston.  It  is  485 J  feet,  or  less  than  one-tenth  of  a 
mile,  in  length.  It  has  two  subway  stations  of  dif- 
ferent lines,  one  at  the  Washington  Street  and  one 
at  the  Tremont  Street  end.  The  city  is  spending  eight 
or  ten  millions  for  these  subways,  besides  other  mil- 
lions annually  to  provide  shopping  facilities  for  a 
million  people.  The  result  here  is  $8,000,000  worth  of 
land  value  for  the  benefit  mainly  of  the  land  owners  of 
Winter  Street,  and  |6oo,ooo  worth  of  shopping  accom- 
modations for  the  people.  Is  the  result  pleasing  or 
profitable? 


Chapter  V 
SECOND  BOSTON  OBJECT  LESSON 

WASHINGTON   STREET  AND  THE   SINGLE  TAX* 

JN  VIEW  of  the  nature  of  ground  rent  as  already 
considered  there  is  one  way  that  promises  to 
simplify  and  equalise  taxation,  viz.,  by  beginning  at 
once  the  gradual  transfer  of  the  burden  to  shoulders 
by  which  eventually  it  will  not  be  felt,  thus  tending 
to  correct  the  distribution  of  wealth,  abolish  strikes, 
silence  the  clamour  against  monopoly  and  special 
privilege,  and  sweep  from  before  the  halting  wheels 
of  social  and  moral  progress  much  of  the  degradation, 
distress,  and  vice  precipitated  to-day  upon  society 
by  want  on  the  one  hand  and  surfeit  on  the  other. 

Men  who  have  large  selfish  interests  often  prove 
themselves  just  as  open  to  conviction  of  fairness  and 
soundness  as  those  who  have  small  selfish  interests. 
So  far  as  the  case  is  made  plain  to  them  their  judgment 
generally  will  be  impartial.  No  business  interest,  for 
instance,  is  more  keenly  sensitive  to  crooked  taxation 
than  is  the  real  estate  business;  none  quicker  to  take 
alarm  at  the  sound  of  hostile  legislation.  No  one 
would  claim,  and  few  would  allow,  that  to  justify  a 
reform  it  should  be  shown  to  be  to  the  pecuniary 


♦ 


-« This  chapter  is  adapted  from  an  address  at  a  banquet  given  by  the  Massa- 
chusetts Single  Tai  League  to  Representative  Real  Estate  Men  in  the  Hotel 
Brunswick,  Boston,  October  8,  1900. 

66 


SECOND  BOSTON  OBJECT  LESSON       67 

advantage  of  any  one  class  of  men  over  another;  yet 
it  is  not  difficult  to  conceive  how,  in  the  relief  of  houses 
and  stores  and  factories  from  taxation,  the  real  estate 
business  would  get  a  large  share  of  betterment  from 
the   change. 

Herewith  is  offered  a  collection  of  facts  and  defini- 
tions, coupled  with  a  few  simple  statements,  calcu- 
lations, and  deductions,  criticism  of  which  is  invited. 
These  take  the  form  of  observations,  purposely  dis- 
jointed in  order  that  a  connection  dropped  may  not  be 
a  connection  lost.  It  is  hoped  that  in  the  consider- 
ation of  these  points  a  sufficient  vantage  ground  of 
agreement  may  appear  from  which  to  begin  at  once 
gradually  to  supplant  the  bad  with  the  good,  the 
crooked  with  that  which  is  straight,  the  unattainable 
and  indefensible  with  that  which  is  practicable,  simple, 
and  near  at  hand. 

The  assessed  valuation  of  Washington  Street,  from 
Adams  Square  to  Eliot  Street,  3,495  feet,  or  two- 
thirds  of  a  mile  in  length,  with  an  area  of  745,003 
square  feet,  171V  acres,  comprising  179  estates,  was 
in    1907: 

Land     ....     $61,135,900      [$77.00  per  square  foot 
Buildings  .     .     .       10,793,200        $13.50  per  square  foot 

This  is  an  increase  in  valuation,  over  the  year  1898, 
of  land,  120,438,400,  or  50  per  cent;  of  buildings, 
$1,955,100,  or  20  per  cent.  In  1899  the  valuation  of 
the  buildings  was  21 J  per  cent  that  of  the  land;  in 
1907,  only  I7i  per  cent. 

The  property,  land  and  buildings,  yields  to  the 
city,  in  taxes  at  $15.90  per  thousand,  $1,143,672. 
By  an  increase  of  $2.80  in  the  rate,  with  all  buildings 


68  THE  A  B  C  OF  TAXATION 

exempted,  the  land  alone  would  yield  the  same  amount, 
($61,135,900  at  $18.70  equals  $1,143,672). 

Some  Pertinent  Illustrations 

There  are  on  this  street,  between  Adams  Square 
and  Eliot  Street,  179  buildings,  twenty-one  of  which 
have  been  erected  in  the  last  twenty  years.  At  this 
rate  Washington  Street  is  confronted  with  the  happy 
prospect  of  buildings  of  modern  beauty  and  con- 
venience in  only  a  trifle  more  than  one  hundred  and 
seventy  years,  provided  only  that  none  of  them 
grows  old  meantime.  Has  not  fifty  years  been  the 
limit  of  a  useful  life  for  the  average  building  of  the 
past?  If  so,  Washington  Street  should  have  three 
full  crops  of  new  buildings,  instead  of  one,  in  the 
one  hundred  and  seventy  years. 

All  nature  renews  itself  and  comes  out  in  a  new 
dress  once  a  year.  The  more  the  land  is  enriched, 
the  more  fertile  the  agricultural  crop.  Why  is  there 
not  found  the  richest  economic  crop  of  buildings  on 
land  richest  in  value?  Is  not  something  ''rotten  in 
Denmark"?     If  so,  what  is  it? 

The  human  body,  as  man's  habitation,  is  renewed 
once  in  seven  years,  cuticle  and  all.  Of  Boston's  87,300 
buildings  1,657  were  erected  in  1907.  If  one-half,  or 
828,  of  these  are  due  to  a  natural  growth  of  less  than 
I  per  cent  annually  (the  annual  increase  in  population 
is  over  2  per  cent),  and  only  one-half  are  to  renew  old 
buildings  already  enumerated,  then  it  will  take  at  this 
rate  upwards  of  one  hundred  years  to  scrape  off  the 
surface  scurf,  and  give  to  Boston  a  fresh  and  healthy 
cuticle.  It  will  require  these  one  hundred  years  even 
if  every  new  building  is  proof  against  decay. 


SECOND  BOSTON  OBJECT  LESSON        69 

Meantime,  where  is  the  builder's  occupation  gone? 
Is  this  health  for  a  body  politic?  If  not,  will  some 
wise  physician  furnish  a  prescription? 

Do  the  I23 1 ,600  worth  of  nearly  worthless  buildings 
shown  in  Fig.  IX  represent  those  business  interests 
of  Boston  for  which  a  Washington  Street  subway 
is  being  completed;  for  which  aTremont  Street  parallel 
subway  was  completed  only  a  few  years  since,  and 
but  one  square  away?  These  subways  add  nothing 
to  the  value  either  of  these  old  buildings  or  of  the  new 
ones  which  might  replace  them.  Yet  they  soon  will 
have  doubled  the  value  of  the  land. 

It  is  submitted  in  all  honesty  and  seriousness  that 
this  Washington  Street,  from  Adams  Square  to  Eliot 
Street,  is  a  veritable  economic  monstrosity.  When- 
ever any  section  of  a  city  is  in  a  state  of  transition, 
like  the  West  Street  and  T^ple  Place  of  a  generation 
ago,  or  like  the  Summer  Street  of  to-day,  altered  fronts 
and  other  makeshift  devices  are  for  a  time  natural 
and  inevitable.  But  here  in  Washington  Street,  for  a 
couple  of  centuries  the  main  business  artery  of  a  great 
city,  there  are  not  on  its  whole  length  more  than  three 
or  four  buildings  which  you  could  point  out  with 
special  pride  to  the  visitor  from  Chicago,  or  Kansas 
City,  or  Marblehead,  or  Cape  Cod.  For  this  condition 
there  must  be  a  cause,  and  this  cause  is  the  private 
appropriation  of  a  public  value;  a  value  publicly 
created,  and  publicly  maintained.  If  this  is  not  the 
cause,  we  ask  you  to  help  us  fmd  what  is. 

Query.  Is  it  the  Old  Corner  Bookstore  (Fig.  VIII), 
now  almost  two  hundred  years  old,  valued  at  $2.62 
per  square  foot,  that  needs  a  new  Washington  Street 
subway?     Is  Washington  Street  land  at  $50  to  $300 


70  THE  A  B  C  OF  TAXATION 

per  square  foot  a  proper  place  for  this  and  a  hundred 
other  similar  tombstones? 

The  economic,  or  ground,  rent  of  this  estate  is  not 
(probably)  what  the  present  tenant  pays  for  the  use 
of  the  land  with  its  worthless  buildings,  but  is  what 
such  use  would  command  in  connection  with  an  up-to- 
date  building.  This  gross  ground  rent  is  at  least  5 
per  cent  on  1730,000  (the  assessed  valuation), 
136,500,  plus  present  taxes  on  the  land,  $2,035,  ^^ 
$38,535.  Whatever  the  user  receives  in  return  for 
the  annual  payment  of  this  ground  rent  or  natural 
tax  (be  it  $38,535,  or  more  or  less),  he  receives  from 
the  city  and  people  of  Boston.  The  owner,  as  owner, 
to  whom  this  rent  is  paid,  gives  him  nothing  in  return. 
CXight  not  the  owner  at  least  to  pay  the  taxes? 

Question.  Why  do  these  worthless  Washington 
Street  buildings  withstand  the  march  of  improve- 
ments? Labour  wants  to  put  up  better  buildings. 
Capital  wants  to  invest  in  better  buildings.  Business 
wants  to  occupy  better  buildings. 

Answer.  The  reason  is  that  a  building  investment 
involves  labour  and  business  risk,  while  land 
investment  does  not;  and  further  that  people  are 
not  only  permitted  to  hold  this  land  practically 
unimproved,  but  are  actually  paid  handsomely  for 
doing  so. 

Query.  Is  it  not  a  fact  that  the  business  of  Wash- 
ington Street  would  be  better  accommodated  to-day 
if  every  alternate  square  were  covered  by  an  up-to- 
date  eight  or  ten  story  block,  with  open  parks  or 
even  market  gardens  in  the  intervening  squares? 

Ground  rent  is  whatever  amount  a  user  pays,  or 
would  be  willing  to  pay,  annually,  for  the  use  of  the 


SECOND  BOSTON  OBJECT  LESSON        71 

land  itself.  It  is  whatever  is  paid  for  the  use  of  a 
whole  property,  land  and  buildings,  less  taxes,  insur- 
ance, and  repairs,  and  a  fair  interest  on  the  value  of 
the  buildings.  When  new  buildings,  or  extensive 
alterations  are  made  by  the  tenant  which  are  to  revert 
to  the  landlord  at  the  end  of  say  a  twenty  years'  lease, 
then  one-twentieth  of  this  outlay  becomes  a  part  of 
the  annual  ground  rent,  because  it  forms  a  part  of  the 
price  paid  for  use  of  the  land.  Ground  rent  is  simply 
"a  premium  paid  for  the  advantage  of  location;  it 
is  the  value  of  the  special  privilege  of  the  occupancy 
of  a  particular  spot  of  land  to  all  of  which  all  men 
have  an  equal  right,  but  from  which  all  but  one  are 
and  must  be  excluded."  To  tax  this  value  of  land 
is  no  burden  upon  the  user,  because  he  can  get  a  better 
living  by  using  this  land,  after  paying  the  rent,  than 
by  using  some  other  land  that  nobody  wants,  and 
that  hence  has  no  rental  value. 

The  Transit  Commission  took  the  estate,  northwest 
corner  of  Washington  and  Boylston  Streets  (Fig.  X), 
by  eminent  domain  for  subway  purposes, and  the  expert 
estimates  of  its  value  ran  as  high  as  $625,000,  or  I587 
a  square  foot ;  the  Commission  conveyed  the  property 
back,  allowing  the  owner  as  compensation  for  the  res- 
ervation of  the  basement  and  part  of  the  ground  floor 
for  transit  purposes,  1150,000,  a  sum  only  117,000 
less  than  the  assessed  valuation  of  the  whole  estate, 
besides  interest  and  an  allowance  of  $10,000  toward 
necessary  reconstruction  of  the  building.  While 
this  is  a  very  complicated  case,  and  the  owner,  a  well- 
known  Boston  merchant,  claims  that  the  sum  received 
by  him  for  damages  does  not  compensate  him  fully 
for  the  diminution  in  the  value  of  the  estate,  the  facts 


72  THE  A  B  C  OF  TAXATION 

certainly  show  that  the  property  was  greatly  under- 
assessed. 

Boston's  Ground  Rent  $55,000,000 

In  the  estimate,  oflfered  in  Chapter  I,  page  18,  is 
clearly  shown  the  all-sufficiency  of  ground  rent  to 
bear  the  whole  burden  of  present  taxation.  Criti- 
cism of  these  figures,  with  fair  consideration  of  the 
process  and  steps  of  the  calculation,  will  be  welcome. 

The  155,000,000  ground  rent  of  Boston  is  the 
natural  tax  which  the  people  of  Boston  pay  for  the 
occupancy  and  use  of  their  land.  This,  it  is  sub- 
mitted, is  tax  enough  for  them  to  pay.  But,  since 
only  $10,382,628  of  this  natural  tax  is  taken  for  public 
purposes,  while  $44,617,372  is  permitted  to  be  absorbed 
into  private  incomes,  by  the  "private  appropriation 
of  ground  rent,"  the  people  of  Boston  have  to  pay 
an  additional  tax  of  $13,038,914  on  buildings,  personal 
property,  and  polls,  with  the  result  that  the  occupancy 
of  their  land,  with  its  benefits  of  good  government  and 
public  service,  costs  the  people  of  Boston  to-day  in 
round  numbers:* 

The  natural  tax  of $55,000,000 

An  unnatural  tax  (on  buildings,  personal  property, 

and  polls)  of 13,038,914 


Total  burden  of  taxation  ....       $68,038,914 

Ofits  ground  rent,  estimated  as  above  at    .  .       $55,000,000 

Boston  now  takes  in  taxation  less  than  two-tenths, 

or $10,382,628 

While  Boston's  whole  tax  is  much  less  than  five- 
tenths,  or  $23,421,542 


*  Credit  for  this  simple  formula  of  great  convenience  in  dealing  with  taxation 
in  any  locality  is  due  to  Mr.  James  R.  Carret,  a  Boston  lawyer  and  conveyancer. 


SECOND  BOSTON  OBJECT  LESSON        73 

The  assessed  valuation  of  the  Ames  estate  (Fig.  XI) 
is:  land,  $654,500,  or  $1 15  per  square  foot;  buildings, 
$469,500,  or  $75.32  per  square  foot.  The  tax  upon  the 
land  is  no  burden  upon  the  owner,  because  he 
purchased  only  the  equity  after  payment  of  tax. 
(See  Chapter  III.)  Neither  does  he  bear  the  burden 
of  the  tax  on  the  building,  because  he  can  shift  it 
upon  his  tenants,  who  do.  This  fact  no  one  disputes. 
Howland  Street  (Fig.  XIII)— thirty-two  well-to-do 
homes — has  an  average  assessed  valuation:  land 
(8,275  feet,  at  51  cents  per  foot),  $4,220;  houses, 
$6,371,  77  cents  per  foot;  houses  and  land,  over 
$10,000. 

The  valuation  of  the  land  and  office  building  of 
the  Ames  estate  is  equivalent  to  that  of  the  land  and 
houses  of  about  three  Howland  Streets.  The  latter 
would  pay  taxes  on  $1,015,500,  at  $15.90,  or  $16,146, 
while  the  owners  of  the  Ames  estate  escape  the 
burden  of  the  tax  on  both  land  and  buildings, 
neither  of  which  can  they  be  made  to  bear. 

The  estate,  corner  of  Cambridge  and  Charles  Streets 
(Fig.  XII),  taken  by  the  city  of  Boston  in  1899  for 
an  approach  to  the  Cambridge  bridge,  was  at  that 
time  assessed,  land  $69,600;  buildings,  $3,400.  The 
commissioners'  award  was  $170,000,  or  $97,000  in 
excess  of  the  assessed  valuation.  This  award  was 
based  upon  the  income  of  the  property,  which  was 
claimed  to  be  $8,000,  or  5  per  cent  on  a  value  of 
$160,000.  The  income  of  $8,000  was  11  per  cent,  of 
the  assessed  valuation  of  $73,000.  Allowing  Mr. 
Edward  Atkinson's  full  claim,  that  the  single  tax — 
local,  state,  and  National — would  take  4  per  cent  of 
assessed  land  values,  7  per  cent  would  still  be  left  in 


74  THE  A  B  C  OF  TAXATION 

this  instance  for  the  landowners.  This  may  be  an 
extreme  illustration,  but  it  goes  to  show  the  vicious- 
ness  of  the  present  system,  and  points  unerringly  to  the 
sufificiency  of  ground  rents  for  all  purposes  of  taxation. 

Few  persons  now  call  in  question  the  right  of  the 
owner  of  any  Washington  Street  lot  to  tear  down 
his  building  and  hold  his  lot  vacant.  If  one  owner 
may  do  this  all  owners  may  do  the  same.  Must 
there  not  be  some  fatal  weakness  in  an  apportionment 
between  the  rights  of  individuals  and  the  rights  of 
the  people  that  would  make  possible  such  an  impolitic 
condition?  But  the  fact  that  modern  buildings  would 
be  worth  $50  to  I75  per  square  foot  instead  of  $13.50, 
the  value  of  present  buildings,  is  proof  that  most  of 
this  land,  though  not  held  entirely  vacant,  is  held 
practically  three-quarters  to  nine-tenths  vacant,  or, 
in  other  words,  put  only  to  one-quarter  or  one-tenth 
of  its  legitimate  and  most  economical  use.  A  public 
economy  that  turns  a  landowner  from  a  public  friend 
into  a  public  enemy,  whether  he  will  or  no,  cannot 
be  wise. 

If  Boston  should  take  the  $4,383  received  for  taxes 
from  the  marble  Sears  Building  on  Washington  Street, 
and  the  $7,465  from  the  Ames  Building,  and  spend 
these  amounts  in  the  improvement  and  repair  of  the 
worthless  buildings  of  Washington  Street,  the  owners 
of  the  Sears  and  Ames  Buildings  would  complain,  and 
very  justly.  Exactly  what  the  City  of  Boston  does 
is  this:  It  spends  these  same  taxes  in  the  "improve- 
ment and  repair"  of  the  land  value  that  is  under 
these  and  similar  buildings.  But  is  this  really  less 
unjust?  This  is  one  more  way  of  looking  at  the  unequal 
incidence  of  a  tax  on  buildings. 


SECOND  BOSTON  OBJECT  LESSON        75 

Why  should  the  Boylston  Building  and  the  old 
Masonic  Temple  and  the  old  Public  Library  have  come 
down  in  their  youth  and  beauty  while  these  Washing- 
ton Street  buildings  are  allowed  to  remain  standing 
in  their  decrepitude?  There  must,  we  say,  be  some 
sufficient  reason.  If  the  reason  here  suggested  is  not 
the  real  one,  we  ask  the  reader  what  it  is. 

Question.  How,  then,  are  we  to  know  just  when  old 
buildings  should  give  place  to  new  ones? 

Answer.  When  the  single  tax  shoe  begins  to  pinch, 
that  is,  when,  under  the  single  tax,  the  old  buildings 
cease  to  be  profitable:  in  other  words,  when,  upon 
land  with  buildings  unsuited  to  the  situation,  a  tax 
seems  heavy  which,  upon  the  same  land  with  proper 
buildings,  would  seem  light. 

The  Honourable  Henry  Winn,  a  well-known  advocate 
of  the  multiple  tax,  says:  "Why  does  a  man  owe  a 
tax?  First,  because  society  protects  his  person; 
second,  it  supplies  and  keeps  in  order  streets  for  his 
passage;  third,  it  lights  his  way  by  night;  fourth,  it 
furnishes  parks  and  libraries;  fifth,  it  schools  him 
and  his  children;  sixth,  it  protects  his  property; 
seventh,  it  keeps  courts  open  to  redress  his  grievances; 
eighth,  it  provides  a  government  to  make  and  enforce 
laws;  ninth,  it  supports  him  if  he  falls  into  poverty; 
and  tenth,  chiefly  because  he  has  been  placed  here  by 
God  to  serve  and  improve,  not  himself  alone,  but 
mankind  in  general,  and  as  that  can  only  be  done  by 
maintaining  government,  order,  and  civilisation,  he 
owes  his  tax  as  he  owes  his  life,  to  support  that 
government." 

"Amen,"  says  the  single  taxer;  and  these  are 
exactly  the  things  for  which  every  man  is  paying  when 


76  THE  A  B  C  OF  TAXATION 

he  pays  his  ground  rent,  the  natural  tax.  Why  ask 
him  to  pay  for  the  same  things  a  second  time? 

The  people  of  Boston,  as  hereinbefore  alleged, 
actually  pay  in  single  taxation  a  natural  tax  of 
$55,000,000,  coupled  with  an  unnatural  and  "double" 
tax  of  $13,000,000,  a  grand  total  of  $68,000,000. 
They  receive  in  return  benefits  amounting  only  to 
$23,000,000.  The  failure  to  pay  all  public  expenses 
out  of  this  natural  tax  of  $55,000,000  is  the  cause  of 
gross  inequality  in  the  division  of  wealth,  an  inequality 
greatly  exaggerated  by  the  additional  $13,000,000 
unnatural  double  tax. 

The  single  tax  stands  for  the  recognition  of  a 
scientific  principle  of  taxation.  When  or  how  it  is 
to  be  introduced  is  not  for  us  to  say.  All  that  is 
here  asked  is  that  you  shall  study  the  problem,  adopt 
the  single  tax  principles,  and  then  begin  to  apply 
them.  The  complaint  is  against  a  condition  and 
never  against  an  individual  or  a  class. 

The  man  who,  when  paying  his  water  rate,  or  his 
city  gas  bill,  or  city  electric  light  bill,  pays  in  full  for 
a  public  service  rendered  to  him,  is  not  paying  a  tax. 
How,  then,  could  a  land  owner,  who,  in  paying  his 
single  tax,  would  pay  to-day  not  in  full,  but  only 
fifty  cents  on  a  dollar  for  the  communal  service  rendered 
him,  say  that  he  was  paying  a  tax,  or  that  he  was  the 
victim  of  confiscation? 

The  proposal  of  the  single  tax  is  gradually  to 
abolish  the  present  complex,  unequal,  and  systemless 
method  of  taxation,  and  to  defray  all  public  expenses 
from  a  tax  upon  land  values  alone.  This  surely 
would  be  a  simple  process.  It  would  be  to  distribute 
the  public  burden  with  invariable  justice,  because  in 


SECOND  BOSTON  OBJECT  LESSON        J^ 

accordance  with  a  natural  economic  law,  instead  of 
a  variable  and  impossible  statute  law.  This  is  all 
there  is  in  the  single  tax  of  complexity,  absurdity, 
or  impracticability. 

The  City  of  Boston  is  lavish  of  its  millions  in  order 
that  Washington  Street  space  may  yield  proportion- 
ately more  business,  more  profit,  more  convenience, 
and  more  satisfaction  to  people.  Enterprising  syn- 
dicates of  men  and  capital  are  ready  and  watching 
to  make  the  most  of  the  situation.  It  is  the  unequal 
advantage  enjoyed  by  the  owners  of  lots  small  or 
large  that  hinders  this  realisation  of  the  city's  good 
intentions.  This  is  the  canker  that  destroys  the 
city's  harvest  from  its  planted  millions. 

The  people  tax  themselves  1 100,000  to  build  a 
beautiful  Milton,  Dorchester,  Newton,  Cambridge,  or 
Lynn  boulevard.  Then  straightway  the  same 
people  again  pay  interest  on  the  same  outlay  in 
the  form  of  ground  rent,  before  they  can  establish 
their  homes  and  enter  into  the  enjoyment  of  their 
own  benefactions.  In  other  words,  they  deposit 
$100,000  in  the  ground,  and  then  pay  5  per  cent 
annually  for  the  privilege  of  appropriating  the 
interest  thereon. 

Why  should  a  city  which  creates  the  enormous 
value  of  its  land,  be  powerless  to  msure,  or  even  to 
facilitate,  the  use  of  it  by  the  provision  of  suitable 
buildings  thereon  because  paralysed  and  checkmated 
by  unequal  rights  vested  in  the  dead  hand  of  cor- 
porations, trustees,  and  institutions. 

German  cities  exercise  themselves  about  the  muni- 
cipal "housing  of  the  poor."  Why  should  not 
American  cities  cast  about  to  remove  the  municipal 


78  THE  A  B  C  OF  TAXATION 

impediments  which  prevent  poor  and  rich  alike  from 
housing  themselves,  both  in  private  and  business 
homes? 

The  nature  of  the  problem  is  the  same  in  the  case 
of  a  store  on  Winter  Street  as  in  the  case  of  a  house 
on  Salem  Street.  Every  argument  in  favour  of 
municipal  initiative  in  the  renovated  housing  of  the 
people  has  no  less  force  in  connection  with  the  reno- 
vated housing  of  the  people's  business. 

If  all  men  are  to  have  equal  rights,  then  the 
right  of  the  landlord,  the  storekeeper,  and  the  cus- 
tomer should  not  be  in  conflict  but  in  harmony. 


Chapter  VI 
THIRD  BOSTON  OBJECT  LESSON 


CORNHILL  AND  THE   SINGLE  TAX* 


MAP    or    BLOCK    BOUNDED     BY    CORNHILL,  BRATTLE  STREET,  SCOLLAT  SQUARE, 
AND   ADAMS  SQUARE. 

Total  number  of  square  feet         ...... 

Number  of  lots  ........ 

Average  number  of  square  feet  to  each  lot       .... 

Total  frontage  on  Cornhill,  in  feet  ..... 

Average  frontage  per  lot,  in  feet  ..... 

Average  width  of  block,  in  feet      ...... 

Width  of  Cornhill,  in  feet  

Width  of  Brattle  Street,  in  feet  .         ,         ,         .         , 

Width  of  subway  underneath  .         .         .         .         , 

Land,  assessed  value  ......< 

Buildings,  assessed  value    ....... 

Land,  assessed  value,  per  foot      ...... 

Buildings,  assessed  value,  per  foot         .         .         .         ,         , 


21,419 

23 

931 

450 
20 

.        .        .  45 

.        .        .  48 

.        .        .  50 

24 

|i, 210,700 

.         .  $ioi,Soo 

.         .         .  $57 

.        .        .  $S 

Between  Cornhill  and  Brattle  Street,  Boston,  and 
facing  upon  both  streets,  are  found  to-day  twenty- 
three  houses  built  by  Uriah  Cotting  for  the  Cornhill 

*  This  chapter  is  adapted  from  an  address  at  a  banquet  given  bj  the 
Massachusetts  Single  Tax  League  to  members  of  the  Boston  Merchants* 
Association  in  the  Hotel  Brunswick,  October  22,  1901. 

79 


8o  THE  A  B  C  OF  TAXATION 

Company  in  1817  (Figs.  XIV  and  XV).  More  than 
one  hundred  firms  and  individuals  are  doing  business 
in  these  contracted  quarters,  in  which  not  one  of 
their  number  would  deign  to  live.  These  estates,  as 
they  stand,  net  the  owners  an  income  of  probably 
20  to  50  per  cent  on  their  original  investment.  With 
modern  buildings  they  would  net  say  5  or  6  per  cent 
on  to-day's  valuation  of  land  and  buildings. 

Why,  we  ask,  should  there  not  be  a  board  of  business 
health  to  condemn  buildings  which,  like  these,  are 
untenable  for  business?  As  a  matter  of  fact,  a  proper 
system  of  taxation  would  vacate  these  untenable 
buildings  without  the  aid  of  any  such  board.  If  the 
erection  of  the  Exchange  Building,  the  Tremont 
Building,  and  other  modern  office  buildings  could 
empty  immediately  hundreds  of  dingy  and  stuflFy 
offices,  why  would  not  a  hundred  business  palaces,  as 
fast  as  they  could  be  built,  empty  the  same  number  of 
cramped  and  ill-appointed  stores,  workrooms,  and 
attics? 

If  land  and  buildings  stood  on  their  respective  merits, 
subject  to  equal  competition,  that  is,  accessible  to 
capital  and  labour  at  the  price  each  is  worth  for  use, 
these  buildings  would  quickl]'  condemn  themselves. 
Such  unmerchantable  material,  if  at  sea,  would  follow 
the  decayed  frigate  to  some  navy  yard  to  be  broken 
up.  On  land,  if  they  had  not  been  fastened  to  it,  they 
would  long  ago  have  gone  to  the  junks  hop;  but  as 
they  are  fixed  to  the  land,  whoever  uses  the  land  must 
use  them. 

Under  the  best  of  conditions,  it  is  sufficient  for  the 
city  to  maintain  a  street  at  the  front  doors  of  abutting 
lots,  each  one  hundred  feet  deep.     Here,  on  Cornhill, 


THIRD  BOSTON  OBJECT  LESSON         8i 

are  lots  averaging  forty-five  feet  deep,  having  one 
forty-eight  foot  public  street,  with  all  its  public  utilities, 
at  the  front  door,  and  another  fifty  foot  street  at  the 
back  door,  equivalent  to  one  street  for  abutting  lots, 
each  twenty-five  feet  deep,  making  the  one  item  of 
street  cost,  for  the  accommodation  of  these  buildings, 
four  times  what  the  highest  public  welfare  demands. 
On  the  other  hand,  it  is  probable  that  if  the  buildings 
in  Comhill  were  new  and  adapted  to  the  situation, 
they  could  easily  accommodate  four  times  the  business 
that  is  done  in  the  present  area. 

With  four  times  as  much  street  as  is  needed,  for  one- 
quarter  of  the  amount  of  business,  is  it  not  a  simple 
calculation  that  Boston's  taxes,  on  account  of  the 
business  done  on  Cornhill  to-day,  are  something  like 
sixteen  times  as  heavy  as  they  need  to  be?  One  would 
naturally  think  that  the  owner  not  only  should  pay  for 
the  maintenance  of  the  land  value,  by  which  he  profits, 
but  should  also  make  the  utmost  of  such  public  facilities. 
As  a  matter  of  fact,  he  does  neither.  Is  it  hardship  to 
require  him  to  bear  the  taxes?  Is  it  possible  to  con- 
ceive of  the  adaptation  of  unlimited  means  to  a 
smaller  end  than  in  this  case  of  Cornhill?  The  object 
of  all  public  service  and  good  government  is  to  provide 
people  with  home  and  business  facilities.  When,  as 
in  this  case,  neither  of  these  objects  is  attained,  is  not 
the  expenditure  a  public  waste?  Is  it  not  money  spent 
for  nothing?  Surely,  there  is  no  prosperity  in  vacant 
lots.  These  are,  in  one  sense,  worse  than  vacant,  yet 
their  value  keeps  on  increasing.  New  buildings  on 
the  top  of  land  increase  its  value,  but  a  new  subway 
with  two  new  subway  stations  at  public  expense, 
under  the  land,  will,  as  is  here  witnessed,  sometimes 


82  THE  A  B  C  OF  TAXATION 

double  its  value  in  spite  of  the  old  buildings  upon  it. 
Is  it  for  such  buildings  as  these  that  Boston  builds  its 
subways? 

One  of  the  good  things  claimed  for  the  single  tax 
is  that  under  it  those  genuine  building  syndicates 
which  erect  and  improve  buildings  at  their  own 
expense  for  the  benefit  of  the  occupiers,  may  be 
expected  to  put  a  happy  end  to  those  alleged  "  land 
improvement  companies  "  which  exploit  the  land  for 
the  benefit  of  themselves,  largely  at  the  expense  of  the 
occupiers. 

When  the  palaces  which  insurance  companies*  build 
for  their  own  investment  are  such  shining  examples  of 
what  the  most  carefully  guarded  capital  can  profitably 
do,  how  can  these  waste  places  in  Cornhill  be  charged 
to  capital?  Capital  would  any  day  gladly  undertake 
to  pay  annually  for  this  whole  square  of  land  what  it 
is  worth  for  use,  would  pay  for  the  present  buildings 
their  total  worth,  and  would  then  equip  the  land 
luxuriously  for  business  occupancy,  asking  in  return 
only  a  secure  title  to  its  improvements.  But  when 
capital  is  asked  to  do  this,  as  tenant,  with  no  title  either 
to  land  or  improvements  thereon,  it  declines  to  play 
against  loaded  dice,  and  business  has  to  live  in  tents 
and  log  cabins  because  its  best  friend,  capital,  is  forced 
to  play  the  role  of  a  seeming  enemy.  The  malefactor, 
i.  e.,  the  evil  factor,  in  the  case,  is  the  private  appro- 
priation of  ground  rent,  which  is  like  a  check  valve — 
the  higher  the  steam  pressure  of  public  expansion  and 

*  It  has  been  thoughtlessly  alleged  that  the  single  tax  "vvould  bring  ruin  to 
savings  banks  and  insurance  companies,  by  impairing  the  value  of  their 
land  securities.  Under  any  gradual  adoption  of  the  single  tax  this  could 
hardly  be  a  serious  charge  so  long  as  investments  are  changed  every  three 
or  five  years,  as  is  the  custom  of  those  fiduciary  institutions. 


THIRD  BOSTON  OBJECT  LESSON         83 

the  demands  of  business,  the  more  securely  the  title 
valve  is  pressed  down  to  its  seat. 

A  title  to  land  bought  and  paid  for  five  or  fifty 
years  ago  is  not  like  other  wealth.  Title  to  Ic.nd  is 
simply  a  warrant  to  take  indirectly  at  the  annual 
round-up  a  certain  proportion  out  of  the  wealth  which 
other  people's  labour  has  produced  upon  that  land. 
That  is,  it  is  a  warrant  to  take  the  ground  rent  which 
public  expenditure  creates,  leaving  other  people  to  go 
on  paying  the  taxes  with  which  to  meet  that  public 
expenditure. 

Ground  Rent  a  Reflected  Value 

It  may  help  to  ^n  understanding  of  the  subject  to 
remember  that  the  site  value  of  land  is  so  to  speak 
a  reflected  value,  an  intangible  value,  not  value  result- 
ing from  individually  directed  labour.  The  immovable 
land  reflects  the  movables  that  are  upon  it.  In  great 
centres  of  traffic  in  movables,  the  land  value  is  great. 
Withdraw  all  movables  from  Boston,  New  York,  or 
Chicago,  divert  them  to  other  centres,  and  land  value 
would  vanish  as  does  your  image  from  the  glass  when 
you  step  away  from  it.  How  plain,  then,  is  the 
unwisdom  of  taxing  the  things  which  a  community 
wishes  above  all  else  to  invite  and  to  hold ;  how  plain 
the  wisdom  of  taxing  nothing  that  can  evade  taxation 

The  Natural  Basis  for  a  Natural  Tax 

The  ultimate  natural  basis  for  the  assessment  of  a 
natural  tax  upon  land  is  manifestly  the  basis  upon 
which  the  assessor  makes  all  his  calculations  of  land 
value,  viz.,  gross  ground  rent,  what  the  land  is  worth 
for  use.    Ground  rent  is  something  that  every  man 


84  THE  A  B  C  OF  TAXATION 

pays,  and  must  pay,  for  the  use  of  his  land,  and  no 
constitution  or  statute,  army  or  navy,  can  relieve  him 
*"rom  this  natural  tax.  He  now  pays  this  ground 
rent,  and  all  other  taxes  besides.  Our  desire  is  to 
turn  Ephraim  from  his  petrified  idols  of  taxation  until 
he  pays  no  tax  except  his  ground  rent,  which  he  must 
pay  in  any  event. 

The  inequality  in  the  division  of  wealth  effected 
through  special  privilege  is  caused  by  the  failure  to 
put  a  natural  tax  in  the  right  place,  and  the  subsequent 
aggravation  of  this  unequal  division  is  caused  by  the 
error  of  putting  artificial  taxes  in  the  wrong  place. 

The  single  tax  is  not  a  new  device  with  a  set  of  newly 
devised  principles  peculiar  to  itsei;  it  must  stand,  if 
it  stands  at  all,  upon  demonstrable  scientific  principles 
of  political  economy.  These  we  are  seeking  to  deter- 
mine and  apply,  believing  that  the  operation  of  such 
principles  must  bear  the  fruits  by  which  they  may 
be  known  and  justified. 

Other  sciences  —  mathematics,  chemistry,  physics, 
astronomy  —  have  long  been  showering  the  world  with 
blessings.  Is  it  not  time  that  economics,  the  science 
par  excellence  of  the  fair  distribution  of  all  these 
blessings,  should  assume  its  high  privilege  and  preroga- 
tive as  quartermaster,  commissary,  and  purveyor, 
to  govern  the  issue  of  all  these  Aladdin  stores? 

In  considering  the  possible  ease  with  which  the 
burden  of  taxation  may  be  made  finally  to  weigh,  let 
the  fact  never  be  lost  sight  of  that  the  selling  value  of 
land  will,  with  the  new  purchaser,  subsequently  to  the 
imposition  of  a  new  tax,  slip  out  from  under  the  burden 
like  a  globule  of  mercury  from  under  the  thumb.  We 
find  that  the  only  place  where  the  tax  yoke  will  stay 


THIRD  BOSTON  OBJECT  LESSON         85 

put  is  squarely  upon  the  shoulders  of  ground  rent,  what 
the  land  is  worth  for  use,  its  gross  annual  value. 
Take,  for  taxation,  a  portion  of  ground  rent,  and  you 
have  a  basis  for  assessment  that  is  stable,  in  that  it  is 
a  value  not  affected  by  taxation.  The  selling  value, 
or  the  assessed  valuation,  is  not  the  shoulders,  but 
the  rump,  or  the  small  of  the  back,  that  will  "slip  the 
yoke,"  as  the  farmers  say,  as  soon  as  real  estate  moves. 

By  fact  and  reason  we  are,  not  led,  but  driven,  to 
the  conclusion  that  more  than  1650,000,000  of  capital 
invested  in  Boston  land  to-day  escapes  entirely  the 
burden  of  the  tax  which  is  assessed  upon  capital 
invested  in  buildings ;  and  the  happy  landlord  of  land 
and  buildings  bears  no  land  tax  burden,  shifts  his 
buildings  tax  upon  his  tenant,  and  thus  himself  entirely 
escapes  the  tax  burden.  This  statement  is  a  corollary, 
or  consequent,  of  the  accepted  economic  principle,  that 
the  selling  value  of  land  is  reduced  by  the  capitalised 
tax  that  is  laid  upon  it. 

This  view  is  in  literal  harmony  with  the  substantial 
agreement  of  the  economists,  that  the  only  direct  tax 
(with  the  possible  exception  of  taxes  on  incomes  and 
inheritances)  —  the  tax  which  cannot  be  shifted  or 
evaded  —  is  a  tax,  not  upon  the  assessed  valuation  of 
land,  nor  upon  the  selling  value  of  the  land,  but  upon 
ground  rent,  or  its  capitalised  value,  the  gross  value 
of  land. 

Chambers  of  commerce,  merchants'  associations, 
manufacturers,  and  dealers  are  constantly  seeking  to 
fmd  or  make  the  best  and  largest  market  for  their 
commodities.  The  best  market,  it  is  fair  to  say,  is  the 
largest  number  of  persons  who  are  able  to  buy  the 
wares  they  want.    The  greater  the  number  of  people 


86  THE  A  B  C  OF  TAXATION 

who  want  every  good  thing  that  is  made  (and  are 
able  to  have  it)  the  better  it  is  for  trade.  Thus,  an 
equitable  distribution  of  wealth  is  a  vital  requisite  in 
the  case. 

Make  taxation  equal,  impartial,  "reasonable"  to 
the  poor  man,  "proportionate"  to  the  rich  man,  and 
the  distribution  of  wealth  will  then  be  as  equal  as 
justice  can  make  it,  for  it  will  be  in  proportion  to  the 
skill  and  industry  of  the  hands  and  brains  producing 
that  wealth.  "  Equal  opportunities  for  all,  and  special 
privileges  to  none."  The  equitable  ideal  is  to-day 
unrealised  because,  while  a  comparatively  equitable 
distribution  of  a  portion  of  wealth  is  going  on  through 
the  one  universal  channel  of  wages,  congestion  of 
wealth  is  constantly  occurring  through  the  second 
and  only  remaining  channel,  the  channel  of  special 
privilege,  v/hich  is  invariably  a  privilege  of  the  private 
appropriation  of  ground  rent,  always  and  wholly  a 
social  product. 

The  single  tax  aim  is,  on  the  one  hand,  to  widen  the 
channel  of  wages  by  opening  the  way  to  equal  opportu- 
nities, and  by  increasing  the  purchasing  power  of  wages 
through  reduction  of  prfces,  and  on  the  other  hand, 
to  narrow  the  channel  of  special  privilege  by  making 
the  man  who  has  this  privilege  pay  a  tax  proportioned 
to  his  privileges. 

Another  Illustration 

The  St.  Paul's  Church  property  on  Tremont  Street, 
Boston,  standing  between  two  large  stores  (Fig.  XVI), 
furnishes  another  good  illustration  of  what  we  have 
been  saying  and  reiterating. 

Less  than  ten  years  ago  $1,500,000  was  offered  for 


THIRD  BOSTON  OBJECT  LESSON        87 

this  property  for  business  purposes,  and  the  offer  was 
declined.  Since  then  the  assessed  valuations  of  the 
adjacent  Tremont  Street  estates  between  Winter  Street 
and  Temple  Place  have  increased  more  than  75  per 
cent.  In  view  of  these  facts  it  should  be  very  con- 
servative to  estimate  to-day: 

The  value  of  St.  Paul's  Church  property  at  .  .  ^2,000,000 
For  this  value  the  St.  Paul  Society  paid  in  1820      .  100,000 

The  people  of  Boston  have  since  contributed  by 
their  aggregate  and  particular  activities, 
industries,  and  expenditures  ....       $1,900,000 

An  annual  contribution  for  87  years  of  much 

above 20,000 

But,  in  recent  years,  this  increase  in  value  has 

been  at  the  annual  rate  of  not  less  than      .  .  $75,000 

Church  property  being  exempt  from  taxation,  the 
people  of  Boston  have  to  make  up  the  amount 
of  the  exemption.  This,  in  the  case  of  St. 
Paul's  is  $22,500,  and  for  all  church  property 
in  the  city  is  $385,000,  a  year. 

If  then  to  the  above  average  annual  contribution 
of  the  public  there  be  added  these  taxes  for  1907, 
more  than   .......  22,000 

The  total  annual  contribution  amounts  to    .         ,  $97,000 

An  amount  equal  to  the  5  per  cent  ground  rent  of 
almost  $2,000,000  worth  of  land,  or  to  the  taxes,  at 
$1 5 .90  per  thousand,  on  $6,100,000  worth  of  property  I 
Ten  out  of  the  354  cities  and  towns  of  Massachusetts 
-—  Everett,  Hyde  Park,  Melrose,  Milton,  North  Adams, 
Revere,  Salem,  Taunton,  Waltham,  and  Watertown  — 
and  the  whole  county  of  Barnstable,  have  each  an 
average  land  valuation  of  $6,000,000.  Thus  the  cost 
of  St.  Paul's  to  the  people  of  Boston  has  been  far 
greater  than  would   be  the   average  income    at  the 


88  THE  A  B  C  OF  TAXATION 

Boston  rate  of  $i6  per  thousand,  from  taxation  upon 
the  land  of  any  one  of  the  above  named  ten  cities 
or  one  county  of  the  state  for  the  year  1907. 

Under  the  single  tax  such  conditions  could  not 
prevail.  Prevailing,  as  they  do,  nothing  but  the 
private  appropriation  of  a  public  ground  rent  can 
perpetuate  them.  Nothing  but  the  taxation  of  ground 
rent  can  correct  them. 

The  St.  Paul's  illustration  seems  extreme  on  account 
of  the  total  exemption  of  church  property,  but  what 
has  been  said  of  it  is  from  two-thirds  to  nine-tenths  true 
of  all  vacant  land,  or  of  land  slightly  improved,  as  is  the 
case  with  a  large  part  of  the  business  section  of 
Boston. 

Granting  all  that  St.  Paul's  may  claim  for  religion 
and  sentiment,  we  yet  maintain — and  its  forty-one 
proprietors  will  doubtless  admit — that  an  impartial 
distribution  of  the  cost  of  religion  and  sentiment  to 
the  one  hundred  and  twenty  thousand  families  of 
Boston  at  this  rate  of  more  than  $2,000  each,  amounting 
to  a  total  of  more  than  $240,000,000  a  year,  would  be 
an  undreamed  of  union  of  Church  and  State. 

The  object  of  this  illustration  is  not  to  cast  any 
invidious  reflection  upon  St.  Paul's  Church,  but  rather 
to  impress  upon  your  minds  the  enormous  dimensions 
of  the  reservoir  from  which  the  single  tax  proposes  to 
draw  all  public  revenue. 

The  proprietors  of  St.  Paul's  are  a  body  of  Christian 
gentlemen  of  discernment  and  philanthropy;  none  are 
more  likely  than  they  to  see  the  inconsistency  of  their 
situation;  none  more  likely  to  welcome  its  cor- 
recting; none  more  likely  to  see  that  they  will  get  a  full 
share  of  betterment  from  a  new  and  improved  order  of 


THIRD  BOSTON  OBJECT  LESSON        89 

things ;  that  a  religion  and  a  church  worthy  of  justifica- 
tion have  no  need  of  such  alms  as  these  from  the  people 
whom  they  seek  to  save.  Brought  face  to  face  with  a 
true  apprehension  of  the  problem,  seeing  the  unequal 
operation  of  a  tax  exemption  that  gives  the  least  to 
those  most  needing  aid,  and  most  to  those  who  need 
it  least,  it  would  not  be  surprising  if  they  were  them.- 
selves  to  instigate  and  inaugurate  the  remedy. 

Some  Objections  Answered 

It  is  objected  to  the  single  tax,  that  it  is  confiscation. 
But  what  is  taken  from  the  owner?  No  land  is  taken. 
The  single  tax  is  not  land  nationalisation.  No  right 
of  occupancy  or  improvement  or  sale  or  devise  is  taken 
from  the  owner;  nothing  except  the  right  to  collect 
natural  taxes  from  other  people,  and  to  be  himself 
exempt.  In  the  aggregate  the  new  tax  would  be 
compensated  for  by  the  exemption  of  an  equal  value 
of  buildings  and  personal  property.  The  landlord 
who  thinks  himself  discriminated  against  by  such  a 
tax  has  only  to  improve  his  land  to  escape  the 
burden. 

Both  land  value  and  house  value  require  to  be 
maintained.  The  public  creates  and  maintains  the 
value  of  the  land.  The  owner,  directly  as  builder, 
or  indirectly  as  purchaser,  creates  and  maintains  the 
use  value  of  the  house. 

The  maintenance  of  the  use  value  of  the  land  by  the 
public  gives  outright  to  the  owner  a  fund  the  interest 
of  which  will  pay  his  land  tax.  The  maintenance  of  the 
use  value  of  the  house  falls  upon  the  owner,  and  he 
must  recover  his  house  tax  out  of  the  house  rent 
increased  so  as  to  include  the  tax.    This  will  be  true, 


90  THE  A  B  C  OF  TAXATION 

because,  unless  the  owner  can  get  a  rent  sufficient  to 
pay  interest  on  the  cost  of  the  house,  over  and  above 
taxes,  no  more  houses  will  be  built,  until  they  become 
so  scarce  as  to  force  rent  to  a  point  that  will  cover  the 
cost  of  maintenance. 

How  can  taxation  be  confiscation?  Etymologically 
the  words  have  nothing,  and  colloquially  almost 
nothing,  in  common.  To  confiscate  is,  according  to  the 
Century  Dictionary,  "to  adjudge  to  be  forfeited  to  the 
public  treasury  by  way  of  penalty"  —  the  meaning  is 
inseparable  from  the  idea  of  forfeiture.  To  tax,  on 
the  contrary,  is  "to  levy  money  or  other  contributions, 
as  from  subjects  or  citizens,  to  meet  the  expense  of 
government." 

Is  it  just  to  allow  the  landowners'  investment,  now 
exempt,  to  remain  exempt?  Does  either  legal  equity 
or  ethics  require  that  the  land  should  be  exempt  from 
an  increased  tax,  or  that  its  owner  should  have  even 
partial,  much  less  total,  immunity  from  the  burden  of 
taxation?  Because  a  new  tax  upon  land  would  reduce 
proportionately  the  selling  price,  should  owners  of 
land  for  that  reason  continue  to  go  scot  free? 

The  advance  in  Boston's  tax  rate  per  thousand  for 
1907  ($15.90)  is  $3  over  that  of  1897  ($13.00.)  The 
capitalised  value  of  this  increase,  $650,000,000  multi- 
plied by  $3  per  thousand,  multiplied  by  twenty 
years  (the  number  years  purchase),  is  $39,000,000. 
Do  we  hear  that  Boston  has  confiscated  $39,000,000 
worth  of  her  citizen's  land  in  the  last  ten  years? 

Boston  has  to-day  some  $560,000,000  of  new  land 
value,  which  it  did  not  have  fifty  years  ago.  Mean- 
time the  tax  rate  doubled  from  $8  in  1856  to  $16  in 
1906.     The  capitalised  value  of  this  $8  increase  in 


THIRD  BOSTON  OBJECT  LESSON         91 

rate  amounts  to  say  $90,000,000.  Is  it  charged  that 
Boston  is  to-day  confiscating  190,000,000  of  the  land 
of  her  citizens? 

All  taxes  are  expended  in  maintaining  the  value  of 
land.  How  can  any  vested  right,  or  statute  law,  or 
hoary  custom  make  it  confiscation  for  the  community 
to  tax  a  value  of  its  own  creation,  especially  since, 
through  the  capitalisation  of  an  established  land  tax, 
it  is  now,  or  soon  becomes,  to  the  owner  of  the  land, 
a  burdenless  tax? 

What  Is  Meant  by  the  Single  Tax 

At  the  eleventh  Dinner-Discussion  of  the  Economic 
Club  of  Boston,  the  club  was  addressed  by  Professor 
E.  R.  A.  Seligman,  of  Columbia  University,  upon 
the  topic: 

Resolved:  That  it  would  be  sound  public  policy  to 
make  the  future  increase  in  ground  rent  a  subject  of 
special  taxation. 

On  that  occasion  there  was  printed  and  placed  at 
each  plate  a  statement  of  the  meaning  of  the  single 
tax,  which,  slightly  revised,  was  as  follows: 

1.  It  means  the  abolition  of  all  taxation  (not 
regulative  or  restrictive)  except  that  upon  land  values. 

2.  It  means  the  gradual  transfer  to  land  of  all  those 
taxes  now  raised  from  buildings  and  other  improve- 
ments, personal  property,  etc. 

3.  It  means  that  Boston  would  raise  its  whole  tax 
in  the  same  way  that  less  than  one-half  of  it  is  now 
raised,  viz.,  by  a  tax  upon  the  value  of  its  land. 

4.  It  means  to  provide  for  common  needs  out  of 
ground  rent  —  a  common  product  —  instead  of  out  of 
wages  —  an  individual  product. 


92  THE  A  B  C  OF  TAXATION 

5.  It  means  that  out  of  its  ground  rent  of  fifty 
millions  or  more  Boston  would  collect  its  whole  tax  of 
twenty  millions  instead  of  only  ten  millions  as  now. 

6.  It  means  that  Boston  could  raise  the  amount 
of  its  existing  taxes  by  taking  a  trifle  more  than 
two-fifths  of  its  ground  rent  (the  annual  value  of  land 
for  use)  in  taxes  instead  of  less  than  one-fifth  as  at 
present,  thus  making  it  possible  to  remit  all  other 
taxes  if  desired. 

7.  It  means  the  taxation  of  unearned  incomes, 
instead  of  hard-earned  incomes. 

8.  It  means  a  tax  that  is  non-repressive,  because, 
being  wholly  a  tax  upon  special  privilege,  it  can  never 
be  a  burden  upon  industry  or  commerce,  nor  can 
it  ever  operate  to  reduce  the  wages  of  labour  or 
increase  prices  to  the  consumer. 


PART    III. 
OTHER  ESSAYS  AND  ADDRESSES 

Chapter    VII. 
Private  Property  in  Land. 

Chapter  VIII. 
Justice  of  the  Single  Tax. 

Chapter  IX. 
The  Single  Tax  and  the  Farmer. 

Chapter  X. 
Regulation  by  Taxation. 

Chapter  XI. 
Inheritance  and  Income  Taxes. 

Chapter  XII. 
The  Single   Tax. 


I 


Chapter  VII 
PRIVATE  PROPERTY  IN  LAND 

*^The  primary  error  of  the  advocates  of  land  nationalisation 
is  in  their  confusion  of  equal  rights  -with  joint  rights.  .  .  In 
truth  the  right  to  the  use  of  land  ts  not  a  joint  or  common  right, 
but  an  equal  right;  the  joint  or  common  right  is  to  rent." 

— Henry  George. 

MOSES  and  Isaiah  and  Herbert  Spencer  made  their 
ages  resound  with  the  thunders  of  the  moral 
law  on  the  land  question,  and  yet  a  groping  world  had 
to  wait  for  Henry  George  to  devise  a  modus  operandi, 
and  so 

Make  channels  for  the  streams  of  love 
Where  they  may  broadly  run. 

Asserting  "the  equal  right  of  all  men  to  the  use  of 
the  earth,"  Herbert  Spencer  declared  that  "equity 
does  not  permit  property  in  land."  But,  failing  to 
see  any  alternative  other  than  "nationalisation  of 
the  land,"  which  was  abhorrent  to  his  philosophy, 
he  later,  while  disavowing  none  of  his  former  principles, 
proclaimed  his  intellectual  despair  and  unconditional 
surrender  in  these  words : 

I  cannot  see  my  way  toward  reconciliation  of  the  ethical 
requirementswith  the  politico-economical  requirements.  .  .  . 
The  belief  that  land  would  be  better  managed  by  public  officials 
than  it  is  by  private  owners  is  a  very  wild  belief.* 

♦  Letter  to  the  London  Times,  November  6,  1889.  See  Henry  George's 
"Perplexed  PhUosopher"  (Doubleday,  Page  &  Co.,  1906),  p.  77. 

95 


96  THE  A  B  C  OF  TAXATION 

Coming  upon  Spencer's  lost  field,  Henry  George 
formed  a  new  line  of  battle,  changed  the  war  cry  of 
''equal  right  to  land"  to  "joint  or  common  right  to 
rent,"  picked  up  the  shepherd's  sling  of  taxation,  the 
familiar  weapon  which  had  escaped  Herbert  Spencer's 
attention,  and  gradually  dispelling  the  mists  of  the 
old  conflict,  won  the  day. 

It  is  my  opinion  that  few  men  have  been  more  mis- 
apprehended, misinterpreted,  and  hence  misjudged, 
than  Henry  George,  and  this,  too,  not  infrequently, 
by  zealous  friends.  This  is  especially  true  of  the  inter- 
pretation of  his  ultimate  views  regarding  land  tenure. 

Few  people  know  of  the  distinction  made  by  Henry 
George,  by  the  science  of  economics,  and  by  statute 
law  between  private  property  in  land  and  private 
property  in  the  things  produced  by  labour,  or  between 
the  private  ownership  of  land  and  the  private  posses- 
sion of  land.  Therefore,  if  you  say  that  private 
property  in  land  is  unjust,  or  that  private  ownership 
of  land  is  unjust,  the  tendency  is  to  close  many  minds 
to  further  consideration  of  a  statement  which  to  them 
savours  too  strongly  of  confiscation.  One  may  attack 
with  vigour  the  private  appropriation  of  ground  rent 
(what  land  is  worth  for  use),  and  be  easily  understood, 
while  an  attack  upon  private  ownership  in  land  is  very 
apt  to  be  misunderstood.  Able  men  sometimes  assert 
that  the  aim  of  the  single  tax  movement  is  the  com- 
plete subversion  and  overthrow  of  the  institution  of 
private  property  in  land.  This  confusion  arises  partly 
from  a  lack  of  clear  understanding  as  to  the  meaning 
of  terms,  and  partly  from  applying  to  land  the  theory 
of  ownership  which  in  law  applies  only  to  other  things. 

Coming  to  an  analysis  of  the  different  terms,  posses- 


PRIVATE  PROPERTY  IN  LAND  97 

sion,  ownership,  and  property,  used  in  describing  the 
tenure  of  land,  we  find  that  while  they  are  far  from 
synonymous,  they  yet  have  much  in  common,  and 
the  terms  are  often  used  interchangeably.  The 
"possession"  of  the  dictionaries  does  not  always 
imply  ownership;  but  possession  does  imply  the  same 
physical  dominion  that  belongs  of  right  to  ownership 
—  which  right  the  legal  title  to  ownership  grants  and 
conveys.  Henry  George's  proposal  was  to  leave 
owners  in  possession  of  land,  and  to  accord  to  that 
possession  the  legal  right  of  physical  dominion  by 
means  of  a  broad  definition  of  the  word,  made  to 
include  the  right  "to  buy  and  sell,  bequeath  and 
devise,"*  or,  in  the  usual  form  of  the  real  estate  deed, 
"to  give,  grant,  bargain,  sell,  and  convey" — a  right 
universally  granted  to  ownership  and  property. 

A  title  to  land  is  a  title  to  the  rights  and  privileges 
that  constitute  its  value,  and  that,  largely  at  least, 
are  created  by  the  labour  of  the  community.  Title 
to  the  land  itself,  whether  its  value  is  one  dollar  or  a 
million  dollars,  is  necessary  to  security  of  improve- 
ments. Title  to  the  annual  value  of  land — ground 
rent  —  is  not  necessary  to  the  security  of  improve- 
ments, which  would  be  equally  secure  whether  one- 
quarter  or  three-quarters  of  ground  rent  be  taken  in 
taxation.  The  dictionaries  do  not  include  land  value 
in  their  definition  of  land.  Land  itself,  deprived  of 
the  rights  and  privileges  pertaining  thereto  —  that  is, 
land  with  a  ninety-nine  years'  restriction  of  a  tight 
and  high  board  fence  around  it  so  that  there  would 
be  no  legal  right  of  way  to  and  from  it  —  could  have 
no  market  value.     The  value  of  land  is  in  large  part 

*"  Progress  and  Poverty"  (Doubleday,  Page  &  Company),  1906,  p.  403. 


98  THE  A  B  C  OF  TAXATION 

created  by  those  tributary  surroundings  which  are 
provided  through  taxation,  and  hence  such  value  is 
largely  the  product  of  the  labour  of  the  community  as 
represented  in  its  public,  quasi-public,  and  private 
outlays.  A  man  who  owns  land  owns  the  soil,  which 
of  itself  has  little  or  no  value,  and  he  owns  every  right 
and  privilege,  fee,  title,  etc.,  pertaining  to  the  land 
from  zenith  to  earth's  centre,  exclusive  and  absolute 
as  against  any  other  individual,  but  qualified  and 
conditional  as  against  the  community. 

Private  ownership  of  land  may  be  defined  as  the 
proprietorship  of  the  rights  and  privileges  pertaining 
to  the  situation.  It  extends  to  the  exclusion  of  all 
other  persons  (person  being  limited  in  law  to  "an 
individual,  or  a  body  corporate,  other  than  the  State"), 
but  is  subject  always  to  the  claims  of  the  community 
to  its  share  in  the  value  of  those  rights  and  privileges, 
so  far  as  that  value  is  a  social  product,  this  claim  to 
be  asserted  and  maintained  by  means  of  the  sovereign 
power  of  taxation. 

Property  in  land,  ownership  of  land,  in  law,  means 
tenure,  holding,  right  of  possession  (subject  to  the 
sovereign  right  of  taxation)  and  no  more.  The  owner 
can  have  no  more  enjoyment  of  these  rights  than  can 
the  possessor  as  defined  by  Henry  George.  Either 
must  have  an  exclusive  enjoyment  (proprietorship) 
in  the  benefits  of  which  no  one  else  can  claim  a  share 
except  through  the  agency  of  taxation.  The  rights  of 
the  public  are  the  same  under  either  definition. 

If,  under  the  single  tax,  land  owners  should  be 
allowed  to  retain  a  small  percentage  of  rent,  there  is 
no  moral  difference  whether  such  privilege  attach  to 
their  ownership  or  to  their  possession.     In  either  case 


PRIVATE  PROPERTY  IN  LAND  99 

there  is  no  recognition  of  the  right  of  the  private 
appropriation  of  ground  rent,  no  compromise  with 
any  wrong  attendant  upon  ownership  that  does  not 
attend  ahke  upon  possession. 

It  is  not  individual  proprietorship  of  land,  but  the 
private  appropriation  of  ground  rent,  which  is  charged 
with  maintaining  industrial  slavery.  True  it  is  that 
under  present  conditions  "when  land  value  is  made 
private  property  the  law  of  equal  freedom  is  denied"; 
but  under  the  Single  Tax  this  would  not  be  true. 
Any  degree  of  justice  or  injustice,  with  the  single  tax 
or  without,  would  be  exactly  the  same  whether  the 
tenure  be  called  property,  ownership,  or  possession. 
What  practical  difference,  then,  does  it  make,  whether 
the  tenure  be  called  by  one  name  or  the  other?  The 
private  property  in  land  of  which  Herbert  Spencer 
and  Tolstoy*  and  Henry  George  treated  was  the 
untaxed  ownership  of  our  day  and  generation  with 
its  corresponding  private  appropriation  of  ground 
rent.  It  may  be  confidently  asserted  that  when 
Henry  George  said,  "Private  property  in  land  is 
unjust,"  he  meant  —  as  the  whole  principle  and 
spirit  of  his  teaching  requiie  us  to  believe,  and  as  the 
context  of  controverted  passages  shows  —  that  private 
property  in  land  values  is  wrong. f 

♦  Stc  Appendix  B. 

■j-  "The  words  'private  property  in  land'  have  two  meanings.  One  meaning 
it,  the  legal  power  privately  to  appropriate  rent.  The  other  meaning  is,  the 
legal  power  exclusively  to  possess  land  in  perpetuity. 

"  The  6rst  power  is  the  essence  of  landlordism.  It  was  attacked  by  all  the 
force  Henry  George  possessed.  The  second  power  is  land  ownership,  and  this 
Henry  George  did  not  attack,  but  on  the  contrary  said,  if  his  plan  were  adopted, 
would  'continue  just  as  now.* 

"  The  value  of  land  has  nothing  to  do  with  the  validity  of  its  title.  If  a  man 
holds  title  to  a  parcel  of  land  of  no  value,  he  is  nevertheless  a  land  owner."— 
John  Z.  White,  in  the  Single   Tax  Review, 


loo  THE  A  B  C  OF  TAXATION 

It  is  sometimes  said  that  if  land  owners  can  right- 
fully claim  ownership  they  are  entitled  to  all  the 
ground  rent;  that  the  common  right  to  land  and  the 
common  right  to  ground  rent  go  together.  How  can 
this  be  true,  when  even  under  the  land  tenure  of 
to-day,  which  is  that  of  ownership,  no  one  claims  that 
land  owners,  as,  for  example, those  of  the  City  of  Boston, 
are  entitled  to  all  the  ground  rent,  but  only  to  that 
part  which  is  not  taken  in  taxation.  Their  own  claim 
falls  short  of  "all"  by  the  1 10,000,000  now  yielded  up 
in  taxation.  In  case  the  demands  of  taxation  should 
be  twice  as  great,  would  they  be  any  more  than  now 
entitled  to  ''all"?  It  is  not  easy  to  see  how  owner- 
ship can  carry  with  it  as  a  necessary  consequence  the 
private  appropriation  of  ground  rent,  because,  while 
there  has  never  been  a  denial,  there  has  always  been 
a  recognition,  of  the  sovereign  power  and  right  to  tax 
the  land. 

Private  ownership  of  land  is  no  injustice  to  anybody 
to-day,  nor  has  it  been  at  any  time.  The  untaxed 
private  ownership  of  land  value  as  it  exists  to-day  is 
unjust.  This  does  not  mean  that  the  ownership  is 
unjust,  but  that  not  to  tax  it  is  unjust.  An  absolute 
ownership  in  land,  such  as  Henry  George  recognises 
in  the  products  of  labour,  would  be  unjust,  but,  says 
Mr.  Edward  Atkinson,  no  such  "absolute  ownership 
of  land  is  recognised  in  the  law  books."  Its  tenure 
is  always  subject  to  taxation,  and  to  the  superior  right 
of  eminent  domain.  Feudal  tenure  would  seem  to 
have  been  a  rude  recognition  of  the  principle  that  the 
beneficiaries  of  a  government  should  pay  the  expenses 
of  government. 

Henry  George  said,  in    1879,  in    "Progress    and 


PRIVATE  PROPERTY  IN  LAND         loi 

Poverty,"  Book  VIII.,  Chapter  II.,  "I  do  not  propose 
.  .  .  to  confiscate  private  property  in  land"  but 
"to  appropriate  rent  by  taxation."  "It  is  not  nec- 
essary," he  says,  "to  confiscate  land;  it  is  only 
necessary  to  confiscate  rent."  And  again,  "People 
are  led  into  confusion  by  assuming  that  we  propose  to 
take  land  from  its  owners."  Yet  again,  in  1892,  in  his 
chapter  on  Compensation  in  "A  Perplexed  Philoso- 
pher,"* Mr.  George  says:  " The  primary  error  of  the 
advocates  of  land  nationalisation  is  in  their  confusion 
of  equal  rights  with  joint  rights.  .  .  In  truth  the 
right  to  the  use  of  land  is  not  a  pint  or  common  rights 
hut  an  equal  right;  the  jo.  A  or  common  right  is  to  rent." 

The  appalling  distress  and  havoc  consequent  upon 
tenant  eviction  in  Scotland,  Ireland,  and  even  in  New 
York  City,  would  be  abolished  if  the  evictors  had  to 
pay  as  much  for  land  to  be  held  idle  as  the  evicted  are 
willing  to  pay  for  it  to  use,  and  Mr.  George's  prediction 
that  the  users  of  the  land  would  eventually  become  the 
owners  would  be  realised.  An  unjust  ownership  would 
give  place  to  a  just  ownership.  The  wrong  is  not  in  a 
just  ownership,  but  in  an  unjust,  because  untaxed  and 
hence  monopoly,  ownership.  What  Mr.  George  plainly 
aimed  at  was  to  destroy  the  latter  while  conserving  the 
former. 

Mr.  George  perhaps  never  had  an  abler  or  fairer 
opponent,  or  one  more  analytical  in  his  treatment  of 
the  issue,  than  Mr.  Edward  Atkinson.  Mr.  Atkinson, 
early  in  his  argument  at  Saratoga  in  1890,  in  order 
to  limit  their  discussion  to  their  differences,  proceeded 
to  eliminate  their  agreements,  chief  of  which,  to  his 
mind,  was  that  land  should  remain  private  property. 

♦Doubleday,  Page  &  Co.,  New  York,  1906,  p.  242. 


102  "THE  A  B  C  OF  TAXATION 

Mr.  George,  although  he  immediately  followed 
Mr.  Atkinson,  made  no  attempt  then  or  later  to  con- 
tradict Mr.  Atkinson's  representation,  nor  did  the  other 
principal  speakers  in  opposition,  Professors  Andrews, 
Clark,  and  Seligman,  charge  Mr.  George  with  advocat- 
ing the  abolition  of  private  property  in  land. 

Mr.  Atkinson  said: 

Mr.  George  and  myself  concur  in  one  point:  namely,  that 
there  is  no  absolute  property  in  land  in  any  States  which  are 
founded  on  the  English  common  law.  In  fact,  there  is,  I 
believe,  no  absolute  property  in  land  anywhere.  Conditional 
property  in  land  —  i.  e.,  peaceful  individual  possession  of  specific 
parcels  of  land  —  is  admitted  to  be  necessary  to  its  use  by  Mr. 
George  and  myself.  .  .  .  Mr.  George  holds  throughout 
his  argument  *^o  the  absolute  necessity  of  giving  conditional 
ownership,  or  complete,  full,  and  peaceable  possession  of  land 
to  those  who  may  chose  to  take  it  under  the  new  condition;  and 
he  has  justified  this  ownership  in  many  ways,  not  only  in  fact, 
but  in  words.  He  says,  **In  applying  to  public  use  the  power 
of  drawing  on  the  general  wealth  which  pertains  to  the  owner- 
ship of  land,  we  discourage  ownership  without  use.'*  In  that 
phrase  he  admits  the  ownership  which  he  later  justifies  in  the 
following  words:  ''It  (i.  e.,  ownership)  arises  from  the  necessity 
which  comes  from  the  highest  use  of  land  of  giving  individual 
possession,  and  comes  from  the  difference  in  the  capacity  of 
land."  And,  finally,  after  advocating  the  single  tax  on  land 
valuation,  he  justifies  it  only  in  these  significant  words:  **Under 
such  conditions,  men  would  not  care  to  hold  land  which  they 
did  not  want  to  use;  and  users  of  land,  where  their  use  was  more 
than  transient, would  become  the  legal  owners,  having  the  assured 
privilege  of  peaceable  possession  and  transfer  as  long  as  the 
tax  was  paid."  .  .  .  What  is  the  right  of  transfer  except 
the  right  of  purchase  and  sale  ?  What  is  peaceable  possession 
and  legal  ownership,  except  a  grant  of  property  in  land  by  the 
State  ?    .     .    .    Mr.  George  sustains  the  necessity  of  private 


PRIVATE  PROPERTY  IN  LAND         103 

ownership  of  land,  in  the  most  positive  terms;  and  he  is  right. 
.  .  .  To  haggle  about  the  difference  between  possession 
and  ownership  of  land  is  mere  word-catching.  But  Mr.  George 
uses  the  term  "ownership"  (i.  e.,  private  ownership)  in  the 
most  positive  way.  Neither  he  nor  myself  sets  up  absolute 
ownership.  Therefore,  it  follows  of  necessity  that  the  only 
ground  of  difference  between  the  advocates  of  the  single  tax 
system,  who  concur  with  Mr.  George  in  admitting  the  absolute 
necessity  of  private  ownership  of  land,  under  suitable  conditions, 
to  whiclr  all  shall  be  subject  alike,  is  as  to  the  conditions  under 
which  that  private  ownership  and  possession  shall  be  granted, 
and  under  which  peaceable  possession  through  all  time  and 
through  all  transfers  shall  be  sustained  by  the  whole  power 
of  the  State.  .  .  .  In  the  present  discussion,  it  has  appeared 
that  Mr.  George  and  myself  agree: — 

1.  That  there  is  no  absolute  ownership  of  land  under  the 
English  common  law.  We  agree  that  what  individuals  now 
possess  is  "an  estate  in  land,"  which  is  subject  to  many  con- 
ditions.    These  conditions  may  be  varied.     .     .     . 

2.  We  agree  that  the  individual  possession  of  land  is  necessary 
to  productive  use,  in  order  that  humanity  may  be  sustained; 
in  other  words,  that  the  land  must  be  impropriated. 

And  so,  with  Henry  George,  we  insist  that  the  real 
controversy  in  hand  is  not  over  the  question  whether 
private  property  in  land  is  right  or  wrong,  but  whether 
in  law  and  in  morals  private  ownership  of  land  should 
or  should  not  include  the  private  appropriation  of 
ground  rent,  the  annual  value  of  the  land  and  — if  it 
should  —what  ought  to  be  the  limit  of  such 
appropriation. 

The  contention  of  the  single  tax  advocate  is  that 
this  limit  is  to  be  found  in  the  dictates  of  justice  rather 
than  in  the  letter  of  any  ephemeral  statute.  On  this 
point,  above  the  utterances  of  agitators  and  economists, 


I04  THE  A  B  C  OF  TAXATION 

let  there  be  heard  the  voice  of  the  Christian  Church, 
as  found  in  the  doctrine  of  St.  Thomas  Aquinas  when 
he  says: 

Human  law  is  law  only  in  virtue  of  its  accordance  with  ripht 
reason,  and  it  is  thus  manifest  that  it  flows  from  the  eternal 
law.  And  in  so  far  as  it  deviates  from  right  reason  it  is  called 
an  unjust  law.  In  such  case  it  is  not  law  at  all,  but  rather  a 
species  of  violence. 

This  is  reiterated  in  the  teachings  of  the  Catholic 
Church,  notably  in  the  Encyclical  of  Pope  Leo  XIII. 
on  the  Condition  of  Labour,  and  is  referred  to  in  the 
following  quotation  from  a  prominent  Catholic  priest: 

As  to  all  property,  land  included,  the  Pope  lays  down  the 
law  of  the  Church  in  this  comprehensive  sentence:  "The  right 
to  possess  property  is  from  nature,  not  from  man;  and  the  State 
has  only  the  right  to  regulate  its  use  in  the  interests  of  the  public 
good,  but  by  no  means  to  abolish  the  right  to  possess  it  altogether. 
The  State  is,  therefore,  unjust  and  cruel,  if  in  the  name  of 
taxation,  it  deprives  the  private  owner  of  more  than  is  just." 

It  follows  from  this  declaration  that  if  the  single  tax  theory 
as  presented  by  its  advocates  aims  at  no  more  than  to  "regulate" 
the  right  of  property  in  land  "in  the  interests  of  the  public 
good,"  and  not  "to  abolish  it  altogether,"  or  to  take  away 
from  the  private  owner  of  land,  "in  the  name  of  taxation,"  more 
than  is  just,*  surely  such  a  proposal  is  not  condemnable  on 
ethical  grounds. 

Now,  if  I  understand  the  aims  and  claims  of  the  Single  Tax 
League,  it  clearly  recognises  the  right  of  private  or  individual 
ownership  of  land.  It  proposes  only  to  levy  such  a  tax  upon 
land  as  will  support  the  government;  thus  throwing  the  burden 
of  taxation  on  that  part  of  the  value  of  the  land  which  is  not  the 
result  of  the  owner's  foresight,  intelligence,  or  labour,  but  is  the 
result  of  the  collective  labour,  growth,  and  development  of  the 
whole  community. 


*  Henry  George,  in  his  Open  Letter  to  the  Pope,  apparently  did  not  advert  to 
these  words,  "more  than  is  just,"  and  hence  his  reasoning  is  open  to  the 
charge  of  lacking  that  complete  justice  which  was  his  highest  aim. 


PRIVATE   PROPERTY   IN   LAND         105 

In  considering,  therefore,  a  tax  on  land  values,  we  must 
bear  in  mind  that  it  is  a  fundamental  teaching  of  the  Church  that 
the  common  good  of  all  mankind  is  an  end  that  must  be  kept  in 
view;  that  the  community  is  the  overlord  of  the  landlord;  that 
every  individual  holds  whatever  land  he  possesses  subject  to 
the  high  and  supreme  title  of  eminent  domain. 

"If  I  thus  correctly  interpret  your  aim  and  object,  I  do  not 
hesitate  to  say  that  your  system  of  taxation  is  not  condemned 
by  the  Catholic  Church,  nor  is  it  contrary  to  her  ethical 
teachings."  * 

To  the  foregoing  there  should  be  added  the  following 
words  of  the  Rev.  Edward  McGlynn  in  his  statement 
to  the  authorities  of  the  Church  of  Romef  regarding 
what  he  broadly  conceived  to  be  the  right  of  eminent 
domain  with  deductions  therefrom: 

The  organised  community  through  civil  government  must 
always  maintain  the  dominion  over  those  natural  bounties,  as 
distinct  from  products  of  private  industry,  and  from  that 
private  possession  of  the  land  which  is  necessary  for  their 
enjoyment. 

The  increasing  need  for  public  revenues  with  social  advance 
being  a  natural  God-ordained  need,  there  must  be  a  right  way 
of  raising  them  —  some  way  that  we  can  truly  say  is  the  way 
intended  by  God.  ...  By  a  beautiful  providence,  that 
may  be  truly  called  divine,  since  it  is  founded  upon  the  nature 
of  things  and  the  nature  of  man  of  which  God  is  the  creator, 
a  fund,  constantly  increasing  with  the  capacities  and  needs  of 
society,  is  produced  by  the  very  growth  of  society  itself,  namely, 
the  rental  value  of  the  natural  bounties  of  which  society  retains 
dominion.  The  justice  and  the  duty  of  appropriating  this  fund 
to  public  uses  is  apparent  in  that  it  takes  nothing  from  the 
private  property  of  individuals  except  what  they  will  pay 
willingly  as  an  equivalent  for  a  value  produced  by  the  com- 
munity, which  they  are  permitted  to  enjoy.     The  fund  thus 

*  Extract  from  an  address  by  the  Rev.  Robert  J.  Johnson,  Rector  of  the 
Gate  of  Heaven  Church,  South  Boston,  at  a  reception  and  dinner  given  by  the 
Massachusetts  Single  Tax  League  to  the  Catholic  Clergy  of  the  Archdiocese 
of  Boston,  December  3,  19CXD. 

t  For  Dr.  McGlynn's  complete  statement  as  presented  in  Italian  to  Mgr. 
SatoUi,  December,  1892,  together  with  English  translation,  see  Appendix  D. 


io6  THE  A  B  C  OF  TAXATION 

created  is  clearly  by  the  law  of  justice  a  public  fund,  not  merely, 
because  the  value  is  a  growth  that  comes  to  the  natural  bounties 
which  God  gave  to  the  community  in  the  beginning,  but  also, 
and  much  more,  because  it  is  a  value  produced  by  the  com- 
munity itself,  so  that  this  rental  value  belongs  to  the  community 
by  that  best  of  titles,  namely,  producing,  making,  or  creating. 

To  permit  any  portion  of  this  public  property  to  go  into 
private  pockets,  without  a  perfect  equivalent  being  paid  into 
the  public  treasury,  would  be  an  injustice  to  the  community. 
Therefore  the  whole  rental  fund  should  be  appropriated  to 
common  or  public  uses. 

In  the  desired  condition  of  things  land  would  be  left  in  the 
private  possession  of  individuals,  with  full  liberty  on  their  part 
to  give,  sell,  or  bequeath  it,  while  the  state  would  levy  on  it  for 
public  uses  a  tax  that  should  equal  the  annual  value  of  the 
land  itself,  irrespective  of  the  use  made  of  it  or  the  improve- 
ments on  it. 

The  only  utility  of  private  ownership  and  dominion  of  land, 
as  distinguished  from  possession,  is  the  evil  utility  of  giving 
to  the  owners  the  power  to  reap  where  they  have  not  sown,  to 
take  the  products  of  the  labour  of  others  without  giving  them  an 
equivalent. 

Thus  it  should  be  clear  that  what  people  need  to  see 
in  order  to  incline  them  to  the  single  tax  is  not  so 
much  "the  wrong  of  private  ownership"  — a  phrase 
which  often  both  violates  and  confuses  their  moral 
sense  —  but  *'the  wrong  of  the  private  appropriation 
of  ground  rent"  —  a  phrase  which  does  neither. 

It  does  not  necessarily  follow  from  this  characterisa- 
tion of  a  doctrine  as  morally  sound,  that  what  is  right 
in  principle  may  not  be  wrong  in  method.  As  to 
method,  Dr.  McGlynn  was  in  accord  with  Henry 
George  in  his  mature  conclusion,  given  in  his  own 
words*  that  "we  can  only  accomplish  the  change  we  seek 
by  the  slow  process  of  educating  men  to  demand  it.  In 
the  very  nature  of  things  it  can  only  come  slowly,  and  step 


♦  "Saratoga  Discussion,"  1880,  p.  78. 


PRIVATE  PROPERTY  IN  LAND 


107 


by  step.  We  do  not  delude  ourselves  on  thai  point, 
and  never  have."  And  again:*  "But  in  thinking  of 
details  it  should  he  remembered  that  we  cannot  get  to  the 
single  tax  at  one  leap,  hut  only  by  gradual  steps,  which 
will  bring  experience  to  the  settlement  of  details." 

Neither  of  them  concerned  himself  with  specific  ways 
and  means.  Neither  thought  of  interpreting  the  state- 
ment that  all  ground  rent  ought  to  be  taken  for  public 
use  to  mean  that  the  whole  of  it  ought  to  be  taken  and 
at  once.  But  both,  recognising  that  a  right  thing  may 
be  done  in  a  wrong  way,  insisted  that  a  right  way  ought 
to  be  found  to  do  a  thing  that  ought  to  be  done.  This 
book,  The  A  B  C  of  Taxation,  is  a  search  for  that 
right  way. 


*  Century  Magazine,  July,  1890,  p.  40I. 


Chapter  VIII 
JUSTICE  OF  THE  SINGLE  TAX 

TO  GO  to  the  foundation  of  the  whole  matter  of 
taxation,  we  contend  that  the  social  disorder 
and  derangement  complained  of  to-day  is  mainly  due 
to  an  unnatural  and  unequal  distribution  of  wealth. 
The  solution  of  the  problem  of  taxation  will  solve  the 
problem  of  the  distribution  of  wealth.  Wealth  is 
produced  in  proportion  to  the  skill  and  the  industry 
of  the  hands  and  brains  of  all  the  world's  workers. 
The  annual  division  of  this  wealth  among  these  workers, 
before  taking  taxes  into  account,  is  in  proportion  to 
ability  and  in  proportion  to  special  privilege,  chiefly 
the  private  appropriation  of  ground  rent.  After  this 
grossly  unequal  annual  division  has  been  made,  comes 
an  unequal  and  unjust  taxation  to  aggravate  still 
further  these  inequalities.  By  the  process  of  taxation, 
Mr.  Shearman  estimates,  the  taxable  savings  of  the 
very  rich  shrink  4  per  cent  while  those  of  the  very  poor 
shrink  78  per  cent.*  Under  the  single  tax  the  savings 
of  both  rich  and  poor  would  shrink  in  the  same  pro- 
portion, that  is,  about  50  per  cent.  Such  inequalities 
tend  to  increase  rather  than  decrease  with  time. 

We  say  that  the  division  under  the  present  system 
(unequal  by  more  than  a  hundredfold)  of  the  annual 
taxable  savings  (before  taxation)  is  regulated  in  two 
ways,  and  in  only  two  ways  —  by  ability  and  by 

*  See  Natural  Taxation  by  Thomas  G.  Shearman  (Doublcday,  Page  &  Co.), 

pp.  35  to  37. 


JUSTICE  OF  THE  SINGLE  TAX  109 

special  privilege.  We  agree  that  a  large  part  of  this 
inequality  is  due  to  difference  of  ability,  but  that  much 
larger  part  which  is  due  to  special  privilege  (chiefly  the 
private  appropriation  of  ground  rent)  we  would  by  our 
proposed  system  of  taxation  abolish. 

To  a  discrimination  of  a  hundredfold  in  the  division 
of  savings  there  is  now  added  another  twenty-fold 
discrimination  in  taxation.  In  pursuit  of  an  equitable 
system  of  taxation  we  want  to  right  this  glaring  wrong 
at  once.  First,  distribute  wealth  according  to  ability, 
that  is,  according  to  production ;  second,  destroy  special 
privilege  by  a  direct  tax,  which  is  paid  by  the  man 
upon  whom  it  is  assessed  (rich  and  poor  alike),  instead 
of  an  indirect  tax,  which  is  never  paid  by  him  upon 
whom  It  is  assessed. 

Land 

By  land,  we  mean,  strictly  speaking,  all  natural 
bounties,  forces,  and  opportunities  —  the  source  of  all 
wealth.  Blackstone  says  it  means  "everything 
terrestrial." 

Franchises 

The  single  tax  theory  regards  all  the  special  privilege 
value  in  railroad  shares,  telegraph  and  telephone,  gas 
and  electric  stocks  as  *'land"  and  nothing  else,  subject 
to  taxation  with  all  other  land  values,  and  at  the  same 
rate,  because  franchise  values  are  created  and  main- 
tained by  precisely  the  same  public  expenditure  and 
service  that  gives  value  to  land.  In  this  way  the 
special  privileges  of  corporations  would  be  taxed. 
Their  tracks,  rolling  stock,  buildings,  and  improvements 
would  not  be  taxed. 


no  THE  A  B  C  OF  TAXATION 

A  franchise  value  is  a  land  value.  Land  value  is 
total  value  of  real  estate  less  value  of  improvements. 
Franchise  value  is  total  trust  or  monopoly  value  less 
value  of  improvements.  Land  value  and  franchise 
value  should  be  taxed  at  the  same  rate. 

Single  taxers  believe  that  taxation  is  the  one  and  only 
effective  weapon,  and  that  right  in  hand,  with  which  to 
destroy  the  evil  of  trusts  and  monopolies,  without 
harm  to  the  good  that  is  in  them. 

Wealth 

Man,  by  the  application  of  his  labour  to  land,  the 
source  of  all  wealth,  directly  and  indirectly  produces 
the  things  he  wants  for  the  satisfaction  of  his  desires. 
All  these  things  taken  together  we  call  wealth.  To  class 
land  as  wealth  savours,  we  say,  of  economic  confusion. 

What  features,  we  ask,  has  land  in  common  with 
wealth?  On  the  other  hand  we  ask  you  to  note  the 
differences  between  land  and  wealth. 

Land  includes  nothing  made  by  man.  Wealth 
includes  nothing  not  made  by  man.  Land  is  a  source. 
Wealth  is  a  product.  Land  is  raw  material.  Wealth 
is  a  manufactured  article.  Land  has  to  be  created  not 
oftener  than  once  in  "six  thousand  years,"  Wealth 
has  to  be  recreated  every  four  or  five  years.  Land  is 
indestructible.  Wealth  is  perishable.  Land  never 
wears  out,  but  is  worth  more  the  more  it  is  used. 
Wealth  is  always  going  in  quick  consumption.  Land 
is  a  fixed  quantity.  Wealth  can  be  increased  at  will. 
The  site  value  of  land  is  determined  by  demand  only. 
The  value  of  wealth  is  fixed  by  supply  and  demand. 
Land  never  requires  insurance  or  repairs.  Wealth 
always   needs   them.    Land   can   always   be  found. 


JUSTICE  OF  THE  SINGLE  TAX  in 

Wealth  is  mercurial  and  fugitive.  While  wealth  is  a 
private  product,  so  to  speak  land  value  is  a  public 
product,  publicly  created  and  publicly  maintained. 
What  more  than  these  differences  is  needful  to  make 
reasonable  and  convincing  a  separate  classification  of 
land  and  wealth,  especially  for  purposes  of  taxation? 

The  right  of  property  in  wealth  is  the  right  of  a  man 
to  eat  his  bread  in  the  sweat  of  his  own  brow.  The 
right  of  property  in  land  to-day  is  the  right  of  a  man 
to  eat  his  bread  in  the  sweat  of  another  man's  brow. 

Usufruct  means  property  in  what  the  land  produces 
this  year  by  the  application  of  one's  own  labour. 

Private  ownership,  including  as  it  does  to-day  the 
private  appropriation  of  ground  rent,  means  property 
in  what  the  land  may  produce  for  the  next  ten,  one 
hundred,  or  one  thousand  years  by  the  application  of 
the  labour  of  others. 

The  Capitalised  Tax 

By  the  capitalised  tax  is  meant  a  sum,  the  interest 
of  which  would  pay  the  tax.  It  is  usually  found  by 
multiplying  the  tax  by  twenty  because  5  per  cent  inter- 
est is  one-twentieth  of  the  principal.  For  every  $16  of 
tax.  the  selling  value  of  land  is  less  than  it  would  be  if 
free  of  this  tax,  by  $320.  an  amount  which  at  5  per  cent 
would  pay  the  tax,  $16,  and  leave  for  the  selling 
value  a  purchasing  price  which  would  net  5  per  cent 
return  to  the  investor. 

Value  and  Valuation 

There  can  be,  strictly  speaking,  only  one  value  for 
anything,  and  that  is,  what  it  will  sell  for.  But  there 
may  be  many  valuations  of  the  same  thing,  and  a  thing 


112  THE  A  B  C  OF  TAXATION 

subject  to  charges  is  not,  scientifically  speaking,  the 
same  as  a  thing  free  from  charges.  Title  to  a  tract  of 
land  subject  to  taxation,  is  not  by  any  means  the 
same  thing  as  title  to  the  same  land  free  of  taxation. 
Therefore,  in  dealing  with  land,  we  speak  of  a  gross 
value,  and  an  assessed  valuation. 

Gross  value  is  the  capitalisation  of  the  gross  ground 
rent.  If  the  current  rate  of  interest  is  5  per  cent,  the 
capitalisation  is  said  to  be  "  at  twenty  years'  purchase,'' 
that  is,  twenty  times  the  amount  of  the  annual  income. 
In  other  words,  it  is  an  amount  5  per  cent  of  which 
would  be  equal  to  the  annual  rent  which  the  land 
commands  for  use,  free  of  charges.  What  pays  $1 .000 
annual  net  income,  is  worth  |2o,ooo  to  buy.  This  gross 
capitalised  value  is  the  value,  which,  as  we  claim, 
should  even  under  the  present  system  be  taxed  uni- 
formly with  other  private  property. 

If  the  gross  ground  rent  of  a  tract  of  land  is  1 1,000 
a  year,  and  it  is  subject  to  no  taxes,  the  market  value, 
assuming  the  usual  rate  of  interest  to  be  5  per  cent,  will 
be  $20,000.  But  if  it  is  subject  to  an  annual  tax  of 
I200,  the  tax  reduces  the  net  rent  by  20  per  cent  and 
hence  reduces  the  price  of  the  land  correspondingly  to 
§16,000. 

Net  value  is  the  capitalisation  of  the  net  rent  (the 
income  less  the  tax)  at  the  current  rate  of  interest,  and 
is  more  familiarly  known  as  the  selling  value. 

The  assessed  valuation  is  the  valuation  placed  upon 
land  by  assessors  for  purposes  of  taxation.  It  varies 
in  different  localities,  being  in  Massachusetts  usually 
from  13  to  100  per  cent  of  the  selling  value. 

We  often  speak  of  this  tax  upon  land  value  as  a  tax 
according  to  benefits  bestowed,  but,  strictly  speaking. 


JUSTICE  OF  THE  SINGLE  TAX  113 

It  is  a  tax  neither  according  to  benefits  nor  according 
to  ability,  because  it  is  a  tax  only  in  form,  not  a  tax  in 
substance.  The  public  merely  takes  out  of  the  land 
with  its  left  hand  the  value  which,  with  its  right  hand, 
it  has  put  into  the  land. 

Our  platform  has  but  one  plank,  "  Equal  opportuni- 
ties for  all  and  special  privileges  to  none"  — or,  yet 
more  briefly,  "Special  privileges  to  none,"  because 
payment  for  special  privileges  will  take  the  place  of 
taxes,  and  there  can  be  but  one  result,  viz.,  equal 
opportunities  for  all. 

We  ask  your  thoughtful  criticism  of  the  single  tax 
tenet  regarding  wages.  We  believe  in  high  wages  and 
low  prices,  which  are  the  equal  opportunity  channels 
for  the  equitable  distribution  of  wealth,  instead  of  low 
wages  and  high  prices,  which  are  the  special  privilege 
channels  for  the  inequitable  congestion  of  wealth. 
Contrary  to  popular  illusion,  wages  are  not  regulated 
by  dollar  wheat,  but  the  price  of  wheat  is  fixed  by  the 
competition  of  dealers,  and  wages  are  fixed  by  the 
competition  of  labour.  The  benefits  of  high  prices  go 
to  the  few,  while  the  benefits  of  low  prices  go  to  the 
many. 

If  a  man  has  the  best  corner  lot  in  a  city,  he  has  a 
monopoly,  because  by  the  private  appropriation  of 
ground  rent  (a  special  privilege  conceded  to  him  by  the 
State,  and  having  all  the  sanction  of  law  and  custom), 
he  cannot  help  diverting,  without  fault  of  his  own,  into 
his  own  private  pocket,  the  public  expenditure  in  its 
transmuted  form  of  ground  rent.  So  we  say  that  the 
special  privilege  greater  than  all  others  put  together 
is  the  private  appropriation  of  ground  rent.  We 
are  entirely  agreed  to  the  private  ownership  of  land. 


114  THE  A  B  C  OF  TAXATION 

with  the  right  to  possess,  "to  buy  and  sell,  bequeath 
and  devise  it,"  provided  only  that  equal  rights  shall 
be  asserted  and  secured  by  taking  in  the  form  of 
taxation  enough  of  the  ground  rent  to  meet  all  public 
expenses.  Because  taxes  are  spent  upon  the  land,  we 
would  take  them  from  the  land. 

The  tendency  to-day  of  this  regulation  by  taxation, 
of  trusts,  monopolies,  franchises  and  special  privileges 
in  all  its  forms  would,  we  claim,  be  strongly  toward 
a  rectification  of  the  admittedly  unjust  distribution, 
not  of  present  wealth,  but  of  wealth  hereafter  to  be 
produced. 

When  all  special  privileges,  including  the  special 
privilege  of  private  appropriation  of  ground  rent,  are 
abolished  by  exacting  payment  for  the  same  at  their 
market  value,  then  taxation,  which  now  so  grievously 
aggravates  an  unjust  distribution,  will  be  unnecessary, 
and  you  will  have  one  channel  only,  and  that  the  one 
proper  channel,  for  the  distribution  of  wealth,  viz., 
wages  proportioned  to  skill  and  industry. 

In  all  primitive  societies  the  soil  has  been  held  as 
common  property  with  equal  rights  of  the  many  to 
natural  opportunities.  To-day  the  land  tenure  pendu- 
lum has  swung  clear  to  the  other  side,  and  in  highly 
civilised  society  land  has  come  to  be  held  by  the  few 
in  private  ownership  with  its  special  privilege  of  the 
private  appropriation  of  ground  rent.  The  single 
tax  aim  is  to  bring  the  pendulum  back  into  a  position  of 
reconciled  equilibrium,  modern  individual  ownership 
by  the  few  brought  into  harmony  with  primitive  com- 
mon ownership  by  the  many.  One  reason  why  so 
many  men  are  averse  to  conceding  to  the  individual 
the  right  of  ownership  in  land  is  that  the  right   has 


JUSTICE  OF  THE  SINGLE  TAX  115 

been  so  often  abused.    The  single  tax  offers  itself  as  a 
means  of  correcting  this  abuse. 

The  Self-operating  Social  Law 

We  ask  you  to  look  with  us  until  you  see,  as  we  think 
we  see,  in  ground  rent  the  self-operating  law  for  the 
social  system,  something  that  will,  if  unobstructed, 
tend  to  hold  in  just  equilibrium  the  conflicting  factors 
of  land,  labour,  and  capital. 

The  particular  factor  in  our  reform  which  we  would 
press  upon  your  attention,  because  generally  least 
understood,  is  the  nature  of  ground  rent.  While  land 
and  wealth  (or  other  wealth)  have  no  feature  in  com- 
mon, taxes  and  ground  rent  appear  to  us  to  have  close 
resemblance  in  every  feature.  Taxes  are  the  cause, 
ground  rent  is  the  effect.  Taxes  are  the  fertilizer, 
ground  rent  is  the  crop.  Where  there  are  no  taxes, 
there  is  no  ground  rent.  Where  taxes  are  scanty, 
ground  rent  is  scanty.  Where  taxes  are  abundant, 
ground  rent  is  abundant.  The  ground  rent  of  a  com- 
munity is,  roughly  speaking,  one-half  of  it  the  result  of 
public  expenditure  and  one-half  the  result  of  quasi- 
public  and  private  expenditure;  but  all  taxes  (public 
expenditure)  are  transmuted  into  ground  rent,  a 
change  of  name  without  a  change  of  nature. 

The  single  tax,  we  claim,  is  absolutely  just  and 
equitable,  because  it  gives  to  every  man  equal  (not 
joint)  access  to  the  land;  because  it  exacts  tribute  from 
every  man  in  proportion  to  his  use  of  the  land;  because 
it  leaves  untouched  the  wealth  which  labour  creates; 
taxes  for  the  public  use  only  a  value  of  its  own  creation 
upon  land  of  God's  creation,  giving  full  value  received 
in  the  privilege  of  exclusive  possession    and  hence  is 


ii6  THE  A  B  C  OF  TAXATION 

not  a  tax  at  all,  but  a  divinely  natural  provision, 
restoring  to  every  man  his  inalienable  share  in  the 
value  of  the  land. 

Just  in  Its  Apportionment 

Full  single  tax  would  mean  all  national  taxes 
apportioned  to  cities  and  towns  in  proportion  to  their 
respective  land  values;  all  local  taxes,  including 
national,  assessed  upon  land  values  alone.  In 
"  Natural  Taxation,"  page  147,  Mr.  Shearman  makes  a 
plausible  claim  that  for  the  year  1890  *'all  national 
and  local  taxes,  if  collected  exclusively  from  the  ground 
rents  of  the  United  States  would  have  absorbed  only 
44J  per  cent  of  those  ground  rents,  leaving  55^  per 
cent  to  the  owners  of  the  bare  land  as  a  clear  annual 
income,  besides  the  absolutely  untaxed  income  from 
all  buildings  and  improvements  upon  their  land." 

Repeated  calculation  of  the  ground  rent  of  the  state 
of  Massachusetts  and  of  the  City  of  Boston,  as  well  as  of 
many  other  cities  and  towns,  has  fully  justified  Mr, 
Shearman's  position  that  gross  ground  rent  is  approxi- 
mately double  the  amount  of  taxes  in  each  case. 

The  constitutions  of  the  several  states  and  the  moral 
sense  of  all  the  people  maintain  that  government  should 
not  take  private  property  for  public  use  without  full 
compensation.  Single  taxers  maintain  not  only  that 
there  is  no  right,  but  that  there  is  no  need  to  do  this, 
even  under  forms  of  taxation. 

We  would  exempt  personal  property  because  by 
the  same  system  under  which  you  collect  a  tax  upon 
the  poor  man's  "visibles,"  3/ou  are  putting  upon  the 
rich  man's  "invisibles"  a  tax  which  you  cannot  collect. 
Equalisation  is  possible  only  by  abolishing   the   tax 


JUSTICE  OF  THE  SINGLE  TAX  117 

on  both  "visibles  and  invisibles."  We  would  exempt 
buildings,  because,  by  the  same  system  under  which 
you  collect  from  the  poor  man  a  tax  upon  his  house  in 
which  he  lives,  you  are  assessing  the  rich  man  for  his 
store,  his  office  building,  and  his  apartment  house,  a 
tax  which  he  himself  can  never  be  made  to  bear. 
Equalisation  is  possible  only  by  abolishing  the  tax  on 
all  buildings. 

Single  taxers  want  to  shift  the  taxes  from  the  house 
to  the  land,  because  every  time  this  is  done  it  is  made 
easier  for  the  individual  to  get  the  house;  whereas 
when  the  tax  is  shifted  from  the  land  to  the  house,  it 
becomes  harder  to  get  both  house  and  land. 

We  say,  tax  the  land  and  exempt  all  other  wealth, 
because,  when  you  tax  both  the  opportunity  to  produce 
(land),  and  the  thing  produced  (wealth),  you  are  in  the 
broadest  sense  inflicting  double  taxation. 

You  do  not  tax  the  old  building,  because,  commer- 
cially speaking,  it  has  "gone  to  decay."  Why,  then, 
should  you  tax  the  new  building,  which,  from  the 
moment  it  is  finished,  is  fast  "going  to  decay"?  We 
say,  tax  only  the  land  value,  which  never  decays. 

The  millionaire  should  pay  for  the  same  sort  of  land 
the  same  tax  per  acre  as  the  poor  man,  and  no  more. 
When  he  occupies  a  similar  seat  in  the  theatre, 
to  see  the  same  show,  he  simply  pays  the  same  price  for 
his  ticket,  full  value  for  what  he  gets.  When  taxes 
are  levied  in  proportion  to  "benefits  bestowed,"  no 
need  remains  for  taxation  according  to  ability  to  pay. 

Justice  of  the  School  Tax 

We  sometimes  hear  the  question :  Is  it  proportionate 
and  reasonable  that  the  poor  man's  vacant  lot  should 


ii8  THE  A  B  C  OF  TAXATION 

be  taxed  to  send  the  rich  man's  children  to  the  public 
school?  But  what  difference  does  it  make  whether  the 
rich  man  sends  a  dozen  children  or  none  to  the  public 
schools?  Public  schools  add  their  cost  to  the  land  value 
of  the  city  or  town.  They  add  just  as  much  value  to 
the  land  of  the  man  that  sends  no  children  as  to  that  of 
him  who  sends  a  dozen.  Is  not  this  fact  sufficient  to 
reconcile  the  childless  man  to  the  justice  of  his  school 
tax?  The  cultivation  of  a  family  would  not  increase 
his  tax  any  more  than  the  cultivation  and  improve- 
ment of  his  farm  would  add  to  the  farmer's  tax,  and 
thus  by  the  single  tax  both  farmers  and  families  would 
be  encouraged. 

Socialism 

The  single  taxer  appeals  also  to  the  socialist  to  see 
and  realise  the  self-evident  truth  that,  without  the 
socialisation  of  ground  rent,  were  every  other  possible 
dream  of  socialism,  political  socialism  or  Christian 
socialism,  brought  to  a  perfect  realisation,  its  full 
benefit  to  the  last  farthing  would  be  reflected  in  the 
enhanced  value  of  the  land  and  so  go  straight  and 
unearned  into  the  pockets  of  the  land  owner. 

There  is  in  natural  taxation  nothing  of  technical 
socialism,*  which  means  the  artificial  assumption  by 
society  of  a  function  that  is  primarily  individual. 
It  is  rather  a  resocialisation  of  that  which  by  its 
own  nature,  in  its  inception  and  its  growth,  can  be 
nothing  but  socialised,  but  which  has  been  artificially 
desocialised. 

Socialism  would  replace  artificial  discord  with 
artificial  concord.      Single  tax  is  natural  harmony  in 

*  See  Appendix  A. 


JUSTICE  OF  THE  SINGLE  TAX  119 

the  absence  of  artificial  discord.  We  speak  paradoxi- 
cally of  the  socialisation  of  ground  rent  as  though  it 
were  something  to  be  artificially  done.  How  can  we 
socialise  that  which  by  its  very  nature  socialises  itself, 
and  can  never  be  naturally  anything  but  socialised? 

A  Puzzling  Question  and  a  Simple  Answer 

What  are  the  obstacles  that  to-day  so  impede  a 
thorough  consideration  of  the  basic  economic  principle 
of  the  single  tax  by  pulpit,  press,  and  legislator? 

The  answer  to  this  apparently  puzzling  question  is 
after  all  a  simple  one: 

First  is  the  notion  that  the  single  tax  contemplates 
public  ownership  of  land,  which  is  not  true;  second, 
the  impression  that  it  would  disturb  present  land 
titles,  which  is  not  true;  third,  the  charge  that  it  would 
take  for  the  community  what  belongs  to  the  individual, 
which  is  not  true;  fourth,  the  poisoning  misappre- 
hension that,  right  or  wrong,  it  would  amount  to-day 
to  taxing  into  the  public  treasury  practically  the  whole 
rental  value  of  one  species  of  property. 

All  men  are  agreed  as  to  the  ethics  of  the  single  tax, 
that  the  earth  was  made  for  all  men  and  not  for  a  few. 
This  is  what  Mr.  George  calls  an  instinct,  an  intuition 
of  the  human  mind,  a  primary  perception  of  the  human 
reason.  If  we  were  to-day  starting  anew,  the  single 
tax  would  be  manifestly  wise  as  a  method  of  taxation; 
if  it  could  to-day  be  put  in  operation  without  injustice 
to  any  one,  it  would  still  be  a  manifestly  wise  plan  of 
taxation.     Can  it  be  done? 

The  single  taxer  is  firmly  of  the  opinion  that  it  is 
no  part  of  God's  economy  that  justice  to  one  man  can 
work   injustice  to   another;  that  for    every    alleged 


I20  THE  A    B    C   OF  TAXATION 

injustice  to  one  man  there  would  be  a  far  greater  justice 
wrought  to  hundreds  and  to  thousands;  that  the 
vacant  lot  which  is  his  only  all,  is  not  the  poor  man's 
universe;  that  his  individual  loss  or  benefit  will  be 
measured,  not  by  his  relation  to  that  vacant,  unpro- 
ductive lot,  but  by  his  relation  to  the  social  fabric  into 
which  he  is  woven  and  to  the  universe  of  which  he  is  a 
part ;  and  that  for  every  alleged  confiscation  there  would 
be  a  score  of  compensations. 

If  the  moral  theory  of  the  "compensationists" 
were  sound,  it  would  apply  —  and  many  of  its  advo- 
cates claim  that  it  does  apply  —  as  well  to  slavery  as  to 
landlordism,  so  that  slaves  could  not  be  justly  set  free 
unless  the  masters  were  compensated.  The  most 
outrageous  act,  then,  of  what  the  "compensationists" 
call  confiscation,  was  committed  by  God  himself,  when 
he  led  the  Israelites  out  of  Egypt.  Instead  of  com- 
pensating the  Egyptians,  who  thereby  lost  valuable 
"private  property"  which  had  had  the  sanction  of  four 
hundred  years'  acquiescence.  He  engulfed  in  the  Red 
Sea  those  whose  sensitiveness  to  the  injustice  of 
"confiscation"  stirred  them  to  follow  and  reclaim 
their  confiscated  property. 

If  the  cinder  is  not  removed  from  your  eye  at  once, 
and  inflammation  follows,  what  then  do  you  do?  Do 
you  bathe  the  head,  apply  a  plaster  to  the  back,  hot 
water  bottles  to  the  feet,  and  some  specific  to  the 
stomach?  Or  do  you  forthwith  remove  the  speck  from 
the  eye  whatever  the  pain  it  costs  you?  The  smaller 
the  offending  cinder,  the  more  intense  oftentimes  the 
inflammation,  and  the  more  difficult  of  removal.  The 
longer  the  operation  is  delayed  the  more  painful  the 
conditions.     While  guarding  well  "the  apple  of  the 


JUSTICE  OF  THE  SINGLE  TAX        121 

eye/'  what  irritation  from  mote  or  beam  or  cinder  can 
compare  with  the  social  irritation  caused  by  injustice? 

Single  Tax  and  the  Massachusetts  Constitution 

Query:  Is  not  the  present  system  of  taxation  clearly 
in  violation  of  those  state  constitutions  which,  like  that 
of  Massachusetts,  provide  that  assessments  shall  be 
"proportionate  and  reasonable"  since,  under  that 
system  a  whole  class  of  property  holders  is  practically 
exempt  from  taxation? 

Query:  Is  not  a  system  of  taxation  which  so  favours 
one  class  of  citizens  above  another  in  direct  violation 
of  the  constitution  of  Massachusetts,  which  provides, 
Part  I.,  Article  VI.,  that  "no  man,  or  corporation,  or 
association  of  men,  have  any  other  title  to  obtain 
advantages,  or  particular  and  exclusive  privileges, 
distinct  from  those  of  the  community,  than  what  arises 
from  the  consideration  of  services  rendered  to  the 
public? 

Query:  Is  not  the  taxation  of  ground  rents  in  lieu 
of  all  other  taxation  manifestly  in  harmony  with  the 
constitution  of  Massachusetts,  which  reads  as  follows. 
Part  I.,  Art.  VII.:  "Government  is  instituted  for  the 
common  good;  for  the  protection,  safety,  prosperity, 
and  happiness  of  the  people;  and  not  for  the  profit, 
honour,  or  private  interest  of  any  one  man,  family,  or 
class  of  men.  Therefore  the  people  alone  have  an 
incontestable,  unalienable,  and  indefeasible  right  to 
institute  government;  and  to  reform,  alter,  or  totally 
change  the  same,  when  their  protection,  safety, 
prosperity,  and  happiness  require  it." 


CHAPTER  IX 
THE  SINGLE  TAX  AND  THE  FARMER 

DO  NOT  let  it  be  thought  that  the  single  tax  would 
be  less  at  home  in  the  country  than  in  the  city. 
The  farmer  was  the  first  wage-earner,  himself  his  own 
employer,  his  wages  the  full  produce  of  his  labour.  He 
is  the  primary  wage-earner  —  the  one  nearest  the 
ground.  His  wages  (one-third  those  of  the  whole 
country)  are  sufficient  to  determine  all  other 
wages,  and  should  be  the  highest  imputable  to 
his  ability,  unabridged  by  special  privilege  or  by 
taxation. 

One  mission  of  the  single  tax  is  to  raise  and  maintain 
the  farmer's  wage  at  the  primitive  point  of  the  full 
produce  of  his  labour,  and  to  protect  and  defend  the 
farmer  as  his  own  employer,  not  merely  as  a  tenant 
farmer. 

What  taxes  ought  the  farmer  to  pay?  He  should, 
of  course,  pay  his  fair  share  of  the  common  expenses 
in  proportion  as  he  is  benefited  by  the  services 
of  his  community.  It  would  not  be  fair  for  him 
to  pay  any  part  of  the  share  of  another  man 
who  has  greater  benefit  than  he  from  this  service. 
What  could  be  fairer  than  to  tax  the  farmer  and 
the  village  man  respectively,  in  proportion  to  the 
benefits  bestowed  upon  each  of  them  by  the 
social     services    which    his     property    puts    at    his 


THE  SINGLE  TAX  AND  THE  FARMER    123 

command?  What  better  indication  can  there  be 
of  his  proportionate  share  of  these  public  advan- 
tages than  the  site  value  which  they  contribute 
to  his  land? 

The  farmer  is,  so  to  speak,  to  a  great  extent  his  own 
commonwealth,  his  own  municipality,  and  very  sen- 
sibly municipalises  most  of  his  own  public  utilities 
instead  of  farming  them  out.  The  usual  items  of 
common  town  expenditure  are  for  water,  light,  fire 
department,  police,  sewerage,  pavements,  sidewalks, 
roads,  schools,  and  the  poor.  As  to  water,  light,  fire 
department,  police,  and  sewerage,  the  farmer  furnishes 
himself  at  his  own  expense,  and  this  is  a  sufficient 
practical  reason  for  exempting  him  from  the  burden 
of  contributing  for  village  services  of  the  same  sort 
provided  at  common  expense.  This  leaves  in  general 
three  things  for  which  the  farmer  ought  to  be  taxed, 
viz.,  the  roads,  the  schools,  and  the  poor.  These 
three  things  represent  needs  which  the  farmer  has  in 
common  with  the  community  in  which  he  lives,  and 
it  is  submitted  that  in  justice  to  him,  and  greatly  to 
his  advantage,  they  should  be  provided  for  by  a  com- 
mon tax,  levied  in  proportion  to  land  values,  either  by 
the  State  or  by  a  minor  political  division,  as  efficiency 
and  economy  may  dictate. 

A  tax  laid  upon  land  values  is  by  far  the  most  "pro- 
portionate and  reasonable "  because  every  man,  woman, 
and  child  contributes  to  this  value.  The  farmer  to- 
day, whose  land  values  are  so  small  —  almost 
insignificant  —  but  whose  labour  values  —  his  build- 
ings and  improvements,  such  as  drains,  fences,  trees, 
crops,  reclamation  and  fertilisation  of  land,  and  his 
personal  property,  which  is  of  course  a  labour  value  — 


124  THE  A  B  C  OF  TAXATION 

are  seen  and  known  of  all  men,  he  it  is  who  is  bearing 
in  great  degree  the  evaded  burden  of  the  owner  of 
stocks  and  bonds.  Such  discrimination  fmds  illustra- 
tion on  every  hand.  For  instance,  with  the  value  of 
the  buildings  and  improvements  of  the  Berkshire, 
Mass.,  farmer  far  in  excess  of  the  site  value  of 
his  land,  while  in  Boston,  Winter  Street  buildings  have 
only  one-thirteenth  the  value  of  Winter  Street  land,  it 
is  easily  seen,  as  a  matter  of  simple  proportion,  how  the 
taxation  of  buildings  bears  more  than  thirteen  times  as 
heavily  on  the  Berkshire  landholder  as  it  does  on  the 
Winter  Street  landholder. 

In  calculating  the  relief  to  the  farmer  through  the 
exemption  of  improvements,  three  classes  of  farmers 
are  to  be  considered:  (i)  The  small  farmers;  (2)  the 
large  farmers ;  (3)  the  bonanza  farmers.  The  buildings 
and  improvements  of  the  small  farmer  will  invariably 
have  a  much  greater  value  in  proportion  to  his  land 
than  those  of  the  large  farmer,  and  greater  still  when 
compared  with  the  bonanza  farmer,  so  that  the  same 
amount  of  tax  distributed  in  proportion  to  land  alone, 
as  compared  with  a  tax  laid  upon  land  and  improve- 
ments, would  relieve  the  small  farmer  just  in  proportion 
as  his  improvements  were  a  larger  fractional  part  of 
his  total  holding.  Herein  surely  lies  the  only  cure 
for  "speculative"  farming  — i.  e.,  farming  more  land 
than  can  be  tilled  —  and  for  tenant  farming  —  i  e., 
farming  the  farmer. 

The  farmer  to-day  is  doubly  discriminated  against, 
first  in  the  over-valuation  of  agricultural  land,  and 
secondly,  in  the  under  -  valuation  of  urban  or 
village  land.  Between  these  upper  and  nether 
millstones    he   is    being   ignorantly    ground.     These 


THE  SINGLE  TAX  AND  THE  FARMER    125 

inequalities     of    assessment    deserve    separate     and 
particular  treatment. 

I     The  Overvaluation  of  Agricultural  Land 

Mr.  Thomas  G.  Shearman  in  his  "  Natural 
Taxation"*  has  made  a  careful  estimate,  with  which 
the  farmers  themselves  would  no  doubt  agree,  that 
improvements  in  the  land  itself  constitute  60  per  cent 
of  the  assessed  valuation  of  farm  land.   His  language  is : 

Upon  the  whole,  it  is  safe  to  say  that,  under  a  system  of 
valuation  excluding  all  improvements,  cultivated  farms  would 
be  assessed  at  less  than  40  per  cent  of  their  whole  value, 
improvements  included. 

2.   The  Undervaluation  of  Urban  or  Village  Land 

As  already  stated  the  dimensions,  as  well  as  the 
continuous  character,  of  the  contribution  made  by  the 
people  to  the  growth  and  volume  of  ground  rent,  are 
seldom  realised — by  many  persons  hardly  suspected, 
even  in  cities,  where  they  are  more  acutely  discernible. 
But  especially  is  this  the  case  in  village  communities 
and  factory  towns,  where  it  has  not  been  the  habit  to 
note  closely  the  value  of  land  apart  from  buildings, 
and  the  rise  and  operation  of  ground  rent. 

A  few  illustrations  will  show  how  this  potential 
agency,  ground  rent,  escapes  observation  both  in  small 
and  large  towns,  and  in  small  cities  as  well. 

In  the  following  illustrative  examples,  the  ratio 
between  assessed  valuation  and  actual  net  value  of 
land,  as  indicated  by  actual  rentals,  is  calculated  by 
deducting  from  the  net  income  of  the  entire  estate 
(i.  e.,  total  income  less  taxes)  an  amount  equal  to    10 

*  Chapter  XII.,  Section  11,  p.  188. 


126  THE  A  B  C  OF  TAXATION 

per  cent  of  the  assessed  valuation  of  the  buildings,  to 
cover  interest,  insurance,  repairs,  and  depreciation. 
Twenty-five  specimen  estates  in  Lawrence,  Scituate, 
Clinton,  and  Whitman,  Mass.,  show  ratios,  thus  cal- 
culated, as  follows: 

25  estates        .        .        average  tax  rate  per  thousand,  $16.85 

r  Land        ....      1^197,828 
tion   < 


Assessed  valuation 


Buildings  .         .         .        236,955 


Total       ....      $434,783 


Gross  rental  of  properties  actually  received  by  the 

owners  .......        $56,067 

Taxes  (on  $434,783,  at  $16.85  per  thousand)    •         •  7)3^5 

Net  rental  after  paying  all  taxes     ....        $48,742 
Less  10  per  cent  on  buildings  ($236,955)  for  interest, 

insurance,  repairs,  and  depreciation    .  .  .  23,695 

Net   income   from   land   alone   (equalling  12^  per 

cent  on  $197,828) $25,047 

This  income  is  5  per  cent  return  on  an  indicated  net 

value  of  at  least $500,040 

Instead  of  on  less  than  40  per  cent  of  that  amount, 
or  the  amount  at  which  the  land  is  assessed  .      .     $197,828 

Leaving  out  the  City  of  Lawrence,  the  ratio  for  the 
three  smaller  communities  of  Scituate,  Clinton,  and 
Whitman  averages  only  30  per  cent. 

The  figures  for  the  above  twenty-five  estates  in  detail 
are  as  follows : 

IN   LAWRENCE,   A  COTTON   MANUFACTURING  CITY   OF 
70,000  INHABITANTS 

Of  seven  estates  the  several  assessed  valuations  were 
respectively  72,  67,  62,  48,  42,  38,  and    1 5  per  cent 


THE  SINGLE  TAX  AND  THE  FARMER    127 

of  the  net  value.    The  average  assessed  valuation  was 
48  per  cent  of  the  net  land  value. 

IN  SCITUATE,  MASS.,  A  SHORE  TOWN  OF  2,6oO 
INHABITANTS 

Of  four  estates  the  several  assessed  valuations  were 
respectively  52J,  50,  48,  and  13  per  cent  of  the  net 
value.  The  average  assessed  valuation  was  37!  per 
cent  of  the  net  land  value. 

IN     CLINTON,     A     MANUFACTURING     TOWN     OF     13,000 
INHABITANTS 

Of  five  estates  the  several  assessed  valuations  were 
respectively  38,  37,  34J,  27^,  and  22|  per  cent  of  the 
net  value.  The  average  assessed  valuation  was  32 
per  cent  of  the  net  land  value. 

IN   WHITMAN,  A  SHOE  MANUFACTURING  TOWN  OF  6,500 
INHABITANTS 

Of  nine  estates  the  several  assessed  valuations  were 
respectively  83,  62,  45J,  43,  32,  27,  23,  19,  and  14  per 
cent  of  the  net  value.  The  average  assessed  valuation 
was  21  per  cent  of  the  net  land  value. 

If  Mr.  Shearman's  estimate  of  the  overvaluation  of 
farm  lands  is  approximately  correct,  and  if  the  fore- 
going illustrations  of  undervaluation  of  municipal  lands 
are  fairly  representative  of  general  conditions,  then 
the  conclusion  seems  inevitable  that  the  farmer 
pays  more  than  six  times  as  much  tax  on  every 
$1,000  of  unimproved  land  value  as  does  the  villager. 


128  THE  A  B  C  OF  TAXATION 

In  other  words    upon   every  $i,ooo   unimproved  or 
site  value  of  his  land  — 

The  farmer  pays  on  $2,500,  or  two  and  a  half  times  the 
actual  value,  say  at  $20  a  thousand,  a  tax  of.  .  .     ^^50 

The  villager  pays  on  $400  which  is  40  per  cent  of  the 
actual  value,  at  $20  a  thousand         ....       $8 

Under  the  single  tax  each  would  pay  the  same. 
Should  the  Farmer  Be  Taxed  on  Fertility 

But  the  story  of  deduction  is  not  yet  done.  The 
question  remains  whether  even  the  whole  unimproved 
value  of  the  land  is  properly  taxable?  There  is 
respectable  economic  opinion*  to  the  effect  that 
fertility  is  not  a  social  but  an  individual  product; 
that  it  is  the  result  of  individual  labour  expended  upon 

*  "Treat  the  land  as  mere  situation  and  ascertain  what  would  be  its  value 
if  the  fertility  of  the  soil  were  exhausted.  The  value  of  the  soil  itself  will  be  the 
cost  which  would  be  necessary  to  bring  it  up  from  a  state  of  exhaustion  to  its 
existing  state  of  fertility.  The  valuing  of  improvements  will  remain  as  it  is  at 
present.  We  shall  then  have  three  items  for  the  assessor  to  ascertain,  namely, 
land,  soil,  and  improvements.  The  first  is  a  social  value  based  on  a  market 
surplus,  which  is  true  rent.  The  second  and  third  are  individual  values,  the 
product  of  effort  and  abstinence.  The  first  is  individually  unearned,  but 
socially  earned;  the  second  and  third  are  individually  earned.     .     .     . 

"If  the  single  taxers  will  workout  both  a  theoretical  and  a  practical  system 
by  which  the  situation  value  of  agricultural  land  can  be  identified  with  the 
site  value  of  urban  land,  and  by  which  the  fertility  of  the  soil  can  be  identified 
with  capital,  the  prospects  are  good  for  winning  over  both  the  economists  and 
the  farmers." — Professor  John  R.  Commons^  University  offVisconsiny  in  The 
Publicy  March  21,  1908. 

"When  studying  the  phenomenon  of  land  rent,  urban  land  and  land  used 
in  manufacture  and  commerce  rather  than  that  utilised  for  agricultural  purposes 
should  be  considered.  Writers  who  persist  in  studying  agricultural  rents  are 
investigating  the  more  obscure  manifestations  of  rent  phenomena. 
The  true  function  of  all  land  is,  in  fact,  reduced  to  that  of  land  in  a  city;  namely, 
to  that  of  furnishing  a  site  upon  which  to  do  business.  The  value  of  the  site 
depends  upon  the 'market  opportunity' which  it  offers.  .  .  .  Land  in  its 
proper  sense  furnishes  standing  room  and  situation  with  regard  to  markets. 
According  to  this  definition,  land  performs  the  same  function  in  agriculture  as 
for  all  non-agricultural  purposes."  Professor  Frank  T.  Carlton,  Albion  College, 
Quarterly  Journal  of  Economics,  November,  1907. 


THE  SINGLE  TAX  AND  THE  FARMER    129 

the  land;  and  that  the  amount  paid  for  the  fertility 
of  land,  as  distinct  from  its  situation,  is  interest  on 
capital  invested,  rather  than  a  true  rent.  If  this 
opinion  be  sound,  and  I  strongly  incline  to  the  belief 
that  it  will  ultimately  prevail,  then  it  would  be  a  grate- 
ful simplification  of  the  problem  and  would  operate 
greatly  to  the  benefit  of  the  farmer  if  in  taxation  the 
element  of  fertility  were  to  be  entirely  disregarded. 

Since, then, the  farm  land  of  Massachusetts, as  already 
shown,  accounts  for  only  one-tenth  of  the  assessed 
land  value  of  the  whole  state,  and  since  the  unimproved 
land  value,  which  alone  would  be  taxable  under  the 
single  tax,  is  less  than  50  per  cent  of  the  assessed 
valuation,  or  one-twentieth  of  the  whole,  it  follows  that 
the  value  of  fertility  as  a  contributor  to  rent  is  not  only 
a  debatable  value,  but  almost  a  negligible  factor  in  the 
diminishing  twentieth  of  the  taxation  problem. 

The  Minor  Importance  of  Agricultural  Rent 

Search  in  the  principal  authorities  shows  that  in  the 
treatment  of  rent  about  fourteen  times  as  much  space 
has  been  devoted  by  them  to  agricultural  as  to  urban 
rent.*  The  Massachusetts  valuations  for  1907  offer  a 
marked  illustration  that  actual  conditions  call  for  an 
apportionment  the  very  reverse  of  this  academic 
treatment  of  the  subject.     Thus: 

ASSESSED  VALUATIONS  LAND  BUILDINGS  TOTAL 

33  cities    ....     $1,088,329,177  $998,896,745       $2,087,225,922 

37  large  towns        .       .  139,965,083  178,810,787  318,775,870 

70  cities  and  towns       .     $1,228,294,260       $1,177,707,532       $2,406,001,792 
284  small  towns       .       .  123,986,089  216,017,954  340,004,043 

354  cities  and  towns       .     $1,352,280,349       $1,393,725,486       $2,746/305,835 
*  For  details  see  Appendix  C. 


130  THE  A    B   C   OF  TAXATION 

Thus  the  land  valuations  of  the  284  small  towns 
($123,986,089)  and  of  the  70  cities  and  large  towns 
($1,228,294,260)  are  seen  to  be  about  in  the  ratio  of 
one  to  ten.  Nor  must  it  be  overlooked,  that  there  is  a 
larger  proportion  of  urban  property  in  small  towns 
than  of  farm  property  in  the  large  ones.  The  state 
census,  which  gives  farm  values  by  themselves,  corro- 
borates the  above  estimate  that  the  Massachusetts 
farm  land  value  left  for  the  agricultural  illustration  of 
Ricardo's  law  of  rert  does  not  exceed  one-tenth  of  the 
assessed  land  value  of  the  whole  state. 

Putting  the  foregoing  statements  together  —  that 
is,  considering  at  once  the  relative  weight  assigned 
to  the  two,  as  indicated  by  the  treatment  of  the 
authorities,  and  the  relative  importance  of  the  subjects 
—  we  are  confronted  with  the  spectacle  of  fourteen 
times  too  much  attention  given  for  a  hundred  years  to 
ten  times  too  small  a  matter.  Proceeding  now  to  the 
multiplication  of  fourteen  by  ten,  we  are  brought  face  to 
face  with  the  mathematical  conclusion  that  in  order  to 
restore  a  lost  equilibrium,  the  schools  might  reasonably 
from  now  on  give  one  hundred  and  forty  times  more 
study  to  the  subject  of  urban  or  city  rent  than  they 
have  been  in  the  habit  of  doing  in  the  past. 

This  extravagant  conclusion  is  set  forth  in  the  hope 
that  it  may  prove  a  magnet  that  shall  draw  present 
attention  away  from  agricultural  ground  rent,  which 
may  almost  be  ignored,  and  fix  it  upon  the  fifty-five 
millions  of  ground  rent  in  Boston,  which  the  people  pay 
yearly  for  the  use  of  its  land;  upon  the  one  hundred 
and  fifty  or  two  hundred  millions  of  ground  rent  in 
Greater  New  York;  upon  the  two  or  three  thousand 
millions  of  ground  rent  in  the  United  States;  and  upon 


THE  SINGLE  TAX  AND  THE  FARMER     131 

the  billions  of  franchise  values  which  in  recent  years 
have  sprung  up  all  around  us  like  gourds  in  the  night. 

Confronted,  as  we  are  to-day,  by  such  acute  condi- 
tions, we  ask  you  to  pardon  whatever  may  seem  like 
impatience  with  a  theory  that  has  dealt  so  laboriously 
with  the  cuticle  instead  of  with  the  heart  of  production. 

We  seek  a  proper  understanding  and  economic 
treatment  of  this  vast  river  of  ground  rent,  which,  like 
a  great  Mississippi,  drains  every  field  of  industry,  labour 
and  capital,  wages  and  interest,  in  the  whole  country 
around.  Our  earnest  contention  is  that  to  such  wise 
treatment  we  must  look  for  the  correction  of  most  that 
is  now  wrong  in  the  distribution  of  wealth.  Out  of 
this  vast  current  of  ground  rent,  we  would  provide  for 
all  public  need. 


Chapter  X 

PUBLIC    UTILITIES  — REGULATION    BY 
TAXATION 

THE  following  thoughts  are  prompted  by  a  desire 
to  make  some  contribution,  however  small,  to 
the  elucidation  of  a  problem  that  to-day  is  clamouring 
for  solution.  The  chapter  is  a  first  essay  at  the  subject 
and  contains  tentative  views  as  well  as  settled  opinions. 
In  this  country  of  ours,  in  the  last  half  century,  have 
grown  up  new  and  great  public  utility  undertakings, 
some  of  which  in  a  short  generation  have  taken  on  stu- 
pendous proportions.  Their  nature  is  neither  wholly 
public  nor  wholly  private,  but  partakes  in  differing 
ratio  of  both,  and  is  best  described  as  quasi-public. 

Ownership  or  Regulation 

It  is  admitted  that  one  of  two  things  must  come, 
viz.,  either  these  public  utilities  must  be  owned  by  the 
public,  or  they  must  be  regulated  by  law. 

Public  ownership,  it  is  objected,  may  be  all  right 
under  comparatively  pure  civic  conditions,  as  in  Swit- 
zerland or  in  Glasgow,  but  public  ownership  is  not  safe 
where  there  is  graft.  Of  taxation  it  can  be  asserted 
that  it  is  likely  to  be  safe  and  sane,  graft  or  no  graft. 

Thus  a  conservative  public  hesitates  to  accept  public 
ownership  as  the  right  way  out,  for  a  country  so  young 
and  expanding  as  ours,  until  a  higher  standard  of  civic 
virtue  and  administrative  capacity  is  attained,  prefer- 

132 


REGULATION  OF  PUBLIC  UTILITIES       133 

ring  to  endure  the  ills  of  monopoly  rather  than  hazard 
what  seems  a  gigantic  experiment.  Yet,  considering 
the  great  advance  already  made  by  the  city  and  state 
of  New  York*  in  the  regulation  of  public  utilities,  it  is 
diificult  to  believe  that  the  people  will  not  hold  fast  to 
what  they  have  now  obtained. 

For  one  I  do  not  incline  to  ownership,  though  I  do 
not  pretend  to  be  wise  enough  to  reach  a  sure  decision. 
Fortunately,  it  does  not  appear  to  me  immediately 
necessary  to  make  such  choice.  There  is  one  good 
way  easily  open  for  its  determination,  viz.,  the  com- 
parative test  of  time.  That  the  employment  of  taxa- 
tion, as  one  instrument  ready-made  and  close  at  hand, 
is  wise,  I  have  not  a  doubt. 

The  astonishing  thing  is  that  economists,  legislators, 
and  newspapers,  in  their  opposition  to  ownership  of 
certain  monopolies,  do  not  more  prominently  suggest 
and  discuss,  even  if  they  are  not  ready  to  advocate, 
the  compromise  alternative  to  ownership.  How  else 
can  the  opposition  to  public  ownership  head  off  its 
coming  better  than  by  advocating  taxation  in  its  stead, 
and  why  not  be  as  persistent  in  experiments  of  taxation 
as  of  ownership,  thus  contributing  to  the  only  possible 
solution  —  experimental  test  and  demonstration  — 
the  survival  of  the  fittest  ?  The  true  system  when  found 
will  be  the  one  that  bears  the  supreme  test  of  furnish- 
ing a  maximum  service  at  a  minimum  cost. 

Legislature  or  Commission 

If,  in  the  course  of  events,  it  should  appear  that  public 
regulation  is  preferred  to  public  ownership,  and  there- 


*See  Reports  of  Public  Service  Commission,  First  and  Second  Districts, 
for  the  six  months  ending  December  31,  1907. 


134  THE  A  B  C  OF  TAXATION 

fore  should  have  the  right  of  way,  so  to  speak,  in  public 
consideration,  then  the  next  question  is : 

Shall  it  be  regulation  by  Legislature  or  regulation  by 
Commission? 

The  Legislature 

Considerable  effort  has  been  recently  directed, 
notably  in  the  mooted  question  of  the  New  Haven  and 
Boston  &  Maine  merger,  along  the  line  of  regulation  by 
legislation,  but  it  must  be  admitted  that  at  best 
legislative  regulation,  being  uninformed  and  uninspired, 
cannot  be  otherwise  than  arbitrary,  unaccommodating, 
undiscriminating. 

Perhaps  no  better  preparation  can  be  made  for  treat- 
ing the  problem  than  to  endeavour  to  define  to  ourselves 
as  clearly  as  possible  the  nature  of  the  task  proposed. 

What  are  some  of  the  matters  for  which  regulation, 
wisely  or  unwisely,  is  invoked?  First  and  indis- 
pensable are  public  audit  and  public  inspection;  the 
questions  of  the  capitalisation  of  franchises,  and  the 
capitalisation  of  earnings,  which  may  or  may  not  be 
made  subject  to  a  general  law :  then  follow  the  problems 
of  mergers,  absorptions,  extensions,  connections,  com- 
mon use  of  tracks,  and  pooling;  the  question  of  rates 
and  rebates,  standard  of  equipment,  strikes  and  wages ; 
exploitation  of  every  kind,  including  the  pocketing  or 
sequestration  of  valuable  franchises  or  patents;  the 
vicious  insurance  plan  of  control  of  stock  to  secure 
control  of  salaries ;  the  just  attribution  of  dividends  to 
capital  and  profits  to  skill;  valuation  of  property; 
valuation  of  franchises;  and  lastly,  like  the  speed 
governor  on  the  engine,  taxation  of  the  franchise. 

To  frame  a  creditable  statute  to  cover  all  these  par- 


REGULATION  OF  PUBLIC  UTILITIES      135 

ticular  features  would  be  an  all  engrossing  occupation 
for  legislators.  To  make  a  specific  law  for  each  class  and 
case  would  seem  to  be  an  impossible  undertaking.  The 
Legislature  of  Massachusetts,  which  ranks  high  in 
intelligence,  alertness,  and  honesty,  is  to-day  struggling 
with  the  New  Haven  and  Boston  &  Maine  merger,  and 
I  venture  to  say  that  not  a  single  legislator  feels  himself 
competent  to  the  the  task.  If  all  similar  questions 
required  the  action  of  the  legislature,  what  would 
become  of  the  docket  and  the  time  of  legislators? 

The  Commission 

The  already  established  trend  toward  regulation  by 
national  or  state  commission,  to  which  it  is  proposed 
that  the  exercise  of  regulative  governmental  power 
shall  be  delegated,  brings  us  to  a  consideration  some- 
what in  detail  of  the  reasons  for,  and  the  possibilities 
of,  the  commission  idea  as  applied  to  the  regulation, 
under  statute,  of  special  franchises  or  public  utilities, 
either  by  rate  making,  by  taxation,  or  by  any  other 
means  whatsoever. 

Mr.  Henry  Clews  voices  a  pregnant  truth  when  he 
says  that  a  large  part  of  the  gross  evils  in  trusts  and 
syndicates  and  public  service  corporations  are  traceable 
to  the  fact  that  "legislatures  have  not  kept  pace  with 
national  progress."  Similarly,  President  Woodrow 
Wilson  of  Princeton  University,  says: 

The  corporation  lawyers  of  this  country  know  what  is  going 
on;  the  legislators  do  not.  I  want  to  say  to  all  corporation 
lawyers,  "if  you  would  save  the  corporation,  you  will  come 
out  from  cover  and  tell  the  legislators  what  is  needed.  You 
know  what  is  needed;  they  don't.  By  telling  them  you  will 
save  the  corporation.  If  you  don't  you  will  have  the  mob  at 
its  doors  in  a  decade." 


136  THE  A  B  C  OF  TAXATION 

In  these  public  service  corporations  the  public  is  a 
recognised  partner,  holding,  through  the  franchise, 
perhaps  a  minor  interest,  possibly  a  major  interest. 
The  private  interest  in  these  partnerships  is  adminis- 
tered by  men  skilful,  alert,  of  life-long  experience, 
masters  of  their  art.  Of  the  public's  interest,  which 
has  too  long  or  too  often  been  that  of  a  silent  partner, 
the  Legislature  is  the  constitutional  representative. 
But  legislative  bodies,  by  reason  of  the  method  of  their 
selection,  their  short  terms,  and  by  their  limited  and 
varied  experience,  are  disqualified  to  cope  directly 
with  the  specialised  ability  and  experience  of  the 
private  administration.  Consequently  the  question 
has  already  arisen  and  is  being  answered,  viz. 
why  should  not  the  interest  of  the  people,  the  State, 
in  the  co-partnership,  be  represented  by  the  ablest 
men  whom  the  President,  or  the  Governor,  can  secure 
at  adequate  salaries,  constituting  permanent  com- 
missions —  men  who  shall  learn  to  know  what  is  needed 
without  asking  corporation  lawyers,  who  shall  become 
as  competent  in  their  distinct  sphere  of  regulation, 
including  the  field  of  taxation,  as  are  the  Hills,  Harri- 
mans,  Mellens,  and  Tuttles  in  what  should  be  their  own 
sole  province  of  railway  administration  —  commissions 
whose  duty  shall  be  to  ascertain  the  facts,  to  frame  the 
argument  for  the  people's  side  —  to  defend  the  rights 
of  the  public  against  aggression,  now  inseparable  from 
the  situation,  and  to  render  a  decision  which  shall 
stand  as  the  verdict  of  the  people's  representatives. 
Not  until  some  such  harmonising  agency  is  employed 
can  it  be  possible  for  these  great  corporations  and  the 
people  to  get  their  respective  rights  without  wrong 
to  the  one  or  the  other. 


REGULATION  OF  PUBLIC  UTILITIES      137 

The  great  lack  to-day  is  not  so  much  in  the  general 
wisdom  and  honest  intention  of  the  people  or  their 
representatives  as  it  is  a  lack  of  understanding  of  certain 
general  principles  of  simple  application;  the  longer 
this  understanding  is  deferred  the  harder  the  problem 
becomes. 

The  President  of  Princeton  says  also: 

We  have,  in  fact,  turned  from  legal  regulation  to  executive 
regulation.     We  have  turned  from  law  to  personal  power. 

But  what  we  are  here  considering  is  legal  regulation, 
executive  regulation  under  law.  What  is  needed  is  a 
Legislature  to  make  wise  general  regulative  laws,  courts 
to  interpret  them,  and  a  competent  executive  agency 
to  administer  them. 

Regulation  by  Rates,  or  by  Taxation,  or  by  Both 

Granting  the  probable  establishment  of  the  commis- 
sion method,  the  endeavour  of  this  chapter  is  to  bring 
to  the  front,  in  the  railroad  and  other  public  utility 
problems,  the  factor  of  taxation:  not  taxation  for 
revenue;  not  taxation  of  future  franchises  or  their 
capitalised  earnings;  but  taxation  of  franchises  already 
granted  and  exploited  and  capitalised,  together  with 
earnings  already  capitalised  —  taxation  of  present 
franchise  earnings  to  bring  them  into  the  public 
treasury,  instead  of  leaving  them  in  private  hands; 
not  the  taxation  of  the  earnings  of  industry,  but  the 
appropriation  by  taxation  of  the  dividends  that  are 
earned  by  the  public;  to  the  end  that  the  profit  of 
"operation"  shall  go  to  skill  and  enterprise,  and  the 
profits  of  the  franchise  shall  go  to  the  people. 

If  there  is  one  problem,  National  and  state,   that 


138  THE  A  B  C  OF  TAXATION 

to-day  towers  above  all  the  rest,  it  is  the  problem  of 
railway  regulation.  The  avowed  aim  of  what  is  known 
as  the  New  York  Ford  Amendment  is  to  facilitate 
the  raising  of  revenue.  It  contains  no  suggestion  of 
possible  extension  to  include  the  far  higher  and  more 
difficult  function  of  regulation.  There  are  those  who 
believe  that  the  vexatious  perplexities  of  this,  as  of  all 
other  public  franchise  problems,  will  prove  more 
amenable  to  the  correcting  tendencies  of  taxation  than 
to  any  other  agency.  Legislative  regulation  is,  at  best, 
clumsy  and  intermittent,  often  amounting  to  a  weak 
confession  that  hostility  of  interests  cannot  be  con- 
verted into  harmony.  Taxation  is  neither  of  these, 
but  is  elastic,  self-adjustable,  and  self-operative.  The 
best  hope  of  any  graft  extermination  must  reside  in 
taxation  —  the  taxation  of  special  privilege.  Would 
any  one  maintain  that  change  for  the  worse  is  possible 
in  American  graft  of  to-day?  Is  the  public  graft  of  a 
corporate  city  worse  than  the  private  graft  of  all  its 
constituent  citizens?  Are  not  the  people  the  victims 
in  either  case,  and  cannot  graft  be  resisted  more  con- 
cretely and  thus  more  effectively  by  the  arm  of  a  strong 
individual  executive  than  by  the  slower  instrumentali- 
ties of  public  administration? 

It  will  be  profitable,  in  approaching  the  problem,  to 
analyse  in  our  own  minds  what  is  meant  by  the  phrases 
public  utilities,  quasi-public  corporations,  semi-public 
functions.  We  mean,  do  we  not,  that  a  part  is  public 
business  and  a  part  is  private  business;  that  one  part 
of  their  capital  is  public,  another  part  private;  that 
one  part  of  their  function  is  public  and  one  part 
individual;  that  one  part  of  their  value  rests  on  fran- 
chise, the  other  part  on  equipment  and  operation? 


REGULATION  OF  PUBLIC  UTILITIES      139 

The  sensible  question  at  once  suggests  itself:  If  these 
constituent  parts  can  be  separated,  why  not  treat  them 
separately?  Why,  in  order  to  control  the  public 
agency,  is  it  necessary  to  assume  control  over  the  private 
agency?  Why  not,  through  taxation,  assume  gradually 
the  public's  right  to  the  franchise,  and  let  improvement 
and  operation  remain  in  private  hands?  Or,  if  we  are 
not  quite  sure  that  it  is  wise  to  take  over  both,  why  not 
take  the  franchise  first,  and  observe  the  effect?  And 
even  if  we  are  persuaded  that  it  is  wise  to  take  both, 
why  not  take  them  over  in  the  natural  order,  one  at  a 
time  — the  franchise  first?  How  better  can  the 
municipality  learn  to  "run"  its  own  utilities  than 
by  first  learning  to  regulate  them? 

The  all  important  preparatory  step  must  be  to 
separate  as  distinctly  as  possible  regulative  functions 
from  administrative  functions,  so  that  the  com- 
mission may  not  meddle  with  administration  further 
than  to  set  such  limits,  not  fixed  by  statute,  as 
bound  the  public's  right. 

The  following  tentative  classification  is  oflFered: 

REGULATIVE 

Audit  Rebates 

Capitalisation  of  earnings  Standard  of  equipment 

Capitalisation  of  franchises  Stock  control  of  salaries 

Exploitation  of  every  kind  Stock  watering 

Inspection  Taxation  of  the  franchise 

Reduction  of  earnings  Valuation  of  franchises 

Rate  of  taxation  Valuation  of  property 

ADMINISTRATIVE 

Absorptions  Pooling 

Common  use  of  tracks  Rate  Making 

Connections  Strikes 

Extensions  Wages 
Mergers 


I40  THE  A  B  C  OF  TAXATION 

Most  of  the  things  set  down  under  the  head  of 
''Regulative"  clearly  belong  there.  The  regulative 
reduction  of  earnings  would  involve  a  reduction  of 
rates  in  general,  but  the  original  making  of  specific 
rates  would  seem  to  fall  inevitably  within  the  province 
of  administration,  while  questions  of  absorption,  com- 
mon use  of  tracks,  connections,  extensions,  mergers, 
pooling,  strikes,  and  wages  would  naturally  range  them- 
selves under  the  same  head ;  and  so,  too,  it  is  respect- 
fully submitted,  the  most  effective,  definite,  and  delicate 
(because  flexible)  regulation  possible  is  through  the 
agency  of  a  franchise  tax,  which  can  be  made  to  extract 
annually  from  the  corporation  that  part  of  its  profits 
directly  contributed  by  the  public,  leaving  all  its 
improvements  —  in  other  words,  its  plant,  the  capital 
devoted  to  its  industry  —  free  of  taxation. 

The  natural  operation  of  such  a  system  would  be  to 
leave  to  the  corporation  only  such  profits  as  are  due 
to  capital  and  industry  actually  involved,  and  thus  to 
reduce  capital  stock  to  a  fair  market  value,  tending  to 
reduce  present  overcapitalisation,  as  is  now  being 
effected  in  the  City  of  New  York. 

The  trend  of  such  taxation  would  be  to  destroy 
the  motive  for  exploitation,  by  appropriating,  through 
taxation,  the  public's  share  of  the  profits,  thus  tending 
to  take  public  utilities  out  of  politics.  Taxation 
would  thus  be,  as  it  were,  the  vital  nexus  between  public 
and  private  interest,  extracting  annually  a  profit 
already  accrued  to  the  franchise  alone,  and  operating 
like  a  board  of  equalisation  between  the  corporation 
and  the  state.  When  this  point  is  reached,  regulation 
and  administration  will  no  more  think  of  exploiting 
each  other    than    would    individual   partners   in   a 


REGULATION  OF  PUBLIC  UTILITIES       141 

business  firm.  Clearly,  the  advantage,  if  it  be  an 
advantage,  temporary  or  permanent,  of  regulation 
over  public  ownership,  is  the  relief  of  the  public  from 
the  details  and  responsibilities  of  administration. 

The  State  of  New  York  has  a  Public  Utilities  Commis- 
sion already  installed  by  way  of  example,  and  has  paved 
the  way  with  an  enabling  statute  to  aid  in  the  process 
of  valuation  for  purposes  of  taxation  of  those  public 
assets  to  which  the  public  may  rightfully  lay  claim. 

The  Ford  Law  for  the  Taxation  of  Special  Franchises, 
now  in  operation  in  the  State  of  New  York,  was  enacted 
in  1899.  It  was  amended  at  a  special  session  called 
by  Governor  Roosevelt,  and,  after  five  or  six  years' 
contest,  was  sustained  by  the  Court  of  Appeals  of  the 
State  of  New  York,  and  by  the  Supreme  Court  of  the 
United  States. 

This  bill  did  not  "prescribe  any  specific  method  of 
assessment,"  but  simply  "added  certain  items  to  the 
prescribed  classes  of  real  property,  full  provision  for 
the  assessment  and  taxation  of  which  was  already 
provided  for  by  other  laws  in  force."* 

An  essential  provision  of  the  original  bill  was  set 
forth  in  the  following  lines:  "The  terms,  'land,'  'real 
estate,' and  'real  property,'  as  used  in  this  chapter, 
include  the  land  itself  above  and  under  water,  all 
buildings  and  other  articles  and  structures,  sub- 
structures and  superstructures,  erected  upon,  under 
or  above,  or  affixed  to  the  same;  all  wharves  and  piers, 
including  the  value  of  the  right  to  collect  wharfage, 
cranage,  or  dockage  thereon;  all  bridges,  all  telegraph 
lines,  wires,  poles,  and  appurtenances  upon,  above,  and 
under  ground ;  all  surface,  under  ground,  and  elevated 

*"  The  Ford  Bill,"  Municipal  Avoirs,  June  1899,  New  York  Reform  Club. 


142  THE  A  B  C  OF  TAXATION 

railroads,  all  railroad  structures,  substructures,  and 
superstructures,  tracks  and  the  iron  thereon ;  branches, 
switches,  and  other  fixtures  permitted  or  authorised  to 
be  made,  laid,  or  placed  in,  upon,  above,  or  under  any 
public  or  private  road,  street,  or  ground;  all  mains, 
pipes,  and  tanks  laid  or  placed  in,  upon,  above,or  under 
any  public  or  private  street,  or  place  for  conducting 
steam,  heat,  water,  oil,  electricity,  or  any  property, 
substance,  or  product  capable  of  transportation  or 
conveyance  therein  or  that  is  protected  thereby;  all 
trees  and  underwood  growing  upon  land,  and  all  mines, 
minerals,  quarries,  and  fossils  in  and  under  the  same, 
except  mines  belonging  to  the  state.'* 

What  is  known  as  the  Ford  amendment  was  an  addi- 
tion of  seven  lines  to  the  above  section  further  elaborat- 
ing the  legal  definition  of '  *  land  "  in  the  following  words : 

Including  the  value  of  all  franchises,  rights,  authority,  or 
permission  to  construct,  maintain,  or  operate,  in,  under,  above, 
upon,  or  through,  any  streets,  highways,  or  public  places,  any 
mains,  pipes,  tanks,  conduits,  or  wires,  with  their  appurtenances, 
for  conducting  water,  steam,  heat,  light,  power,  gas,  oil,  or 
other  substance  or  electricity  for  telegraphic,  telephonic,  or 
other  purposes. 

These  seven  lines  are  a  clear  and  concise  restate- 
ment of  the  legal  meaning  of  the  term  "land"  as 
including  the  recognised  "rights  and  privileges  thereto 
pertaining."  It  is  this  definition  for  purposes  of  taxa- 
tion that  is  the  basis  of  the  few  words  of  argument 
which  I  have  to  offer.  It  is  interesting,  because, 
with  the  sanction  of  the  highest  courts  of  the  state 
and  Nation,  it  defines  a  public  franchise  as  "land,"  a 
public  franchise  value  as  "land  value." 

It  is  evident  that  the  public  can  reap  its  franchise 


REGULATION  OF  PUBLIC  UTILITIES      143 

benefit  either  in  lower  fares  or  in  franchise  taxes. 
It  may  be  assumed  that  the  gross  amount  of  the 
benefit  is  the  same  whichever  way  it  is  distributed. 
If  the  franchise  is  taxed,  the  benefit  is  distributed 
immediately  among  all  the  people.  If  rates  are  re- 
duced, would  not  the  benefit,  while  going  immediately 
to  the  patrons  of  the  road,  likewise  be  ultimately  dif- 
fused among  all  the  people? 

If  the  above  analysis  be  correct,  it  follows  that 
the  question  of  method  is  one,  not  of  justice,  but  of 
expediency,  and  it  is  submitted  that,  on  the  ground  of 
expediency,  the  taxation  method  is  preferable  by 
reason  of  its  greater  simplicity. 

A  too  frequent  change  in  schedule  rates  is  at 
least  inconvenient.  This  disadvantage  finds  illustration 
in  the  contrasted  conditions  of  1907  and  1908.  By 
hard  times  and  greatly  reduced  business,  the  railroads 
now  seek  to  justify  either  a  reduction  of  wages  or  a 
paradoxical  advance  of  rates,  in  place  of  the  reduction 
usually  resulting  from  dull  business. 

It  is  at  this  point  that  taxation  offers  itself,  like  the 
"ratchet"  or  the  "follower"  in  the  machine,  to  "take 
up  the  slack"  be  it  more  or  less  from  year  to  year. 

Under  the  system  here  considered,  in  which  regula- 
tion is  supplemented  by  taxation,  instead  of  a  legisla- 
tive reduction  of  rates  once  in  every  five,  ten,  or  twenty- 
five  years,  in  the  face  of  a  formidable  lobby,  there  would 
be  a  periodical  but  not  too  frequent  general  readjust- 
ment of  rates,  which  presumably  must  be  high  enough 
to  include  dividends  on  capital  actually  employed; 
there  would  be  an  annual  flexible  regulation  of  the  tax 
based  upon  the  net  earnings  of  the  previous  year,  in 
the  light  of  an  honest,  expert,  and  inquisitorial  public 


144  THE  A  B  C  OF  TAXATION 

inspection  and  accounting.  This  tax  would  appro- 
priate to  the  public  such  net  earnings  (barring  a  liberal 
surplus),  leaving  the  industry  itself  free  from  tax. 
Such  regulation  would  seem  to  promise  all  the 
benefits  which  could  be  claimed  for  public  owner- 
ship without  the  dangers  which  would  attend  that 
policy.  It  may  be  that  the  management  and  the 
commission  could  be  merged  into  a  holding  company, 
which  would  become,  to  all  intents  and  purposes,  a 
public  commission  with  all  the  benefits  of  actual 
municipal  ownership. 

By  way  of  illustration,  let  it  be  supposed  that  a 
number  of  railway  experts  (not  exploiters)  have  formed 
a  company  to  take  over  the  franchise  and  operation  of 
a  great  railway.  Although  small  holders  of  stock,  these 
men  naturally  become  the  salaried  officers  and  managers 
of  the  business. 

Under  what  must  amount  to  a  municipal  guarantee 
of  dividends  (out  of  profits  in  good  years,  or  out  of 
surplus  in  bad  years),  the  promise  of  a  low  market  rate 
suffices  to  attract  ample  funds  from  the  sale  of  capital 
stock,  and  the  corporation  is  established  as  a  going 
concern. 

Let  it  be  further  assumed  that  taxation  has  been 
operative,  say,  for  a  generation ;  that  it  has  gradually 
recovered  to  the  public  the  value  of  the  franchise  by  a 
process  so  tentative  and  even  cautious  as  to  make 
"grim  financial  disaster"  impossible.  Let  it  be  next 
assumed  that,  as  a  result,  the  triple  concurrent  agencies, 
"private  ownership,"  "public  regulation,"  and  "taxa- 
tion of  franchise,"  are  now  in  mutual  and  harmonious 
control  of  the  situation,  from  which  speculation  and 
exploitation  will  have  been  eliminated  as  superfluous. 


REGULATION  OF  PUBLIC  UTILITIES      145 

The  problem  of  government  regulation  will  be  to 
harmonise  the  three  interests  of  capital,  management, 
and  the  public;  a  fair  profit  to  capital;  fair  rewards  for 
skill  and  enterprise  in  management;  a  fair  return  to 
the  public  for  franchise  privileges. 

Capital:  A  fair  rate  of  return  to  capital  invested  in 
railways  is  the  market  rate  of  interest  upon  invest- 
ments of  equal  security,  as  fixed  in  competitive  indus- 
tries, and  this  is  all  that  capital  (minus  speculation) 
demands. 

When  the  public  thus  asserts  its  rights  and  enforces 
them,  it  must,  of  course,  first  guarantee  dividends  to 
the  stockholders,  whose  property  rights  would  other- 
wise be  imi:>erilled. 

Capital  does  not  run  the  road,  and  hence  it  is  not 
entitled  to  unusual  profits  due  to  the  risks  of  an 
established  business.  Reduction  of  rates  and  taxation 
of  franchise  will  have  squeezed  the  water  from  the 
stock,  and  actual  capital,  as  determined  by  the  com- 
mission valuation,  will  get  its  "fair  profit "  in  dividends, 
and  profits  will  go  to  skill  and  enterprise,  where  they 
properly  belong.  The  claim  that  a  higher  rate  of 
dividend  should  be  paid  to  capital  on  account  of  skill 
and  enterprise  in  management  is  a  vicious  one,  arising 
from  the  attribution  to  one  factor  of  what  clearly 
belongs  to  an  entirely  distinct  one. 

Management:  The  administration  of  the  business 
of  the  public  service  corporation  would  be,  as  now,  in 
the  hands  of  agents,  superintendents,  and  managing 
directors,  who  would  profit  by  salaries  in  proportion 
to  their  skill  and  brains,  from  $1 ,000  to  $50,000,  a  year. 
It  is  these  men  who  run  the  road  now,  and  it  is  their 
concern  to  deserve  profits  by  so  doing.     "Traffic  men, 


146  THE  A  B  C  OF  TAXATION 

as  a  whole,  keen,  adroit,  and  sensitive  to  every  change 
in  the  industrial  world,  would  turn  to  with  their 
magnificent  forces  and  abilities  and  work  with  the 
commission  instead  of  against  it."  Skill  and  enter- 
prise, and  public  exigency,  instead  of  selfishness  and 
greed,  would  provide  the  initiative  for  legitimate 
extension  and  development. 

The  Public:  Its  concern  is  to  reap  from  its  own 
business,  delegated  to  private  hands,  a  fair  return, 
whether  it  be  by  lower  rates  or  higher  taxation.  The 
public  utilities  commission,  composed  of  men  of  good 
judgment  and  incorruptible  honesty,  its  functions  being 
supervisory  rather  than  managerial,  will  fix  upon  a  fair 
capitalisation,  and  will  determine  when  and  what  gross 
reduction  in  current  or  accumulated  earnings  the 
administration  should  proceed  to  effect  through  the 
reduction  of  specific  rates.  By  the  municipalisation 
of  the  franchise  the  main  motive  for  "stock  watering 
and  corporation  wrecking"  or  for  "underpaid  or  over- 
worked employees  or  false  economies"  will  be 
destroyed.  Whatever  "rebates,"  "stock  watering," 
and  "corporation  wrecking"  survive  the  assumption 
of  the  franchise  by  taxation,  the  commission  will 
prevent  under  statute.  The  value  of  the  franchise  will 
be  gradually  absorbed  through  reduction  of  rates, 
leaving,  however,  a  substantial  margin  as  the  best 
possible  index  and  basis  for  taxation  and  regulation. 
This  marginal  surplus  would  serve  the  purpose  of 
equalising  conditions  from  year  to  year,  bridging  over 
lean  financial  periods,  and  thus  securing  more  fully  the 
stability  of  the  fair  profits  to  capital  invested. 

To  sum  up,  it  is  my  contention  that,  with  railways 
privately  owned,  publicly  regulated,  and  taxed  approxi- 


REGULATION  OF  PUBLIC  UTILITIES      147 

mately  to  the  value  of  their  franchises,  public  audit 
will  increasingly  protect  both  public  and  stockholder; 
public  inspection  will  keep  up  the  standard  of  the 
service;  capital  will  get  its  interest;  managerial  skill 
and  enterprise  will  get  its  compensation;  the  public 
will  get  its  low  rates  and  taxes.  It  will,  therefore, 
appear,  that  franchise  taxation  is  proposed  not  as  a 
sole  solution  of  the  railway  problem,  but  as  a  flexible, 
practicable,  speedy  supplement  to  the  necessarily  more 
rigid  policy  of  regulation. 

The  people  should  have  the  benefit  of  monopoly,  and 
how  can  this  benefit  be  better  secured  to  the  people 
than  by  charging  the  corporation  a  fair  price  for  what 
the  people  do  for  it,  leaving  the  corporation  free  to 
prosecute  its  private  business  in  its  own  way? 


Chapter  XI 
INHERITANCE  AND  INCOME  TAXES* 

THE  proposed  Presidential  and  Congressional  plan 
of  limiting  fortunes  and  raising  revenue  by  inheri- 
tance and  income  taxes  may,  it  is  suggested,  be  greatly 
improved  by  two  simple  modifications,  viz.:  (i)  Let 
fortunes  be  taxed  chiefly  in  the  process  of  their  accumu- 
lation, rather  than  at  probation ;  and  (2)  let  the  income 
tax  be  limited  to  those  incomes  which  are  not  only 
unearned,  but  which  are  now  untaxed.  I  ask  considera- 
tion for  a  few  of  the  arguments  upon  these  points. 

It  is  substantially  correct  to  say  that  wealth,  as  fast 
as  produced,  is  divided  into  two  parts:  one  part 
goes  to  wages  of  hand  and  brain,  the  other  part  goes 
to  privilege.  The  greater  the  part  that  goes  to  wages, 
the  smaller  the  part  that  goes  to  privilege,  and  vice 
versa.  The  prime  agency  in  determining  how  large 
shall  be  the  part  that  goes  to  privilege  is  the  private 
appropriation  of  ground  rent,  economic  rent,  in  its 
various  forms.  The  essence  of  privilege  is  the  law- 
given  power  of  one  man  to  profit  at  another  man's 
expense.  A  man  gets  rich,  not  out  of  his  earnings, 
but  out  of  his  savings.  If  obliged  to  spend  all  his 
earnings  it  is  not  possible  for  him  to  accumulate  riches, 
The  poor  man  rebels,  not  because  his  rich  neighbour 

*  Address  before  the  Economic  Club  of  Boston.  Published  in  the  New 
York  Evening  Post,  March  6, 1907;  Harper's  Weekly,  May  25,  1907;  and  the 
Outlook,  August  3,  1907. 

14S 


INHERITANCE  AND  INCOME  TAXES   149 

can  accumulate  five  hundred  dollars  to  his  one,  but 
because,  through  the  operation  of  this  special  privilege, 
it  is  at  his,  the  poor  man's,  expense  that  the  rich  man's 
accumulation  is  made.  Ex-Governor  Long  says  that 
there  will  be  discontent  just  so  long  as  certain  comforts 
and  possessions  are  within  the  reach  of  one  class  and 
beyond  the  reach  of  another  class.  This  discontent 
Archbishop  O'Connell  calls  the  "tumult  of  theenvious." 
But  unprivileged  men,  whether  unprivileged  rich  or 
unprivileged  poor,  have  not  far  to  look  to  fmd  that 
discontent  and  envy  start  only  where  skill  and  enterprise 
leave  oflf  and  special  privilege  begins.  You  are  not 
envious  of  Edison  or  Marconi  or  Bessemer  or  railroad 
magnates,  or  captains  of  industry;  you  gladly  accord 
them  princely  rewards  as  public  benefactors.  It  is 
only  when  the  people  are  called  upon  to  provide  an 
Edison  fortune  for  every  city  and  town  in  the  country 
through  privileged  exaction  that  your  discontent  is 
aroused.  It  is  only  when  they  are  required  to  super- 
impose upon  an  unprivileged  steel  fortune  of  three  or 
four  millions  a  privileged  fortune  of  a  thousand  millions, 
based  upon  economic  rent,  that  the  shoe  begins  to 
pinch.  It  is  only  when  the  ore  baron,  the  coal  baron, 
the  oil  baron,  the  railroad  baron,  and  the  land  baron 
are  privileged  to  take  ten  dollars  or  a  hundred  dollars 
from  their  wages  and  add  it  to  the  monopoly  price  of 
coal  and  iron  and  oil  that  men  are  swayed  by  the 
"tumult  of  the  envious." 

Legislation  has  been  busy  constituting  criminal 
offences.  The  air  is  charged  with  criminal  prosecution 
and  conviction  where  fortunes  have  been  swelled 
through  violation  of  law.  But  is  it  not  true  that  neither 
legislatures    nor    courts    have     seriously     addressed 


I50  THE  A  B  C  OF  TAXATION 

themselves  to  stopping  the  continuous  drain  of  wealth 
from  the  pockets  of  the  producers  into  the  coffers  of 
the  privileged?  President  Roosevelt  in  his  last 
message  enjoins  upon  Congress:  "Let  us  not  do  what 
the  next  generation  cannot  undo.  We  have  a  right 
to  the  proper  use  of  both  the  forests  and  the  fuel  during 
our  lifetime,  but  we  should  not  dispose  of  the  birth- 
right of  our  children."  Mr.  Bryan,  in  his  prediction  of 
"A  Great  Moral  Awakening,"  quotes  the  declaration  of 
the  United  States  Supreme  Court  that  "an  unjust  tax 
is  larceny  in  form  of  law."  Unjust  fortunes  are, 
we  claim,  the  fruit  of  unjust  taxes,  taxes  that  subtract 
from  wages  and  make  almost  impossible  the  savings 
of  labour  while  augmenting  the  fortunes  of  privilege; 
or,  to  be  more  exact,  unjust  fortunes  are  due  to  the 
absence  of  just  taxes. 

But  it  is  asked,  what  are  you  going  to  do  about  it? 
We  say  that  there  is  just  one  punishment  to  fit  the 
crime,  to  wit,  the  taxation  of  privilege.  Tax  the  oil 
and  the  coal,  the  franchise,  and  all  other  forms  of 
economic  rent,  at  its  fixed  initial  source,  the  land, 
which,  without  inquisitorial  or  dooming  process,  bears 
always  the  imprint  of  its  own  market  valuation.  Tax, 
not  private  ownership  or  corporate  franchise,  but  the 
privilege  attached  thereto.  The  colossal  error  of  the 
century  is  the  private  appropriation,  instead  of  the 
taxation,  of  rent.  This  it  is  that  makes  the  shopping 
district  of  every  city  a  continuous  battlefield  for  the 
business  interests  of  her  people,  and  every  battle  a 
Waterloo. 

For  the  prevention  of  unjust  fortunes  a  natural  ■ 
process  is  already  provided.     For  an  equitable  reduc- 
tion  of   accumulated   fortunes    artificial    machinery 


INHERITANCE  AND  INCOME  TAXES     151 

remains  to  be  invented.  President  Roosevelt  in  his 
message  confesses  that  the  question  of  an  income  tax 
is  "very  intricate,  delicate,  and  troublesome."  It 
would  seem  that  the  proposed  dissipation  of  fortunes 
by  means  of  an  inheritance  tax  must  prove  awkward 
and  of  questionable  justice,  besides  discouraging 
enterprise  at  its  point  of  greatest  efficiency,  and  in  the 
midst  of  a  beneficent  career.  It  would  discourage  the 
accumulation  of  unprivileged  fortunes,  which  are  a 
blessing  in  proportion  to  their  size. 

With  all  his  boasted  freedom,  the  American  citizen 
cannot  invent  or  manufacture  his  own  principles.  He 
can  select  them,  but  he  cannot  remould  or  ignore 
them.  He  may  make  permutations  and  combinations 
to  his  heart's  content,  but  two  and  two  will  always 
miake  four,  and  the  square  of  the  hypotenuse  will 
always  be  equal  to  the  sum  of  the  squares  of  the  other 
two  sides  of  the  triangle. 

So  in  economics,  certain  fundamentals  cannot  be 
disregarded,  as  for  example  that  the  expenditure, 
enterprise,  and  activity  of  society  express  themselves 
in  economic  rent,  the  value  of  land.  Whoever  pays 
this  rent  pays,  as  President  Roosevelt  says,  "for  the 
protection  the  State  gives  him."  Whatever  of  this 
rent  the  city  gets  in  taxes  it  has  bought  and  paid  for; 
whoever  else  gets  any  considerable  part  of  it  gets 
something  for  nothing.  Taxes  are  like  the  wheat 
poured  into  the  public  hopper;  rent,  in  whatever  form, 
may  be  described  as  the  flour  that  comes  from  the 
public  mill.  The  privileged  man,  who  is  allowed  to 
carry  off  the  grist,  eats  his  bread,  as  it  were,  at  the  tax- 
payer's expense.  A  tax  upon  rent  subtracts  nothing 
from  wages,  and  any  tax  upon  rent,  however  large. 


152  THE  A  B  C  OF  TAXATION 

cannot  remain  a  burden  upon  the  owner  beyond  a 
generation  at  most.  Land  value,  otherwise  perishable, 
is  made  imperishable  by  public  conservation ;  hence  the 
plea  that  the  whole  tax,  whether  inheritance  or  income, 
be  gradually  transferred  to  this  one  basis.  Whether 
it  shall  be  imposed  lightly,  as  a  life  rate,  or  heavily, 
as  a  death  rate,  is  merely  a  question  of  method.  In 
either  case  it  will  soon  cease  to  be  a  burden  upon  any 
one. 

Unjust  fortunes  are  made  out  of  ground  rent  accumu- 
lated and  compounded.  They  can  be  perpetuated  only 
by  the  private  appropriation  of  ground  rent;  cut  off 
from  ground  rent  the  public  nutriment  and  they  will 
quickly  crumble  and  perish  from  the  face  of  the  earth. 

Mr.  Carnegie  says:  ''Who  made  the  'wealth'  of  the 
Manhattan  Island  farm?  The  community,  the  popu- 
lation, the  people.  Then  you  tell  me  that  wealth  is 
sacred.  I  say  that  the  community  was  the  leading 
partner  that  made  that  wealth.  It  was  hundreds  of 
people  settling  up  there,  thousands  of  people  settling 
around  there,  and  here  are  these  millionaires.  They 
have  toiled  not,  neither  have  they  spun."  Is  it  not 
sensible  to  make  such  cumulative  fortunes  as  these  the 
basis  of  live  taxation? 

President  Roosevelt  cannot  eliminate  "intricacy, 
delicacy,  and  troublesomeness"  from  his  income  tax 
until  he  learns  to  distinguish  sharply  between  capital 
and  privilege,  between  incomes  that  are  earned  and 
those  that  are  unearned 


Chapter  XII 
THE  SINGLE  TAX* 

FOR  the  practical  views  which  it  is  my  privilege 
to  present  to  this  distinguished  conference  I  beg  to 
assume  responsibility  individually,  rather  than  as 
representing  any  organised  body,  who  thereby  might 
be  compromised.  To  express  my  conviction  in 
ecclesiastical  form  I  begin  with  the 

Credo 

(i)  I  believe  in  the  single  tax  defined  by  Henry 
George  in  "Progress  and  Poverty"  as  "the  abolition  of 
all  taxes  save  those  on  land  values,"  to  be  accomplished, 
as  he  said  at  Saratoga,  "by  the  slow  process  of  educa- 
ting men  to  demand  it";  to  which  he  added:  "In 
thinking  of  details  it  should  be  remembered  that  we 
cannot  get  to  the  single  tax  at  one  leap,  but  only  by 
gradual  steps,  which  will  bring  experience  to  the  settle- 
ment of  details." 

(2)  I  believe  that  the  amount  of  the  single  tax 
should  be  limited  to  the  needs  of  the  State  for  an  effec- 
tive and  economical  administration  of  government. 


♦Address  before  the  National  Tax  Association,  November  13,  1907,  at 
Columbus,  Ohio.  See  "  State  and  Local  Taxation.  First  National  Conference, 
1907."  The  Macmillan  Company,  1908.  The  reader  is  warned  that  this 
chapter  is  made  up  largely  of  expressions  found  elsewhere  in  the  book, 
especially  in  the  first  three  chapters.  The  only  reason  for  its  insertion  is 
that  it  represents  the  author's  latest  resume  of  the  subject,  prepared  for  an 
important  occasion. 

"53 


154  THE  A  B  C  OF  TAXATION 

"  It  is  a  question  of  applying  land  values  to  common  use 
as  far  as  they  will  go,  or  as  much  of  them  as  may  be 
needed,  as  the  case  may  prove  to  be."* 

(3)  I  believe  in  the  classification, formulated  by  the 
New  York  Ford  Franchise  Act,  of  a  public  franchise  as 
"land,"  and  a  public  franchise  value  as  "land  value," 
together  with  the  plainly  consequent  converse  truth, 
viz.,  that  the  site  value  of  land  is  a  private  franchise 
value,  because  land  depends  for  its  value  upon  those 
same  concrete  and  tangible  things  that  give  value  to 
a  public  franchise. 

(4)  I  believe  with  Henry  George  that  "in  truth  the 
right  to  the  use  of  land  is  not  a  joint  or  common  right, 
but  an  equal  right ;  the  joint  or  common  right  is  to  rent, 
in  the  economic  sense  of  the  term.  Therefore  it  is 
not  necessary  for  the  State  to  take  land;  it  is  only 
necessary  for  it  to  take  rent."  Accordingly  I  believe 
that  a  man  who  owns  land  owns  the  site,  and  every 
right  and  privilege,  fee,  title,  etc.,  pertaining  to  the 
land,  from  zenith  to  earth's  centre,  exclusive  and 
absolute,  as  against  any  other  individual,  but  never- 
theless subject  always  to  the  right  of  eminent  domain, 
and  to  the  claims  of  the  community  to  its  share  in  the 
value  of  those  rights  and  privileges,  through  the 
sovereign  power  of  taxation. 

(5)  I  believe  in  this  single  tax  doctrine  of  Henry 
George,  because  it  is  broad  and  catholic  like  the  air, 
the  sunshine,  and  all  other  bounties  that  heaven  sends 
alike  upon  the  just  and  the  unjust.  It  knows  no  dis- 
tinction of  race,  denomination,  party,  sect,  or  creed. 
It  knows  no  socialism,  individualism,  communism, 
anarchism,  Greek,  barbarian,  bond,  or  free.   The  Land 

*  Louis  F.  Post,  "  The  Single  Tax,"  p.  86. 


THE  SINGLE  TAX  155 

Question  is  under  all  these.  Where  it  leaves  off,  these 
begin.  A  single  taxer  may  be  any  of  these.  All  these 
should  be  single  taxers. 

The  Argument 

The  argument  in  the  case  may  be  put  briefly  as 
follows : 

The  three  economic  legs  necessary  and  sufficient 
whereupon  the  single  tax  stool  may  firmly  stand  are 
found  in  three  generic  peculiarities  quite  exceptional  in 
their  nature,  which  distinguish  land  from  houses  or 
other  man-made  products.  The  failure  to  recognise 
this  distinction  is,  we  believe,  sufficient  to  account  for 
the  crookedness  of  present  systems  of  taxation.  Such 
a  recognition  must  lie  at  the  very  foundation  of  any 
just  system  of  the  future. 

These  three  attributes,  firmly  grounded  in  orthodox 
economics,  are,  in  economic  language,  as  follows: 

a  The  site  value  of  land  is  a  social  product. 

h  Aland  tax  cannot  be  "shifted." 

c  The  selling  value  of  land  is  an  untaxed  value. 

These  three  fundamentals  are  worthy  of  brief 
separate  consideration. 

a  First  in  order  is  the  fact  that  land  value  is  a 
social  product,  i.  e.,  it  is  created  principally  by  the 
community  through  its  activities,  industries,  and 
expenditures.  The  value  of  land  is  based  primarily 
upon  economic  rent,  defined  as  "what  land  is  worth 
for  use,"  what  it  would  command  in  the  open  market. 

Strictly  speaking  this  "worth  for  use"  usually 
attaches  not  to  the  land  itself,  not  to  the  earth's  surface, 
not  to  the  inherent  capabilities  of  the  soil,  not  to  light 
and  air  or  other  bounties  of  nature  resident  in  the  land, 


156  THE  A  B  C  OF  TAXATION 

but  to  scores  of  things  exterior  to  the  land  and  through 
it  made  available  for  use,  so  that,  as  applied  to  urban 
land,  the  following  would  be  a  more  accurate  definition : 

Ground  rent  is  the  annual  value  of  the  exclusive  use 
and  control  of  a  given  area  of  land,  involving  the 
enjoyment  of  those  "rights  and  privileges  thereto 
pertaining"  which  are  stipulated  in  every  title  deed, 
and  which,  enumerated  specifically,  are  as  follows: 
right  and  ease  of  access  to  water,  health  inspection, 
sewerage,  fire  protection,  police,  schools,  libraries, 
museums,  parks,  playgrounds,  steam  and  electric  rail- 
way service,  gas  and  electric  lighting,  telegraph  and 
telephone  service,  subways,  ferries,  churches,  public 
schools,  private  schools,  colleges,  universities,  public 
buildings  —  utilities  which  depend  for  their  efficiency 
and  economy  on  the  character  of  the  government; 
which  collectively  constitute  the  economic  and  social 
advantages  of  the  land;  and  which  are  due  to  the 
presence  and  activity  of  population,  and  are  inseparable 
therefrom,  including  the  benefit  of  proximity  to,  and 
command  of,  facilities  for  commerce  and  communica- 
tion with  the  world  —  an  artificial  value  created 
primarily  through  public  expenditure  of  taxes.  In 
practice,  the  term  "land"  is  erroneously  made  to 
include  destructible  elements  which  require  constant 
replenishment ;  but  these  form  no  part  of  this  economic 
advantage  of  situation  or  site  value. 

Consequently  ground  rent  may  be  said  to  result  from 
at  least  three  distinct  causes,  all  of  which  are  connected 
with  aggregated  social,  as  distinguished  from  individual, 
activity:  (i)  public  expenditure;  (2)  quasi-public 
expenditure;  (3)  private  expenditure.  Thus  their 
very  nature  and  origin  would  seem  to  point  to  land 


THE  SINGLE  TAX  157 

values  as  peculiarly  fitted  to  bear  justly  the  burden  of 
taxation. 

b  Second  in  order  is  the  fundamental  fact  that  a 
tax  upon  ground  rent  cannot  be  shifted  upon  the 
tenant  in  increased  rent.  The  argument  in  the  case 
may  run  thus:  Ground  rent,  *'what  land  is  worth  for 
use,"  is  determined  not  by  taxation,  but  by  demand. 
Ground  rent  is  the  gross  income,  what  the  user  pays 
for  the  use  of  land;  a  tax  is  a  charge  upon  this  income, 
similar  in  its  nature  to  the  incumbrance  of  mortgage 
interest.  It  is  a  matter  of  every-day  knowledge  that 
even  though  land  be  mortgaged  nearly  to  its  full  value, 
no  owner  would  think  to  rid  himself  of  the  mortgage 
interest  that  he  has  to  pay  through  raising  his  tenant's 
rent  by  a  corresponding  amount.  Mortgage  interest 
is  a  lien  upon  land  held  by  an  individual;  similarly, 
a  tax  may  be  conceived  most  clearly  as  a  lien  upon 
land  held  by  the  state.  Both  affect  the  relations 
between  owner  and  mortgagor,  and  between  owner 
and  state  respectively;  neither  has  any  bearing  upon 
the  relations  between  owner  and  tenant.  *'Tax" 
is  simply  the  name  of  that  part  of  the  gross  ground  rent 
which  is  taken  by  the  State  in  taxation,  the  other 
part  going  to  the  owner;  the  ratio  these  two  parts  bear 
to  one  another  has  no  eflFect  upon  the  gross  rent  figure, 
which  is  always  the  sum  of  these  two  parts,  viz.,  the 
net  rent  plus  the  tax.  The  greater  the  tax  the  smaller 
the  net  rent  to  the  owner,  and  vice  versa.  Ground 
rent  is,  as  a  rule,  "all  that  the  traffic  will  bear";  that 
is,  the  owner  gets  all  he  can  for  use  of  his  land, 
whether  the  tax  be  light  or  heavy.  Putting  more 
tax  upon  land  will  not  make  it  worth  any  more 
for  use.     If  the  market  value  of  a  lot  of  land  for 


158  THE  A  B  C  OF  TAXATION 

use  is   I300  a  year,  a  tax  of  |ioo  will  not  make  it 
worth  I400  a  year. 

These  two  propositions  (a)  that  land  value  is  a  social 
product,  and  (b)  that  a  tax  upon  land  cannot  be  shifted 
by  the  owner  upon  his  tenant  in  increased  rent,  are 
well  settled  in  the  professional  mind. 

(c)  Third  and  last  is  the  fact,  a  necessary  corollary 
of  the  second,  that  the  selling  value  of  land  is  an 
untaxed  value,  a  proposition  that  has  received  the 
definite  approval  of  upwards  of  fifty  leading  American 
teachers  of  economics  and  has  been  seriously  questioned 
by  but  two  or  three  of  the  three  hundred  to  whom  it 
has  been  submitted. 

Every  purchaser  of  a  piece  of  property  knows,  with- 
out argument,  that  he  is  governed  as  to  the  price  he  will 
pay,  not  by  the  gross  income,  but  by  the  net  income 
that  will  remain  to  him  after  all  charges  and  incum- 
brances by  way  of  mortgage  interest  or  tax  have  been 
discharged. 

To  illustrate:  Assuming  a  piece  of  land  worth  $300 
a  year  for  use  to  be  free  of  all  charges  and  incumbrances, 
and  assuming  the  current  rate  of  interest  to  be  5  per 
cent  per  annum,  a  purchaser  would  buy  the  lot  for 
$6,000,  because  interest  upon  that  sum  would  amount 
to  the  stipulated  I300  a  year.  But  assume  that,  on  the 
contrary,  it  is  found  to  be  subject  to  a  mortgage  of 
f  2,000,  upon  which  the  annual  interest  charge  is  |ioo; 
then  he  will  buy  the  land,  not  at  $6,000,  but  at  $4,000, 
the  value  of  the  equity  remaining  after  mortgage 
interest  has  been  paid. 

But  assume  further  thas  this  lot  of  land,  besides 
being  subject  to  a  mortgage  of  $2,000,  is  subject  also 
to  an  established  tax  of  $100,  which  charge  the  pur- 


THE  SINGLE  TAX  159 

chaser  must  also  assume.  He  will  then  purchase  the 
land  not  at  ^4,000,  but  at  |2,ooo.  The  tax  charge  of 
1 1  GO  and  the  mortgage  interest  charge  of  1 100  respec- 
tively reduce  the  selling  price  of  land  by  the  same 
amount,  |2,ooo.  The  mortgage  and  the  tax  together 
therefore  reduce  it  by  l4,ooo;  and  the  purchaser  will 
buy  the  land  at  |2,ooo,  the  value  of  the  equity  that 
remains  after  both  mortgage  interest  and  tax  have 
been  paid.  This  $2,000  is  the  capitalisation  of  the 
annual  value  of  the  lot  after  all  charges  have  been  met. 
The  gross  value  is  the  taxed  value.  The  net  value  is 
an  untaxed  value. 

It  follows  from  the  above  too  brief  analysis  that, 
under  the  present  system,  the  selling  value  of  land  is  an 
untaxed  value  and  land  owners  who  invest  to-day  are 
entirely  exempt  from  taxation. 

As  this  exemption  of  the  present  owner  holds  true 
to-day,  so  it  will  be  true  in  future  of  each  new  purchaser 
subsequently  to  the  imposition  of  any  new  tax.  It 
is  in  the  very  nature  of  things  that  the  burden  of 
a  land  tax  cannot  be  made  to  survive  a  change  of 
ownership. 

But  when  we  turn  to  the  case  of  the  taxation  of 
houses  we  find  that  no  parallel  appears.  Whereas  a 
tax  upon  the  lot  could  not,  in  the  nature  of  things, 
increase  its  annual  rental,  or  cost  for  use,  a  similar 
tax  upon  the  house  is  added  directly  to  the  annual  cost 
to  the  user.  If  a  house  costing  $6,000  to  build  is 
subject  to  a  tax  of  $100,  this  amount  must  be  paid 
annually  in  addition  to  an  interest  charge  of  $300. 
Increasing  or  decreasing  taxation  upon  the  lot  has  no 
influence  upon  its  annual  cost  to  the  user;  while 
increasing  or   decreasing   the   tax    upon    the   house 


i6o  THE  A   B   C  OF  TAXATION 

increases  or  decreases  in  exact  proportion  the  annual 
cost  to  the  user. 

The  moral  of  this  illustration  is  that  a  tenant  gets 
for  use  annually  $300  worth  of  land  for  I300,  and  a 
house  costing  I300  for  I400.  In  other  words,  a  house 
tax  of  1 1 00  takes  in  taxation  $100  a  year  of  the 
user's  income.  A  land  tax  of  $100  takes  in  taxation 
no  part  of  the  income  of  the  present  owner,  provided 
that  he  purchased  the  land  after  the  tax  was 
imposed. 

The  beauty  of  this  illustration  is  that  while  land 
stands  for  everything  except  the  products  of  labour,  a 
house  is  here  made  to  stand  as  the  representative  of 
any  and  all  products  of  individual  labour,  and  the 
illustration  thus  becomes  all  inclusive. 

The  practical  exemption  of  the  selling  value  of  land 
is  vital  in  its  bearing  upon  any  proposition  for  obtain- 
ing an  increased  revenue  from  that  source,  accom- 
panied by  a  corresponding  exemption  of  other 
property. 

In  the  light  of  the  foregoing  argument  it  is  interesting 
to  consider 

WHAT  ONE  CITY,  THE  CITY  OF  BOSTON,  MIGHT 
HAVE  DONE  TO  PROMOTE  BUSINESS  AND  SECURE 
EQUITY  THROUGH  A  SOUND  AND  JUST  SYSTEM 
OF    TAXATION 

The  following  estimate  indicates  the  gigantic  pro- 
portions of  the  factor  ground  rent,  and  its  sufficiency 
to  meet  all  reasonable  costs  of  government  economically 
administered,  not  only  without  impoverishing  the  land- 
owner, but  without  subjecting  him  at  any  time  to  a 


THE  SINGLE  TAX  i6i 

tax  more  burdensome  or  more  continuous  than  that 
borne  by  every  man  that  has  lived  in  a  house  since  a 
house  tax  was  invented. 

The  gross  ground  rent  of  the  land  of  the  City  of 

Boston  is  by  careful  estimate  more  than       .     1^50,000,000 

Of  this  amount  there  is  already  taken  in  taxa- 
tion     10,000,000 

Leaving   to    the    landowners    of    to-day    a    net 

ground  rent  of    .         .  .  .  .  .     1^40,000,000 

The  fact  that  this  sum  amounts  to  $68  per 
capita,  or  $340  per  family,  will  help  the  mind 
to  grasp  its  magnitude  as  a  factor  in  the  dis- 
tribution of  wealth. 

State  and  local  taxes  upon  improvements,  build- 
ings, personal  property,  and  polls  amount  to 
something  over     ......       11,000,000 

If  this  additional  amount  were  taken  from  rent 
there  would  still  remain  to  the    landowners  a 

balance  of $29,000,000 

or  $48   per  capita,  or  $240  per  family. 

Coming  to  the  consideration  of  the  means  by  which 
more  revenue  may  be  gradually  raised  from  the  land 
and  the  burden  of  taxation  made  more  proportionate 
and  reasonable,  choice  may  be  had  from  a  variety  of 
methods.  The  one  most  frequently  suggested  is  that 
of  appropriating  by  taxation  part  or  all  of  the  future 
increase  in  land  values.  If  Boston  should  decide  to 
start  to-day  and  take  in  taxation  her  future  unearned 
increment  above  the  present  value  of  1653,000,000, 
the  case  would  be  exactly  the  same  as  that  of  some  new 
community  where  no  value  has  accrued,  a  situation 
in  which  the  ideal  justice  of  the  single  tax  is  so 
frequently  conceded. 

If   Boston  had  decided  ten  years  ago  to  take  in 


1 62  THE  A    B   C  OF  TAXATION 

taxation  an  additional  2  per  cent  (i^)  of  its 
gross  ground  rent  each  year  for  ten  years,  amounting 
in  that  period  to  a  total  of  20  per  cent,  coupled  with  a 
corresponding  reduction  in  the  tax  upon  buildings  and 
personal  property,  that  city  would  be  raising  to-day 
from  its  land  more  revenue  than  now  by 

Twenty  per  cent  of  ;^55,ooo,ooo  (p.  18)  or  .  .  j^i  1,000,000 
The   increase  in   the  gross  ground  rent  in   the 

same  ten  years  has  been       ....     ^20,000,000 

So  that  Boston  would  be  taking  in  increased  taxation 
to-day  little  more  than  one-half  of  its  "unearned  incre- 
ment" for  the  same  period. 

Under  this  supposition  the  1468,000,000  valuation 
of  ten  years  ago  would  still  remain  untouched  by 
taxation,  as  is  now  the  case  with  substantially  the  whole 
$653,000,000  valuation  of  1907. 

The  foregoing  Boston  figures  are  submitted  simply 
for  purposes  of  illustration,  not  in  any  way  as  support 
of  a  specific  recommendation. 

Important  Conclusion 

If  the  preceding  argument  is  valid,  it  establishes  the 
fact  of  gross  inequality  in  the  incidence  of  taxation  as 
between  land  values  and  improvement  values.  If 
it  is  admittedly  wrong  that  present  land  values  should 
be  untaxed,  how  can  such  fiscal  wrong  best  be  righted? 
Begin  at  once  a  transfer  of  taxes  from  improvements  to 
land,  so  gradual  that  two  old  injustices  will  cease  for 
every  new  one  that  is  begun,  until  this  untaxed  value 
is  made  to  bear  at  least  its  proportionate  burden  at  the 
same  rate  with  other  things. 

In  conclusion  I  wish  to  emphasise  this  basic  fact: 


THE  SINGLE  TAX  163 

that  the  burden  of  a  land  tax  cannot  be  made  to  survive 
a  change  of  ownership  has  in  turn  this  corollary  of  its 
own,  viz.,  that  a  new  tax  burden  if  imposed  to-day 
would  in  one  generation,  by  sale  or  by  inheritance, 
cease  to  be  a  burden.  If  all  taxes  are  finally  collected 
from  the  landowner,  he  will  then  be  the  only  man 
taxed.  If  another  generation  serves  to  let  his  successor 
out  from  under  the  burden,  who  will  remain  under  it? 
Ground  rent,  economic  rent,  being  an  equivalent  for 
value  received,  is  not  a  burden,  and  if  all  taxes  are 
ultimately  taken  from  rent,  it  follows  that  in  the  course 
of  two  or  three  generations  taxation  may  cease  entirely 
from  being  a  burden  upon  any  one. 

If  professional  economists  and  taxation  experts 
will  at  once,  to  use  a  nautical  phrase,  quit  their  dead 
reckoning  and  steer  their  craft  by  the  single  tax  pole- 
star,  time  and  tide  will  do  the  rest. 


PART  IV. 
APPENDIX 

A.  Ethics  of  the   Single  Tax  :    Its  Breadth 
AND  Catholicity. 

B.  Tolstoy  and  Henry  George. 

C.  The    Dispp.oportionate     Treatment     of 

Agricultural  Rents  by  Economists. 

D.  Statement  of  the  Rev.  Edward  McGlynn. 

E.  A  Protest  Against  Unjust  Taxation. 

F.  Agreements  in  Political  Economy. 

G.  Details    of    One  Hundred  and  Twenty 

Sales. 

H.  Details    of    Seven  Hundred  and  Fifty- 
one  Rentals. 


ETHICS   OF   THE    SINGLE   TAX,   ITS  BREADTH  AND  CATHOLICITY* 

The  appeal  to  reason  contained  in  the  doctrine  of  Henry 
George,  whether  as  a  moral  philosophy,  or  as  a  system  of  tax- 
ation, is  as  universal  as  is  the  natural  tax  (ground  rent),  which 
has  been  in  automatic  and  irresistible  operation  for  centuries, 
in  every  civilised  country  under  the  sun.  A  response  to  this 
universal  appeal  only  awaits  the  precipitation  of  a  mass  of 
relative  ignorance  and  error  now  held  in  solution  in  the  public 
mind  regarding  the  author  and  his  doctrine. 

This  single  tax  of  Henry  George  is  broad  and  catholic  like 
the  air,  the  sunshine,  and  all  other  bounties  that  heaven 
sends  alike  upon  the  just  and  the  unjust.  It  knows  no  dis- 
tinction of  race,  denomination,  party,  sect,  or  creed.  It 
knows  no  socialism,  individualism,  communism,  anarchism, 
Greek,  barbarian,  bond,  or  free.  The  land  question  is  under 
all  these.  Where  it  leaves  oflp,  these  begin.  A  single  taxer  may 
be  any  of  these.     All  of  these  should  be  single  taxers. 

There  is  in  the  single  tax,  or  natural  taxation,  nothing  of 
technical  socialism,  which  means  the  assumption  by  society 
of  functions  that  are  primarily  individual.  It  is  rather  a 
re-socialisation  of  that  which  by  its  own  nature,  in  its  incep- 
tion and  in  its  growth,  can  be  nothing  but  socialised,  but  which 
has  been  artificially  de-socialised.  There  is  in  natural  tax- 
ation no  communism,  if  by  communism  is  meant  the  com- 
pulsory pooling  of  the  products  of  human  labour.  Such 
taxation  is,  however,  the  divine  communism  of  the  common 
enjoyment  of  a  natural  bounty  bestowed  upon  all  in  common. 
There  is  in  natural  taxation  no  taint  of  the  anarchism  of  dis- 
order. It  is  the  recognition  of  the  ideal  anarchism  of  law,  so 
perfect,  self-adjusting,  self-operating,  that  no  external  force 
is  needed  to  carry  it  into  execution. 

*  Published  in  the  Arena  of  January,  1899. 
167 


1 68  THE  A  B  C  OF  TAXATION 

Its  appeal  is  no  less  to  the  Catholic  than  to  the  Protestant; 
no  more  to  the  Christian  than  to  the  Jew  or  the  Mohammedan, 
or  the  Pagan;  it  appeals  alike  to  Republican  and  Democrat. 
Being  a  veritable  lodestone —  all  attraction,  no  repulsion, 
and  with  the  whole  arsenal  of  arguments  on  its  side —  why 
should  it  not  quickly  gather  to  itself  a  victorious  host  ? 

Economically,  the  single  tax  proposes  the  displacement  of 
an  unjust  distribution  by  a  just  distribution  of  wealth.  Instead 
of  distribution  according  to  special  privilege,  and  taxation 
according  to  ability,  it  proposes  distribution  according  to 
ability,  and  taxation  according  to  special  privileges,  chief 
of  which  is  the  private  appropriation  of  ground  rent.  Morally, 
it  offers  itself  as  a  fundamental  bond  of  unity  to  reinforce  the 
great  accomplishments  already  made,  and  greater  efforts  to 
be  made  along  the  line  of  Christian  agreement. 

Henry  George  offers  to  the  world,  not  only  a  political  philo- 
sophy that  will  stand  the  test  of  the  gospel,  but  a  religious 
philosophy  also,  that  removes  a  great  beam  from  the  eye  of 
the  Christian  Church,  enabling  it  to  see  clearly  where  it  now 
confesses  blindness,  and  adding  to  its  light  a  warmth  and  a 
radiance  which  the  indifference  of  the  world  could  not  resist. 
Hence  the  persistent  disciples  of  Henry  George  ask  Christians 
to  consider  this  doctrine;  to  gather  to  the  standard  of  the 
single  tax,  and  to  follow  that  standard,  not  as  the  hound 
follows  the  fox,  winding  and  redoubling  upon  its  own  trail, 
but  as  the  bee  flies,  and  as  the  carrier-pigeon  flies,  by  the 
instinct  of  principle,  in  the  straight  line  that  lies  between 
right  and  wrong. 

B 

TOLSTOY   AND    HENRY   GEORGE* 

Tolstoy's  letter  to  the  London  Times  upon  the  subject, 
"A  Great  Iniquity,"  is  the  Russian  philosopher's  latest  utter- 

*  Published  in  the  Springfield  Republican,  December  lo,  1905;  New  York 
Evening  Post,  December  19,  1905;  and  the  Boston  Evening  Transcript^ 
December  26,  1905. 


APPENDIX  B  169 

ance  upon  the  land  question.  In  it  is  declared  his  belief  that 
the  greatest  of  all  iniquities  is  the  private  ownership  of  land, 
together  with  his  explicit  endorsement  of  the  single  tax  doctrine 
of  Henry  George. 

The  utterances  of  this  world-famous  man,  heralded  far  and 
near,  are  likely  to  foster  the  misapprehension  that  the  aim  of 
both  Henry  George  and  himself  is  the  destruction  of  private 
property  in  land. 

I,  therefore,  beg,  with  only  a  word  or  two  of  comment,  to 
call  critical  attention  to  one  of  Tolstoy's  statements,  leaving  it 
to  the  reader  to  make  his  own  interpretation  of  its  meaning. 

Notwithstanding  Tolstoy's  unequivocal  declaration  that  "the 
soil  must  be  restored  to  the  people,"  and  his  reiteration  of  "the 
wrong  of  private  property  in  land,"  the  conclusion  that  he 
would  destroy  the  private  ownership  of  land  must  be,  it  seems 
to  me,  a  mistaken  one,  and  out  of  harmony  with  both  his  text 
and  context.  Henry  George  specifically  arraigned  the  institu- 
tion of  private  property  in  land,  as  it  now  exists.  He  con- 
demned that  feature  of  land  tenure  which  necessitates  the  inva- 
sion by  taxation  of  the  otherwise  sacred  right  of  private  property 
in  the  products  of  labour  in  order  that  ground  rent  may  con- 
tinue to  inure  mainly  to  private  benefit.  Hence,  it  must  be 
submitted  that  what  Tolstoy  had  in  mind  was  private  property 
in  land  "as  now  existing."  The  length  and  breadth  of  George's 
proposed  remedy,  to  which  Tolstoy  gives  full  endorsement,  was, 
in  Mr.  George's  own  words,  "I  do  not  propose  ...  to  con- 
fiscate private  property  in  land.  .  .  but  to  appropriate  rent 
by  taxation."  ("Progress  and  Poverty,"  Book  VHI,  Chapter 
2).  In  the  enjoyment  of  every  other  "right  and  privilege"  of 
tenure,  the  right  to  "own,  possess,  buy,  sell,  devise  and 
bequeath"  excepting  only  the  one  privilege  of  the  private 
appropriation  of  rent,  Mr.  George's  specific  declaration  was 
that  the  land  owner  should  be  left  undisturbed.  The  following 
paragraph  is  from  Tolstoy's  "A  Great  Iniquity": 

"A  member  of  the  English  Parliament,  Labouchere,  could 
publicly  say,  without  meeting  any  refutation,  that  'he  was  not 


170  THE  A  B  C  OF  TAXATION 

such  a  visionary  as  Henry  George;  he  did  not  propose  to  take 
the  land  from  the  landlords  and  rent  it  out  again;  what  he 
was  in  favour  of  was  putting  a  tax  on  land  values.*  That  is, 
whilst  attributing  to  George  what  he  could  not  possibly  have 
said,  Labouchere  by  way  of  correcting  these  imaginary  fan- 
tasies, suggested  that  which  Henry  George  did  indeed  say." 

Tolstoy's  language  thus  proves  beyond  a  possible  doubt  that 
he  does  not  believe  in  taking  the  land  from  the  landlords,  and 
that  he  does  not  believe  that  Henry  George  could  have  said  so, 
but  that  both  are  agreed  in  taking  ground  rent  in  taxation. 

One  more  thought  by  way  of  comment.  George  and  Tolstoy, 
in  common  with  Herbert  Spencer,  found,  in  the  literature  of 
the  land  question,  in  the  dictionaries,  and  in  works  on  political 
economy,  one  word,  ''land,"  standing  for  soil  and  for  situation, 
and  they  used  the  one  term  without  defining  to  themselves 
and  to  their  readers  the  two  ideas  embraced  in  it.  A  clear 
distinction  presents  itself  between  what  academic  economists 
might  call  two  separate  "concepts,"  viz.,  *'land"  and  "land 
value."  It  is  as  follows:  "Land,"  defined  as  the  earth's 
surface;  the  inherent  capabilities  of  the  soil;  the  bounties  of 
nature;  natural  resources;  "natural  media"; — "land  value," 
defined  to  be  the  value  of  "rights  and  privileges  thereto  per- 
taining," as  specified  in  deeds  of  conveyance;  value  of  the 
advantages  of  society  and  government;  value  of  proximity; 
value  due  to  command  of  facilities  for  commerce  and  com- 
munication with  the  world;  an  artificial  value,  not  a  value  of 
"natural  media."  Land  and  land  value  as  above  defined 
may  be  contrasted  by  supposing  one  of  two  city  lots  to  have  a 
doorless  and  windowless  hundred  foot  wall  around  it,  or  to 
have  no  legal  right  of  way  to  and  from  it,  in  either  of  which 
cases  the  value  would  be  that  of  land  as  a  purely  physical 
thing,  without  its  social  incidents. 

If  any  one  will  re-read  both  authors,  bearing  in  mind  to 
apply  to  private  property  in  land  wherever  it  occurs,  the  above 
distinction,  as  well  as  the  qualifying  words,  "as  at  present 
existing,"  a  great  deal  of  confusion  will  surely  be  dissipated. 


APPENDIX  C  171 

and  sense  will  appear  in  place  of  what  may  have  been  pro- 
nounced foolishness. 


THE    DISPROPORTIONATE   TREATMENT  OF   AGRICULTURAL  RENTS 
BY   ECONOMISTS 

Has  not  agricultural  rent,  as  a  somewhat  natural  result  of 
the  fact  that  Ricardo's  law  of  rent  was  specifically  expressed 
and  illustrated  in  agricultural  terms,  received  undue  attention 
from  the  schools,  to  the  neglect  of  urban  or  city  rent  in  its 
more  acute  forms  ? 

Out  of  a  curiosity  to  ascertain  the  actual  preponderance 
accorded  to  agricultural  over  urban  rent  in  standard  economic 
treatises,  the  writer  has  instituted  careful  comparisons  of  the 
space  devoted  by  the  authorities  to  agricultural  land  and  to 
urban  land  respectively  in  treating  questions  bearing  on  land 
values  and  land  rent.  The  result  shows  that  in  thirty-four 
leading  works  of  thirty  authors,  42,094  lines  were  given  to 
agricultural  rents,  and  2,919  lines  to  urban  rent,*  a  ratio  of 
fourteen  to  one. 

Following  is  the  list  complete: 

Author  and  work  Agricultural  Urban 

Text       Notes       Total      Text    Notes    Total 
lines         lines        lines       lines      lines      lines 

Adams,    H.    C,    The    Science    of 

Finance,  1887 803  6         809         36   .  . .         36 

Andrews,  E.  B.,  Institutes  of  Econo- 
mics, 1889    30        26  56        15     24        39 

Bullock,  C.  J.,  Introduction  to  the 

Studyof  Economics,  1897  .     .     .  570  3         573        81       7        88 

Caimes,  J.  E.,  Some  Leading  Prin- 
ciples of  Political  Economy,  1874  .  135         26         161        

*  WTiere  agriculture  has  been  considered  for  other  purposes  than  value 
and  rent  of  land,  it  has  been  omitted  from  the  comparison.  The  line  of 
distinction  is  sometimes  drawn  with  difFxCulty,  and  in  one  or  two  cases,  where 
the  argument  has  seemed  to  bear  equally  on  agricultural  and  urban  land,  it 
has  been  included  under  both  heads.  In  view  of  the  liability  to  error  in  such 
a  comparison,  this  list  is  circulated  in  the  hope  that  interested  parties  may 
supply  any  authorities  which  ought  not  to  be  omitted,  and  note  any  corrections 
in  the  readings  for  future  publication  and  reference. 


172 


THE  A  B  C  OF  TAXATION 


Author  and  Work 

Carey,  H.  C,  Principles  of  Political 
Economy,  1840 

Chalmers,  Thos.,  Political  Economy, 
1882 

Clark,  J.  B.,  The  Distribution  of 
Wealth,  1899 

Ely,  R.T.,  Socialism,  1894    .      .      • 

Ely,  R.  T.,  Introduction  to  Political 
Economy,  1889 

Ely,  R.  T.,  Land,  Labour,  and  Tax- 
ation, 1882 

Fawcett,  H.,  Manual  of  Political 
Economy,  1874 

Gide,  Chas.,  Principles  of  Political 
Economy,  1896 

Hadley,A.  T.,  Economics,  1896.      . 

Jevons,  W.  S.,  The  Theory  of  Poli- 
tical Economy,  1871     .      .      .      . 

Laughlin,  J.  L.,  Elements  of  Poli- 
tical Economy,  1896     .      .      .      . 

Malthus,  T.  R.,  Nature  and  Progress 
of  Rent,  18 1 5 

McCulloch,  J.  R.,  Principles  of  Poli- 
tical Economy,  1849     .      .      .      . 

Madeod,  H.  D.,  The  Elements  of 
Economics,  1886 

Macvane,  S.  M.,  The  Working 
Principles  of  Political  Economy, 
1890 

Marshall,  Alfred,  Principles  of 
Economics,  1898  .      .      .      . 

Mill,  J.  S.,  Principles  of  Political 
Economy,  1864 

Nicholson,  J.  S.,  Principles  of  Poli- 
tical Economy,  1 901      .      .      .      . 

Rae,  John,  Contemporary  Socialism, 
1884 

Ricardo,  D.,  Principles  of  Politica 
Economy,  18 19 

Rogers,  Thorold,  A  Manual  of  Poli 
tical  Economy,  1868     ... 

Rogers,  Thorold,  Six  Centuries  ol 
Work  and  Wages,  1884      .      . 

Say,  J.  B., Political  Economy,  1821 

Seligman,  E.  R.  A.,  The  Shifting  and 
Incidenceof  Taxation,  1892    . 

Senior,  N.  W.,  Political  Economy, 
1863 


Agricultural 
Text        Notes        Total 
lines          lines          lines 

Urban 
Text    Notes 
lines     lines 

Total 
lines 

54i 

64 

606 

118    .. 

1x8 

3»3i2 

205 

3,517 



... 

1,148 
84 

69 

1,217 
84 

12    ... 

84    ... 

12 

84 

no 

... 

no 

48     ... 

48 

288 

... 

288 

192    ... 

192 

1,835 

5 

1,840 

274    ... 

274 

907 
240 

16 

5 

923 
24s 

117    ... 

70    ... 

117 

70 

301 

301 

... 

579 

579 

19    ... 

19 

1,705 

45 

1,750 



... 

1,378 

60 

1,438 

...     ... 

... 

1,257 

... 

1,257 

109    ... 

109 

492 

5 

497 

78       17 

95 

3,557 

343 

3,900 

40    180 

202 

782 

... 

782 

...       20 

20 

2,622 

203 

2,825 

355      9 

364 

920 

... 

920 

^  ... 

2 

2,859 

112 

2,971 

... 

1,010 

1,010 

20   . .. 

20 

562 

442 

II 

562 

453 

207   ..< 
114  ... 

207 
114 

1,365 

1,365 

500      6 

506 

451 

451 



APPENDIX  D 


173 


22 

22 

19 

12 

31 

58 

13 

71 

38 

38 

Author  and  Work  Agricultural  Urban 

Text  Notes  Total       Text  Notes      Total 

lines  lines  lines        lines   lines       lines 

Sidgwick,  H.  I.,  Principles  of  Poli- 
tical Economy,  1883      ....  371  35  406           3    •••           3 

Smith,  Adam,  Wealth  of  Nations, 

1818 2,755  •••  2,755 

Walker,F.  A., Land  and  Rent,  1888  4,648  254  4,902 

Walker,  F.  A.,  Political  Economy, 

1888.      ........  2,228  85  2,313 

Walker,    Amasa,    The    Science    of 

Wealth,  1872 228  ...  228 

Total    ...            .      .  40,516  1,578  42,094   2,611  288    2,qi9 


D 

DOCUMENT  PRESENTED  TO  MGR.  SATOLLI   BY  THE  REV.  EDWARD 

MCGLYNN,D.D.,  IN  DECEMBER  1892 AND  BY  HIS  DIRECTION 

EXAMINED  BY  A  COMMITTEE  OF  THE  PROFESSORS  OF  THE 
CATHOLIC  UNIVERSITY,  AT  WASHINGTON,  D.  C.  —  DECL.\RED 
TO  CONTAIN  NOTHING  CONTRARY    TO    CATHOLIC    TEACHING 

All  men  are  endowed  by  the  law  of  nature  with  the  right 
to  life  and  to  the  pursuit  of  happiness  and  therefore  with  the 
right  to  exert  their  energies  upon  those  natural  bounties  with- 
out which  labour  or  life  is  impossible. 

God  has  granted  those  natural  be  inties,  that  is  to  say,  the 
earth,  to  mankind  in  general,  so  that  no  part  of  it  has  been 
assigned  to  anyone  in  particular,  and  so  that  the  limits  of 
private  possession  have  been  left  to  be  fixed  by  man's  own 
industry  and  the  laws  of  individual  peoples. 

But  it  is  a  necessary  part  of  the  liberty  and  dignity  of  man 
that  man  should  own  himself,  always,  of  course,  with  perfect 
subjection  to  the  moral  law.  Therefore,  besides  the  common 
[  equal  ]  right  to  natural  bounties,  there  must  be  by  the  law  of 
nature  private  property  and  dominion  in  the  fruits  of  industry  or 
in  what  is  produced  by  labour  out  of  those  natural  bounties  to 
which  the  individual  may  have  legitimate  access,  that  is,  so 
far  as  he  does  not  infringe  the  equal  right  of  others  or  the 
common  rights. 


174  THE  A  B  C  OF  TAXATION 

It  Is  a  chief  function  of  civil  government  to  maintain  equally 
sacred  these  two  natural  rights. 

It  is  lawful,  and  it  is  for  the  best  interests  of  the  individual 
and  of  the  community  and  necessary  for  civilisation  that  there 
should  be  a  division  as  to  the  use  and  an  undisturbed,  perma- 
nent, exclusive  private  possession  of  portions  of  the  natural 
bounties,  or  of  the  land;  in  fact,  such  exclusive  possession  is 
necessary  to  the  ownership,  use  and  enjoyment  by  the  individual 
of  the  fruits  and  products  of  his  industry. 

But  the  organised  community  through  civil  government 
must  always  maintain  the  dominion  over  those  natural  bounties, 
as  distinct  from  the  products  of  private  industry  and  from 
that  private  possession  of  the  land  which  is  necessary  for  their 
enjoyment.  The  maintenance  of  this  dominion  over  the 
natural  bounties  is  a  primary  function  and  duty  of  the  organised 
community,  in  order  to  maintain  the  equal  right  of  all  men 
to  labour  for  their  living  and  for  the  pursuit  of  happiness,  and 
therefore  their  equal  right  of  access  directly  or  indirectly  to 
natural  bounties.  The  assertion  of  this  dominion  by  civil 
government  is  especially  necessary  because,  with  the  very 
beginning  of  civil  government  and  with  the  growth  of  civilisa- 
tion, there  comes  to  the  natural  bounties,  or  the  land,  a  peculiar 
and  an  increasing  value  distinct  from  and  irrespective  of  the 
products  of  private  industry  existing  therein.  This  value  is 
not  produced  by  the  industry  of  the  private  possessor  or  pro- 
prietor but  is  produced  by  the  existence  of  the  community  and 
grows  with  the  growth  and  civilisation  of  the  community. 
It  is  therefore  called  unearned  increment.  It  is  this  unearned 
increment  that  in  cities  gives  to  lands  without  any  improve- 
ments so  great  a  value.  This  value  represents  and  measures 
the  advantages  and  opportunities  produced  by  the  community, 
and  men,  when  not  permitted  to  acquire  the  absolute  dominion 
over  such  lands,  will  willingly  pay  the  value  of  this  unearned 
increment  in  the  form  of  rents,  just  as  men,  when  not  per- 
mitted to  own  other  men,  will  willingly  pay  wages  for  desired 
services. 


APPENDIX  D  175 

No  sooner  does  the  organised  community,  or  state,  arise,  than 
it  needs  revenues.  This  need  for  revenues  is  small  at  first 
while  population  is  sparse,  industry  rude,  and  the  functions 
of  the  state  few  and  simple,  but  with  growth  of  population  and 
advance  of  civilisation  the  functions  of  the  state  increase  and 
larger  and  larger  revenues  are  needed.  God  is  the  author  of 
society  and  has  pre-ordained  civilisation.  The  increasing 
need  for  public  revenues  with  social  advance  being  a  natural 
God-ordained  need,  there  must  be  a  right  way  of  raising  them 
—  some  way  that  we  can  truly  say  is  the  way  intended  by  God. 
It  is  clear  that  this  right  of  raising  public  revenues  must  accord 
with  the  moral  law  or  the  law  of  justice.  It  must  not  con- 
flict with  individual  rights,  it  must  find  its  means  in  common 
rights  and  common  duties.  By  a  beautiful  providence,  that 
may  be  truly  called  divine,  since  it  is  founded  upon  the  nature 
of  things  and  the  nature  of  man,  of  which  God  is  the  creator, 
a  fund,  constantly  increasing  with  the  capacities  and  needs 
of  society,  is  produced  by  the  very  growth  of  society  itself, 
namely,  the  rental  value  of  the  natural  bounties  of  which  society 
retains  dominion.  The  justice  and  the  duty  of  appropriating 
this  fund  to  public  uses  is  apparent  in  that  it  takes  nothing  from 
the  private  property  of  individuals  except  what  they  will  pay 
willingly  as  an  equivalent  for  a  value  produced  by  the  com- 
munity, which  they  are  permitted  to  enjoy.  The  fund  thus 
created  is  clearly  by  the  law  of  justice  a  public  fund,  not  merely 
because  the  value  is  a  growth  that  comes  to  the  natural  bounties 
which  God  gave  to  the  community  in  the  beginning,  but  also, 
and  much  more,  because  it  is  a  value  produced  by  the  com- 
munity itself,  so  that  this  rental  value  belongs  to  the  com- 
munity by  that  best  of  titles,  namely,  producing,  making,  or 
creating. 

To  permit  any  portion  of  this  public  property  to  go  into  pri- 
vate pockets,  without  a  perfect  equivalent  being  paid  into  the 
public  treasury,  would  be  an  injustice  to  the  community. 
Therefore  the  whole  rental  fund  should  be  appropriated  to 
common  or  public  uses. 


176  THE  A  B  C  OF  TAXATION 

This  rental  tax  will  make  compulsory  the  adequate  utilisa- 
tion of  natural  bounties  exactly  in  proportion  to  the  growth 
of  the  community  and  of  civilisation,  and  will  thus  compel 
the  possessors  to  employ  labour,  the  demand  for  which  will 
enable  the  labourer  to  obtain  perfectly  just  wages.  The  rental 
tax  fund  growing  by  a  natural  law  proportionately  with  the 
growth  of  civilisation  will  thus  be  sufficient  for  public  needs 
and  capacities  and  therefore  all  taxes  upon  industry  and  upon 
the  products  of  industry  may  and  should  be  abolished.  While 
the  tax  on  land  values  promotes  industry  and  therefore  increases 
private  wealth,  taxes  upon  industry  act  like  a  fine  or  a  punish- 
ment inflicted  upon  industry — they  impede  and  restrain  and 
finally   strangle  it. 

In  the  desired  condition  of  things  land  would  be  left  in  the 
private  possession  of  individuals,  with  full  liberty  on  their 
part  to  give,  sell,  or  bequeath  it,  while  the  state  would  levy  on 
it  for  public  uses  a  tax  that  should  equal  the  annual  value  of 
the  land  itself,  irrespective  of  the  use  made  of  it  or  the  improve- 
ments on  it. 

The  only  utility  of  private  ownership  and  dominion  of  land, 
as  distinguished  from  possession,  is  the  evil  utility  of  giving 
to  the  owners  the  power  to  reap  where  they  have  not  sown, 
to  take  the  products  of  the  labour  of  others  without  giving 
them  an  equivalent —  the  power  to  impoverish  and  practically 
to  reduce  to  a  species  of  slavery  the  masses  of  men,  who  are 
compelled  to  pay  to  private  owners  the  greater  part  of  what 
they  produce  for  permission  to  live  and  to  labour  in  this  world, 
when  they  would  work  upon  the  natural  bounties  for  their  own 
account,  and  the  power,  when  men  work  for  wages,  to  compel 
them  to  compete  against  one  another  for  the  opportunity  to 
labour,  and  to  compel  them  to  consent  to  labour  for  the  lowest 
possible  wages — wages  that  are  by  no  means  the  equivalent 
of  the  new  value  created  by  the  work  of  the  labourer,  but  are 
barely  sufficient  to  maintain  the  labourer  in  a  miserable  exis- 
tence, and  even  the  power  to  deny  to  the  labourer  the  oppor- 
tunity to  labour  at  all.     This  is  an  injustice  against  the  equal 


APPENDIX  D  177 

right  of  all  men  to  life  and  to  the  pursuit  of  happiness,  a  right 
based  upon  the  brotherhood  of  man  which  is  derived  from  the 
fatherhood  of  God.  This  is  the  injustice  that  we  would 
abolish  in  order  to  abolish  involuntary  poverty. 

That  the  appropriation  of  the  rental  value  of  land  to  public 
uses  in  the  form  of  a  tax  would  abolish  the  injustice  which  has 
just  been  described,  and  thus  abolish  involuntary  poverty, 
is  clear;  since  in  such  case  no  one  would  hold  lands  except 
for  use,  and  the  masses  of  men,  having  free  access  to  unoccupied 
lands,  would  be  able  to  exert  their  labour  directly  upon  natural 
bounties  and  to  enjoy  the  full  fruits  and  products  of  their 
labours,  beginning  to  pay  a  portion  of  the  fruits  of  their  industry 
to  the  public  treasury  only  when,  with  the  growth  of  the  com- 
munity and  the  extension  to  them  of  the  benefits  of  civilisation, 
there  would  come  to  their  lands  a  rental  value  distinct  from 
the  value  of  the  products  of  their  industry,  which  value  they 
would  willingly  pay  as  the  exact  equivalent  of  the  new  advan- 
tages coming  to  them  from  the  community;  and  again  in  such 
case  men  would  not  be  compelled  to  work  for  employers  for 
wages  less  than  absolutely  just  wages,  namely,  the  equivalent 
of  the  new  value  created  by  their  labour;  since  men  surely 
would  not  consent  to  work  for  unjust  wages,  when  they  could 
obtain  perfectly  just  wages  by  working  for  themselves;  and, 
finally,  since,  when  what  belongs  to  the  community  shall  have 
been  given  to  the  community,  the  only  valuable  things  that 
men  shall  own  as  private  property  will  be  those  things  that 
have  been  produced  by  private  industry,  the  boundless  desires 
and  capacities  of  civilised  human  nature  for  good  things  will 
always  create  a  demand  for  these  good  things,  namely,  the 
products  of  labour —  a  demand  always  greater  than  the 
supply;  and  therefore  for  the  labour  that  produces  these 
good  things  there  will  always  be  a  demand  greater  than  the 
supply  and  the  labourer  will  be  able  to  command  perfectly 
just  wages —  which  are  a  perfect  equivalent  in  the  product  of 
some  other  person's  labour  for  the  new  value  which  his  own 
labour   produces. 


178  THE  A  B  C  OF  TAXATION 


ITALIAN  ORIGINAL   OF   THE    PRECEDING    DOCUMENT 

Tutti  gli  uomini  sono  investiti  dalla  legge  di  natura  col 
diritto  alia  vita  ed  al  proseguimento  del  proprio  bene  e  godono 
per  conseguenza  del  diritto  ad  esercitare  le  proprie  forze  su 
quei  doni  della  natura,  senza  i  quali  il  lavoro  o  la  vita  sarebbe 
impossibile. 

Iddio  ha  dato  questi  doni  della  natura,  cioe  a  dire,  la  terra  al 
I'umana  famiglia  in  genere  di  modo  che  nessuna  parte 
di  essa  e  stata  concessa  ad  alcuno  in  particolare,  e  di  modo 
che  la  determinazione  dei  limiti  della  possessione  privata  e 
stata  lasciata  alia  propria  industria  dell'  uomo  ed  alle  leggi  dei 
singoli  popoli. 

Ma  appartiene  necessariamente  alia  liberta  e  dignita  del 
I'uomo,  che  I'uomo  sia  padrone  di  se  stesso  (sui  juris),  sempre, 
ben  s'intende,  con  perfetta  soggezione  alia  legge  morale.  Per 
conseguenza  oltre  al  diritto  comune  ai  doni  della  natura,  vi 
dev'essere  per  la  legge  della  stessa  natura  proprieta  privata 
e  dominio  privato  nei  frutti  dell*  industria  ossia  quel  che  il 
lavoro  produce  da  quei  doni  della  natura  ai  quali  Tindividuo 
abbia  legittimo  accesso,  cioe  a  dire,  in  quanto  egli  non  infrange 
I'ugual  diritto  deglialtri  ossia  i  diritti  comuni. 

Una  funzione  capitale  del  governo  civile  si  e  di  mantenere 
ugualmente  saldi  questi  due  diritti  naturali. 

Egli  e  lecito  non  solamente  ma  e  per  il  miglior  bene  del 
I'individuo  e  della  comunita  ed  e  necessario  per  la  civilta  che 
vi  sia  divisione  in  quanto  all'  uso  di  porzione  dei  doni  della 
natura  ossia  della  terra,  e  possessione  privata  dei  medesimi, 
pacifica,  permanente  ed  esclusiva;  e  difFatti,  questa  possessione 
esclusiva  e  necessaria  acciocche  I'individuo  possa  godere  il 
dominio  e  I'uso  dei  frutti  e  prodotti  della  propria  industria. 

Ma  la  comunita  organizzata  per  mezzo  del  governo  civile 
deve  sempre  mantenere  il  dominio  sopra  quei  doni  della  natura, 
affine  di  mantenere  I'ugual  diritto  di  tutti  gli  uomini  a  lavorare 
per  mantenere  la  propria  vita  e  per  proseguire  il  proprio  bene  'e 


APPENDIX  D  179 

conseguentemente  a  mantenere  il  loro  diritto  di  aver  accesso 
direttamente  o  indirettamente  ai  doni  della  natura.  L'asserzione 
pratica  di  questo  dominio  per  parte  del  governo  civile,  e 
necessaria  per  la  ragione  che  col  primo  cominciamento  del 
governo  civile  e  coll'  incremento  della  civilta  vi  arriva  ai  doni 
della  natura  ossia  della  terra  un  valore  peculiare  ognora  cres- 
cente,  ben  distinto  dai  prodotti  dell'  industria  privata  esistenti 
su  di  tali  terreni  e  senza  alcun  riguardo  ai  medesimi.  Questo 
valore  non  e  gia  prodotto  dall'  industria  del  possessore  o  pro- 
prietario  private,  ma  bensl  e  esso  prodotto  dall'  esistenza  della 
comanita  e  cresce  mano  a  mano  coll'  aumento  e  colla  crescente 
civilta  della  comunita  istessa.  Ed  e  percio  che  questo  valore 
vien  chiamato  col  nome  d'incremento  avventizio  e.non  guadag- 
nato.  E,  da  questo  incremento  avventizio  e  non  guadagnato 
che  nelle  citta,  per  esempio,  deriva  ai  terreni  senza  alcun  mig- 
lioramento  [come  case  o  altro]  un  si  grosso  valore.  Questo 
valore  rappresenta  e  misura  le  opportunita  ed  i  vantaggi  prodotti 
dalla  comunita,  e  quando  agli  uomini  non  sia  permesso  di 
acquistare  I'assoluto  dominio  sopra  tali  terreni,  volontieri 
pagheranno  essi  il  valore  di  questo  incremento  avventizio  nella 
forma  del  prezzo  d'affitto,  precisamente  come,  quando  agli 
uomini  non  sia  permesso  d'impossessarsi  di  altri  uomini, 
pagheranno  essi  volontieri  una  mercede  per  i  servigi  che  si 
richieggono. 

Appena  nasce  la  comunita  organizzata,  ossia  lo  Stato,  che 
abbisogna  essa  di  entrate.  Questo  bisogno  di  entrate  e  tenuissimo 
sul  bel  principio  mentre  la  popolazione  e  tuttora  scarsissima, 
I'industria  e  rozza  e  le  funzioni  dello  Stato  sono  poche  e  semplici, 
ma  coir  aumento  della  popolazione  e  col  progresso  della  civilta 
si  aumentano  le  funzioni  dello  Stato  e  vi  e  bisogno  di  sempre 
piu  grandi  entrate.  Dio  e  I'autore  della  societa  ed  ha  pre- 
ordinato  la  civilta.  II  bisogno  di  pubbliche  entrate  crescenti 
sempre  col  progresso  sociale  essendo  un  bisogno  naturale 
divinamente  ordinato,  vi  dev'essere  una  via  giusta  e  diritta  di 
riscuoterle,  qualche  via  della  quale  possiamo  dire  con  verita  che 
essa  fu  nella  intenzione  divina.     E  cosa  chiara  che  questa  via* 


i8o  THE  A  B  C  OF  TAXATION 

giusta  e  diritta  di  riscuotere  le  entrate  pubbliche,  dev'essere  in 
accordo  colla  legge  morale  ossia  la  legge  della  giustizia.  Non 
dovra  essa  stare  in  conflitto  coi  diritti  dell*  individuo  e  dovra 
trovare  i  suoi  mezzi  nei  comuni  diritti  e  nei  comuni  doveri. 
Per  una  bella  provvidenza,  che  puo  chiamarsi  Divina  (giacche 
e  essa  fondata  sulla  natura  delle  cose  e  sulla  natura  dell'  uomo 
della  quale  Dio  e  il  creatore),  un  fondo  di  risorse,  crescente 
costantemente  a  misura  della  capacita  e  dei  bisogni  della  societa, 
vien  prodotto  dall*  istesso  aumento  della  societa  medesima, 
cioe  a  dire,  le  entrate  da  riscuotersi  dai  valori  dei  beni  che  sono 
puramente  doni  della  natura,  e  dei  quali  la  societa  ritiene  ognora 
il  dominio.  Che  Tappropriazione  di  questo  fondo  di  risorse 
ad  usi  pubblici  sia  e  giusta  e  doverosa,  apparisce  evidentemente 
da  cio  che  esso  nulla  piglia  dalla  proprieta  privata  degl'  individui 
se  non  quello  che  essi  pagheranno  volontieri  come  un  equivalente 
a  quel  valore  prodotto  dalla  comunita  e  del  quale  e  lasciata 
agl'  individui  libera  facolta  di  godere.  II  fondo  creato  in  questa 
maniera  e  evidentemente  per  la  legge  di  giustizia  un  fondo 
pubblico,  non  solamente  perche  questo  valore  e  un  aumento 
non  guadagnato  ed  avventizio  ai  doni  di  natura  i  quali  furono 
dal  bel  principio  dati  alia  comunita  da  Dio,  ma  eziandio  e 
vieppiii  per  la  ragione  che  esso  e  un  valore  prodotto  dalla 
comunita  istessa,  di  modo  che  questa  rendita,  riscossa  dal  valore 
fondiario,  appartiene  alia  comunita  per  il  piii  giusto  di  tutti  i 
titoli,  cioe  a  dire,  dal  produrre,  dal  fare  o  dal  creare.  II 
permettere  che  alcuna  porzione  di  questa  proprieta  pubblica 
vada  nelle  tasche  di  privati  senza  che  si  paghi  al  tesoro  pubblico 
un  perfetto  equivalente  sarebbe  un  ingiustizia  contro  i  diritti 
della  comunita.  Per  conseguenza  tutto  il  valore  fondiario 
dev'essere  appropriate  ad  usi  pubblici  o  comuni. 

La  riscossione  di  questa  imposta  fondiaria  fara  si  che  sia 
giuoco  forza  utilizzare  adequatamente  i  beniofferti  dalla  natura, 
esattamente  in  proporzione  all'  incremento  della  comunita  e 
della  civilta,  e  cosi  costringera  i  possessori  ad  impiegare  il  lavoro 
proprio  o  d'altrui  di  modo  che  i  lavoranti  che  si  offriranno  in 
corrispondenza  alia  domanda,  potranno  ottenere  la  mercede 


APPENDIX   D  i8i 

precisa  richiesta  dalla  giustizia.  La  entrata  provenlente  dal 
I'imposta  sui  valori  fondiari,  crescente  per  forza  di  d'una  legge 
naturale  proporzionatamente  all*  incremento  della  popolazione 
e  della  civilta,  sara  percio  sufFciente  a  tutti  i  bisogni  pubblici 
ed  alle  pubbliche  capacita,  e  per  questa  ragione  tutte  le  imposte 
suir  industria  e  sui  prodotti  dell'  industria  potranno  essere 
abolite,  e  si  dovrebbero  abolire.  Mentre  I'imposta  sui  valori 
dei  terreni  promuove  I'industria  e  percio  aumenta  la  ricchezza 
privata,  le  imposte  sull*  industria  hanno  la  forza  d'una  multa  o 
d'una  punizione  inflitta  all*  industria,  la  impediscono,  la  ristrin- 
gono  e  finalmente  la  strangolano. 

In  questa  condizione  di  cose  i  terreni  sarebbero  lasciati 
nella  possessione  privata  di  invidui,  con  piena  liberta  da  loro 
parte  di  donare,  di  vendere  o  di  lasciare  agli  eredi,  e  lo  stato  da 
altra  parte  riscuoterebbe  per  usi  pubblici  una  rendita  in  forma 
di  imposta  che  equivarrebbe  al  valore  annuo  dei  medesimi, 
terreni  senza  aver  riguardo  all  *uso  che  ne  facciano  od  ai 
miglioramenti  che  vi  producono. 

L'unica  utilita  della  proprieta  privata  ossia  il  dominio  private 
del  terreno,  in  quanto  si  distingue  dalla  possessione  od  occupa- 
zione,  si  e  la  mala  utilita  del  dare  ai  proprietari  il  potere  di 
mietere  dove  non  hanno  seminato,  di  pigliare  i  prodotti  del 
I'altrui  lavoro  senza  dare  a  loro  un  compenso —  il  potere  di 
impoverire  le  masse  degli  uomini  e  di  ridurle  a  quel  che  e 
praticamente  una  specie  di  schiavitij;  dacche  sono  essi  costretti 
a  pagare  a  proprietari  privati  la  piii  gran  parte  di  quello  che 
producono,  e  cio  devono  dare  per  il  permesso  di  vivere  in  questo 
mondo  e  di  esercitarvi  il  loro  lavoro,  quando  essi  vogliono 
lavorare  direttamente  sui  bene  naturale —  il  terreno —  per 
conto  proprio;  ed  il  potere  di  costringere  gli  uomini  che  lavorano 
per  una  mercede,  di  far  a  gara  I'uno  contro  I'altro,  per  I'opportu- 
nita  di  lavorare  —  acconsentendo  cosi  a  lavorare  per  la  piii  tenue 
mercede  —  una  mercede  nullamente  equivalente  al  nuovo 
valore  creato  dall  'opera  del  lavorante  ma  che  e  semplicemente 
ed  appena  sufficiente  a  mantenere  il  lavorante  in  una  miserabile 
esistenza —  il  potere  finalmente  di  negare  del  tutto  al  lavorante 


1 82  THE  A  B  C  OF  TAXATION 

Topportunita  di  impiegare  il  suo  lavoro.  Questo  e  un  ingiu- 
stizia  contro  il  diritto  uguale  di  tutti  gli  uomini  alia  vita  ed  al 
proseguimento  della  propria  felicita —  un  diritto  fondato  sulla 
fratellanza  degli  uomini,  la  quale  e  derivata  dalla  paternita  di 
Dio.  Questo  si  e  la  ingiustizia  che  noi  vorremmo  abolire  affine 
di  abolire  la  poverta  involontaria. 

Che  I'appropriazione  del  valore  avventizio  e  non  guadagnato 
del  terreno  ad  usi  pubblici  nella  forma  di  una  imposta,  varrebbe 
bene  ad  abolire  la  ingiustizia  la  quale  or  ora  abbiamo  dimostrata 
e  per  conseguenza  ad  abolire  la  poverta  involontaria,  apparisce 
chiaramente;    giacche   in   tal   caso   nessuno   occuperebbe   dei 
terreni  se  non  per  utilizzarli  e  le  masse  degli  uomini,  avendo 
libero  accesso  ai  terreni  non-occupati,  sarebbero  in  istato  di 
esercitare  il  loro  lavoro  sui  beni  della  natura  e  di  godere  appieno 
dei  frutti  e  dei  prodotti  del  proprio  lavoro,  allora   solamente 
cominciando  a  pagare  una  porzione  dei  frutti  della  propria 
industria  al  pubblico  erario  quando,  coll'  aumento  della  com- 
unita  e  coll'  estensione  a  loro  dei  benefizi  della  civilta,  deriverebbe 
ai  loro  terreni  un  valore  fondiario  di  rendita  distinto  dai  prodotti 
della  loro  industria  il  qual  valore  essi  pagherebbero  volontieri 
come  I'esatto  equivalente  dei  nuovi  vantaggi  a  loro  derivanti 
dalla  comunita;    e  dippiu  in  tal  caso,  non  sarebbero   costretti 
gli  nomini  a  lavorare  per  padroni  per  una  mercede  minore  di 
quella  che  e  assolutamente  la  giusta  mercede,  cioe,  I'equivalente 
del   nuovo   valore   creato   dal   loro   lavoro;     imperciocche   gli 
uomini  certamente  non  acconsentirebbero  a  lavorere  per  una 
ingiusta  mercede,  quando  essi  potessero  ottenere  una  mercede 
del  tutto  giusta  lavorando  per  proprio  conto;    e  finalmente 
giacche  quando  quel  che  appartiene  alia  comunita  sara  stato 
dato  alia  comunita,  allora  le  sole  cose  di  valore  che  gli  uomini 
possederanno  come  proprieta  privata  saranno  quelle  cose  che 
Bono   state   prodotte   dalla   privata   industria,   i   desideri  e   le 
capacita  senza   limiti   della   incivilita  umana  natura,  di  usare 
e  godere  dei  beni,  creera  una  domanda  per  tali  beni  che  sono 
i  prodotti  del    lavoro,    una    domanda    sempre    maggiore    del 
Tofferta;  e  percib  vi  sara  sempre,  per  quel  lavoro  che  produce 


APPENDIX  D  '  183 

quest!  beni,  una  domanda  maggiore  del  TofFerta  e  cosi  II  lavo- 
rante  potra  pretendere  efFettivamente  alia  mercede  veramente 
giusta,  la  quale  sara  un  preciso  equivalente  reso  dal  prodotto 
del  Taltrui  lavoro,  in  contraccambio  del  nuovo  valore  che 
egli  produce  col  lavoro  proprio. 


There  has  recently  appeared  from  the  pen  of  a  Catholic  lay- 
man a  book*  in  which  the  author  tries  to  extenuate  the  import- 
ance of  Monsignor  Satolli's  decision  by  intimating  that  it 
represents  only  the  simple  individual  opinion  of  the  four  pro- 
fessors. Loyalty  to  truth  dictates  that  this  criticism  should  be 
here  offset  by  some  pertinent  facts  in  the  case. 

Monsignor  Satolli  in  a  former  visit  to  the  United  States  in  1889 
and  as  the  guest  of  Archbishop  Corrigan,  had  ample  opportunity 
for  investigation  of  the  land  question  from  the  viewpoint  of 
the  United  States  and  of  Rome.  Hence  he  had  four  years  of 
time  in  which  he  might  have  made  a  preliminary  examina- 
tion. Monsignor  Satolli  was  credited  with  having  been  one  of 
those  consulted  when  the  Pope's  Encyclical,  Rerum  Nova- 
rum,  of  May  15,  1891,  was  in  preparation,  and  was  thereby 
the  better  able  to  judge  what  was  in  accord  or  in  conflict 
with  it. 

Among  the  important  duties  of  his  mission  was  to  bring  to  a 
satisfactory  conclusion  what  was  then  known  as  the  McGlynn 
Controversy.  Dr.  McGlynn,  at  the  request  of  the  Apostolic 
Delegate,  submitted  to  him  through  his  counsel.  Dr.  Burtsell, 
a  statement  in  Italian  of  his  views  on  the  subject  of  private 
property  in  land.  On  this  statement  Monsignor  Satolli  consulted 
four  of  the  professors  of  the  Catholic  University.  The  decision 
of  Monsignor  Satolli  that  there  was  nothing  contrary  to 
Catholic  doctrine  in  the  opinions  of  Dr.  McGlynn  as  exhibited 

"♦Fundamental  Fallacy  of  Socialism,"  Arthur  Prcuss,  published  by 
B.  Herder,  St.  Louis,  Mo.,  1908. 


i84  THE  A  B  C  OF  TAXATION 

in  that  statement  was  official,  and  was  followed  by  the  return  of 
Dr.  McGlynn  to  active  duty. 


A   PROTEST  AGAINST  UNJUST  TAXATION 

The  following  remarks  were  addressed  by  the  author  to  the 
assessors  of  the  City  of  Newton,  Mass.,  less  with  the  idea  of 
securing  an  economic  advantage  through  a  deduction  of  his  tax 
payments  than  by  reason  of  a  hope  that  he  might  strike  a  blow 
for  the  acceptance  of  single  tax  principles  of  taxation. 

"Gentlemen —  I  am  assessed  on  my  house  lot,  Newtonville 
Avenue  and  Bellevue  Street,  20,264  square  feet,  at  fifteen  cents  a 
foot;  on  additional  land,  less  desirable,  facing  on  Lewis 
Terrace,  17,496  feet,  valued  at  ten  cents  a  foot,  in  all  — 

Onland,  $4,750  at  $16.20  per  thousand $76.95 

On  house,  $9,000  at  $16.20  per  thousand 145 -So 

Personal  estate  and  water  tax        .         .         .         .         .         .         .         74-40 


Total $297.15 

"To  the  valuation  of  the  land,  which  is  fair  and  reasonable, 
I  make  no  objection.  Against  so  large  a  tax  upon  my  house  I 
desire  to  protest,  and  I  respectfully  ask  its  abatement  not  only 
because  the  actual  cost  of  the  house  was  fictitious  and  exag- 
gerated beyond  any  true  market  value,  but  because  its  selling 
value  is  greatly  depreciated  by  the  surroundings,  which  to-day 
would  not  justify  a  house  of  much  more  than  half  its  pretensions. 
Not  only  have  I  by  building  my  house  contributed  liberally  to 
create  the  value  of  my  neighbours'  land,  but  the  best  part  of  my 
substance  has  in  the  last  ten  or  a  dozen  years  been  largely 
wasted  in  trying,  by  private  improvement  and  adornment  of 
both  house  and  land,  to  counteract  the  adverse  influences  of  coal 
yards  and  freight  yards  and  steam  whistles.  I  have  thus 
attempted  to  rescue  and  protect  my  neighbours'  land  values  just 


APPENDIX  E  185 

as  much  as  my  own,  and  mine  have  rapidly  perished  in  the 
attempt. 

"I  think  we  are  all  agreed  that  the  value  of  the  land  of  Newton 
is  created  by  the  whole  community  of  Newton,  with  its  improve- 
ments, character,  activity,  and  its  industry.  Are  we  not  also 
agreed  upon  the  fact,  equally  important  and  more  patent 
perhaps  to  the  casual  observer,  viz.,  that  this  land  value  is 
maintained  from  year  to  year  by  the  public  expenditure  of  New- 
ton's taxes  ?  When  your  public  service  ceases  or  languishes, 
when  you  stop  the  care  of  streets,  the  water  supply,  fire  depart- 
ment, or  the  schools,  land  values  respond  almost  instantly. 
All  these  public  expenditures  of  the  people's  money  add  nothing 
to  the  value  of  a  house — which  value  is  ultimately  the  cost  of 
building  another  house  as  good —  but  they  do  add  to  or  rather 
maintain  the  value  of  my  neighbours'  land  and  mine,  which 
otherwise  would  rapidly  depreciate  in  value.  Why  should  you 
tax  the  decaying  value  of  my  house,  to  help  maintain  the  aug- 
menting value  of  hundreds  of  other  men's  vacant  acres,  standing 
unused,  just  like  so  many  idle  mills  supplied  with  the  main 
shafting  from  nature's  power  house  with  a  great  city's  lavish 
supplies  on  tap  .? 

**  There  would  be  far  more  reason  to  ask  me  and  others  to  pay 
taxes  on  our  houses,  if  public  service  were  at  all  limited  to  the 
needs  of  these  houses,  instead  of  being,  as  it  is,  vastly  in  excess, 
if  not  indeed  double,  that  need.  This  public  service  costs  the 
same  for  a  vacant  lot  as  it  does  for  the  adjoining  similar  lot  with 
a  ;^20,ooo  house  on  it.  I  object  to  being  taxed  to  pay  for  the 
other  man's  share  of  this  public  service. 

"Thus  I  am  asking  abatement  of  a  tax  that  is  H  upon 
improvements  and  personal  property  and  js  upon  land, 
because  it  is  in  violation  of  the  requirements  of  the  constitution 
of  the  State  of  Massachusetts  that  all  assessments  shall  be  'pro- 
portionate and  reasonable';  because  it  is  more  than  my  propor- 
tionate and  reasonable  share  of  the  total  assessment — unequal 
♦axation  for  equal  benefits. 

"Now  for  what  purpose  do  you  lay  taxes  except  for  public 


1 86  THE  A  B  C  OF  TAXATION 

service  ?  What  more  reasonable  than  to  lay  these  taxes  in 
proportion  to  public  service  rendered,  in  proportion  to  benefits 
bestowed;  that  is,  in  proportion  to  special  privileges  enjoyed  ? 
The  land  value  is  a  perfect  reflection  of  this  constant  service. 
The  same  is  not  true  of  houses  or  other  improvements  or  personal 
property. 

"Thus  I  am  constrained  to  ask  by  what  canon  of  taxation  do 
you  tax  me  so  far  beyond  the  public  service  that  I  enjoy  as 
indicated  in  the  market  value  of  my  land  ?  Surely  it  is  not  taxa- 
tion according  to  ability,  but  rather  according  to  a  spendthrift 
disposition.  My  house  adds  not  a  dollar  to  the  city's  expense 
on  my  account.  That  expense  would  be  the  same  if  my  house 
should  burn  down.  The  same  is  true  of  my  personal  estate. 
So  large  a  tax  cannot  be  on  account  of  special  privilege.  It  is 
no  special  privilege  to  me  to  border  on  a  coal  yard  and  a  freight 
yard  and  a  railroad.  It  is  no  special  privilege  to  me  that  while 
the  woods  of  Newton  are  full  of  concrete  sidewalks,  I  have  lived 
twenty-four  years  in  the  vain  hope  of  access  to  either  the  Newton 
or  Newtonville  station  over  a  clean  sidewalk.  It  is  no  special 
privilege  that  until  within  a  very  few  years  the  sidewalk  to 
Newtonville  has  been  at  seasons  impassable  because  of  mud  and 
surface  water  ankle  deep,  or  that  to-day  the  sidewalk  to  the 
Newton  station,  one-half  plank  and  the  other  half  gravel,  is  only 
wide  enough  to  accommodate  people  Indian  file. 

"The  land  value  is  the  balance  or  equilibrium  between  these 
public  advantages  and  disadvantages.  If  assessed  according 
to  my  proportionate  and  constitutional  share  of  the  public 
expense, my  tax  would  be  determined  in  this  wise:  as  ^^20,927,850 
(the  total  land  value  of  Newton)  is  to  1^4,750  (the  value  of  my 
land),  so  is  $895,915  (the  total  tax  of  Newton)  to  $203.35  (my 
proportionate  share  of  that  tax).  I  am  taxed  to-day  ;^297.i5, 
or  593.80  in  excess  of  this  fair  amount.  It  is  the  abatement 
of  this  excess  that  I  respectfully  ask  your  honourable 
board  to  grant." 


APPENDIX  F  187 


AGREEMENTS   IN   POLITICAL   ECONOMY* 

[The  following  address,  delivered  at  a  Round  Table  Conference  of  The 
American  Economic  Association  is  thought  worthy  of  inclusion  here,  because 
it  is  believed  that  the  plan  proposed,  defended,  and  adopted  is  bound  to  prove 
fruitful  in  advancing  every  good  cause  the  promotion  of  which  depends  upon 
the  widespread  knowledge  and  acceptance  of  sound  economic  opinion.] 

I  FEEL  highly  honoured  in  having  been  called  to  the  chair- 
manship of  a  Round  Table  of  the  American  Economic  Associa- 
tion for  the  discussion  of  Agreements  in  Political  Economy,  a 
topic  that  has  long  appealed  to  me  as  of  the  very  greatest  interest 
and  importance. 

I  have  been  engaged  for  several  years  in  a  sort  of  probationary 
work,  known  to  many,  perhaps  to  most  of  you —  that  of  trying 
to  elicit  from  economists  agreement  upon  certain  definitions  and 
statements  of  principles,  touching  land  value  and  land  taxation. 
Perhaps  the  best  illustration  I  can  give  of  the  plan  I  have  in 
mind  is  a  statement  of  the  present  fruits  of  this  effort,  imperfectly 
indicated  by  the  following  recorded  canvass  of  opinions: 
1902.     I.     Definition:       Ground  rent  is  what  land  is  worth        yes     no 

foruse •       135        o 

190a  4.  Definition:  Public  Franchises  are  exclusive  free 
privileges  granted  to  one  or  several  persons  incor- 
porated, from  which  the  mass  of  citizens  are 
excluded.  These  franchises  usually  pertain  toland, 
including  as  they  do  (to  use  the  language  of  the 
New  York  Legislative  Ford  Bill)  all  "rights,  autho- 
rity, or  permission  to  construct,  maintain,  or 
operate,  in,  under,  above,  upon,  or  through,  any 
streets,  highways,  or  public  places,  any  mains, 
pipes,  tanks,  conduits,  or  wires,  with  their  appur- 
tenances, for  conducting  water,  steam,  heat,  light, 
power,  gas,  oil,  or  other  substance,  or  electricity  for 
telegraphic,  telephonic,  or  other  purposes." 
Hence  their  classification,  by  the  above  Act,  as 
"land  values  "  may  be  confirmed  as  correct,  and 
their  annual  values  properly  classed  as  ground 

rent 103      »5 

*  Paper  presented  at  a  Round  Table  Discussion  at  the  Annual  Meeting  of  the 
American  Economic  Association,  Madison,  Wis.,  December  28,  I907« 


i88  THE  A  B  C  OF  TAXATION 

1902.     3.     A  tax  upon  ground  rent  is  a  direct  tax  and  cannot         yes      no 
be  shifted 108       26 

1902.  4.  Thesellingvalueof  land  is, under  present  conditions 
in  most  American  states,  reduced  by  the  capitalised 
tax  that  is  laid  upon  it  .....        105       17 

1902.  5.  Hence  the  selling  value  of  land  is,  to  the  same  extent, 
an  untaxed  value,  so  far  as  any  purchaser,  subse- 
quently to  the  imposition  of  the  tax,  is  concerned      .         95       24 

1904.  6.  Definition:  Monopoly:  Control,  absolute  or 
substantial,  temporary  or  permanent,  of  the  supply 
and  hence  of  the  price  of  any  commodity  or  ser- 
vice, whether  maintained  (i)  through  control  of 
of  natural  resources,  (2)  through  some  special  and 
exclusive  right  or  privilege  conferred  by  law,  (3) 
through  combination  or  concert  of  action,  or  (4)  by 
any  other  means  which  are  not  available  to  similar 
capital  and  skill  in  competitive  hands.  ..863 

1904.     7.     It  would  be  sound  public  policy  to  make  the  future 

increase  in  ground  rent  a  subject  of  special  taxation.         77       10 

1906.     8.     The  Selling  Value  of  Land  is  an   Untaxed   Value 

(Illustration  No.  19) 59         2 

The  concrete  suggestion  I  would  here  offer  is  that,  with  the 
work  already  done  for  a  nucleus,  the  same  method  be  extended, 
corrected,  improved,  and  adapted  to  include,  as  experience 
may  justify,  other,  and  finally  perhaps  all  points  of  economic 
theory,  and  the  practical  economic  rules  and  principles  to  be 
deduced  from  them.  I  would  emphasise  the  great  importance 
of  such  a  step  as  a  means  of  securing  agreement  on  economic 
principles,  and  not  as  a  method  of  advancing  any  particular 
programme  of  reform. 

Let  it  be  supposed,  for  instance,  that  the  association  itself 
should  see  fit  to  adopt  a  resolution  somewhat  as  follows: 

Whereas:  This  association,  recognising  the  value  of  substan- 
tial agreement  upon  the  largest  possible  number  of  definitions 
of  common  terms  and  of  economic  principles,  commends  effort 
toward  the  establishment  and  general  enlargement  of  such 
agreement  and  favours  response  and  cooperation  from  the 
members  of  the  association,  therefore 

Resolved:  That  the  President  is  authorised  to  appoint  a 
general  committee  of  not  more  than  twelve  members,  upon 
whose  recommendation  definitions  and  statements  of  principles 


APPENDIX  F  189 

may  be  submitted  to  the  full  membership  of  the  association 
for  approval  or  criticism;  the  progress  of  such  agreement  to 
constitute  an  available  subject  of  annual  discussion  and  report 
in  the  proceedings  of  the  association,  and  be  it  further  resolved 
that  this  general  committee  may  appoint  or  confirm  working 
committees  in  various  departments  to  conduct  the  necessary 
correspondence  and  report  partial  or  preliminary  agreements  to 
the  general  committee.* 

An  incident  of  such  a  concerted  movement,  as  above  outlined, 
might  be  an  enthusiasm  equal  to  or  exceeding  that  of  the  recent 
Columbus  Conference  on  Taxation,  an  interest  that  promises 
to  be  permanent  and  increasing.  Work  of  this  nature,  v^hich 
must  of  course  be  a  growth,  might  afford  pleasure  as  well  as 
profit,  and  might  readily  enlist  the  interest  of  those  who  would 
make  of  themselves  centres  of  agitation  and  development  in  the 
various  fields  of  Capital,  Labour,  Rent,  Wages,  Interest, 
Taxation,  Population,  Production,  Distribution,  etc.  If  such 
a  race  is  worth  the  running,  what  more  appropriate  than  that 
the  American  Economic  Association  should  set  the  pace  ? 

It  is  not  expected  that  agreements  like  these  will  be  new 
discoveries,  but  simply  old  discoveries  brought  into  stronger 
light,  formulated,  and  subjected  to  continuous  correction  and 
perfection,  through  reconciliation  of  differences  and  re-state- 
ment of  old  agreements  to  conform  to  the  latest  thought. 

Such  an  assembly  and  exposition  of  essential  principles  can 
but  be  of  inestimable  profit  to  the  student,  the  teacher,  the 
university,  and  the  State,  compassing,  as  it  must  eventually, 
an  accepted  body  of  principles —  principles  that  may  be  taught 
fearlessly  by  teachers  old  and  young,  experienced  or 
inexperienced,  leading  or  led,  and  with  a  confidence  and 
satisfaction  akin  to  that  pervading  the  domain  of  exact  science. 

On  the  relatively  solid  ground  of  such  accepted  doctrine  the 

*  Professors  Hollander,  Carver,  Seager,  Fetter  and  others  spoke  in  approval 
of  the  plan  as  presented,  Professor  Carver  expressing  the  opinion  that  its  adop>- 
tion  would  mark  a  new  epoch.  At  a  subsequent  business  meeting  of  the 
association  the  executive  committee  unanimously  recommended,  and  the 
association  adopted,  the  resolution  without  dissent. 


190 


THE  A  B  C  OF  TAXATION 


college  graduate  will  take  with  him  to  his  home  and  into  the 
concerns  of  life  something  that  will  be  to  him  an  armour  and  a 
weapon  always  at  hand —  an  economic  code  that  shall  be  as  a 
handbook  to  the  publicist,  politician,  and  statesman — that 
shall  make  of  the  college  men  in  Congress  and  Legislature  not 
dreary  followers  of  a  groping  public  sentiment,  or  the  confident 
advocates  of  exploded  economic  opinion,  but  instructors  and 
leaders  of  their  time. 


DETAILS    OF    ONE    HUNDRED    AND    TWENTY    BOSTON     PROPERTY 


SALES' 


Number  of 
Estate 

I 

2 

3 

4 
5 
6 

7 
8 

9 
10 
II 

12 
13 

IS 

16 

17 
Ig 

19 

20 

21 

22 
»3 

as 
26 

17 
28 


Assessed 
Valuation 
of  Land 

$67,200 

43>5oo 

245,000 
65,000 
77,600 
89,500 

196,000 
42,000 
10,800 

101,500 

17,000 

33,700 

6,000 

2I,200 

115,500 
21,500 
22,400 

I35»700 

492,000 
10,800 
49,500 
90,000 
14,300 
48,000 
68,800 

164,600 
1,800 

167,000 


Assessed 

Valuation 

of  Buildings 

$75,000 

15,000 

85,000 

10,500 

22,400 

17,500 

60,000 

11,000 

4,000 

24,500 

3,000 

2,300 

2,700 

15,000 

59.500 

10,500 

8,000 

75,000 

232,400 

5,100 

9,000 

17,000 

2,700 

7,000 

10,000 

120^400 

2,100 

100,000 


Total 
Assessed 
Valuation 

$142,200 
58,500 

330,000 
75.500 

100,000 

107,000 

256,000 
53,000 
14,800 

126,000 

20,000 

36,000 

8,700 

36,200 

175,000 
32,000 
30,400 

210,700 

724,400 
15,900 
58,500 

107,000 
17,000 
55,000 
78,800 

285,000 
3.900 

267,000 


Price 

Indicated 

by  Revenue 

Stamps 
on  Deeds 

$165,000 
75,000 

625,000 
75.500 

120,000 

130,000 

280,000 
75,000 
20,000 

175,000 

28,000 

45,000 

8,500 

42,000 

290,000 
35.500 
46,000 

2IOpOO 

925,000 
30,000 
46,500 

136,000 
21,000 
85,000 
94,000 

425POO 
3.500 

333.000 


Percentage 
01  Selling 

Price  Repre- 
sented by 
Valuation 

86 

78 

5^ 
100 

83 
82 

91 

70 
74 

71 

80 
102 

86 

60 

92 

66 
100 

75 

S3 
"5 

78 

80 

64 
83 
67 
III 
80 


♦  For  comments  see  page  16. 


APPENDIX  G 


191 


Number  of 
Estate 

29 
30 

3" 

3» 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
4> 
4» 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
5» 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
66 

67 
68 
69 
70 
7» 
7» 
73 
74 
75 


Assessed 

Valuation 
of  Land 

$14,200 

39»30o 

4,200 

105,000 

29,000 

34,ioo 

79,300 

10,000 

79,300 

54,000 

25,900 

131,000 

14,000 

7,700 

8,600 

2,000 

27,500 

9,200 

14,000 

11,000 

9,200 

11,500 

6/x)o 

4,400 

14,300 

26,000 

5,900 

3,200 

17,000 

16,200 

13,300 

3,600 

9,200 

8,300 

4,000 

18,000 

7,600 

13,300 

3,600 

30,000 

65,000 

18,000 

7,800 

4,800 

18,000 

6,300 

8,800 


Assessed 

Valuation 

of  Buildings 

$7,000 
11,500 

3,100 
25,000 

6,000 

7,000 

7,000 

3,000 
20,000 

8,000 
12,000 
28,000 
23,500 
14,900 

8400 

7,500 
26,500 
11,800 
20,000 

9,000 
10,300 
56,000 
17,000 

6,100 
22,700 

5,000 
12,100 

6,500 
27,000 
10,800 
14,000 

5,200 
11,800 
29,200 

6,700 
18,000 
20,900 
20,700 

4,200 
31,000 
20,000 
13,000 
17,000 
16,000 
11,500 

10,700 

8,200 


Total 
Assessed 
Valuation 

$21,200 

50,800 

7,300 
130,000 
35,000 
41,100 
86,300 
13,000 
99,300 
62,000 
37,900 
159,000 
37,500 
22,600 
17,000 

9,500 
54,000 
21,000 
34,000 
20,000 
19,500 
67,500 
23,000 
10,500 
37,000 
31,000 
18,000 

9,700 
44,000 
27,000 
27,300 

8,800 
21,000 
37,500 
10,700 
36,000 
28,500 
34,000 

7,800 
61,000 
85,000 
31,000 
24,800 
20,800 
29,500 
17,000 
17,000 


Price 

Indicated 

by  Revenue 

Stamps 

on  Deeds 

$23,500 
60,000 

9,500 
160,000 
35,000 
55,000 
122,000 
12,500 
135,000 
69,500 
57,000 
200,000 
39,000 
29,000 
16,500 
10,000 
65,000 
22,000 
47,500 
21,000 
22,000 
75,000 
33,000 
10,000 
42,000 
38,000 
23,500 

9,500 
47,000 
25,000 
27,000 

9,000 
22,000 
42,000 

9,500 
32,000 
35,000 
33,000 

9,000 
80,000 
91,000 
38,000 

z8,ooo 
25,000 
27,000 
15,500 
22,000 


Percentage 
of  Selling 
Price  Repre- 
sented by 
Valuation 

90 

84 
76 


100 

74 
70 
104 
73 
89 
66 

79 
96 

77 
103 

95 
83 
95 
71 
95 
88 
90 
69 

105 
88 
81 
76 

102 

93 

108 

101 

97 

95 

89 

112 

112 

81 

103 

86 

76 

93 
81 
88 

83 
109 
109 

77 


192 


THE  A  B  C  OF  TAXATION 


Price 

Percentage 

Indicated 

of  Selling 

Assessed 

Assessed 

Total 

by  Revenue 

Price  Repre- 
sented by 

Number  of 

Valuation 

Valuation 

Assessed 

Stamps 

Estate 

of  Land 

of  Buildings 

Valuation 

on  Deeds 

Valuation 

76 

$14,700 

$12,300 

$27,000 

$25,000 

108 

77 

6,200 

15,000 

21,200 

25>5oo 

83 

78 

18,800 

11,200 

30,000 

29,000 

103 

79 

10,800 

10,200 

21,000 

25,000 

84 

80 

6,400 

11,600 

18,000 

18,000 

100 

81 

3,700 

6,800 

10,500 

10,500 

100 

82 

3,600 

4,500 

8,100 

10,000 

81 

83 

4,500 

1,200 

5,700 

6,500 

87 

84 

1,300 

2,500 

3,800 

4,000 

95 

85 

4,800 

8,200 

13,000 

15,500 

83 

86 

1,000 

3,500 

4,500 

5,000 

90 

87 

4,200 

10,000 

14,200 

17,000 

83 

88 

2,900 

3,600 

6,500 

8,500 

76 

89 

2,800 

5,000 

7,800 

7,800 

100 

90 

1,600 

2,600 

4,200 

4,500 

93 

91 

12,500 

64,000 

76,500 

70,000 

109 

92 

1,600 

3,600 

5,200 

5,800 

89 

93 

4,000 

6,500 

10,500 

12,000 

87 

94 

3,500 

4,800 

8,300 

7,000 

118 

95 

8,400 

25,000 

33»400 

25,000 

133 

96 

1,000 

1,500 

2,500 

2,300 

108 

97 

2,400 

2,900 

5,300 

4,000 

132 

98 

5,800 

7,200 

13,000 

15,000 

86 

99 

3,200 

5,200 

8,400 

9,300 

90 

100 

3,100 

6,000 

9,100 

8,000 

113 

lOI 

6,000 

5,200 

11,200 

12,000 

93 

102 

3,600 

5>5oo 

9,100 

10,000 

9> 

103 

2,700 

6,000 

8,700 

10,000 

87 

104 

30,000 

14,500 

44,500 

45,000 

98 

105 

15,700 

8,000 

23,700 

20,000 

118 

106 

6,300 

7,700 

14,000 

12,000 

116 

107 

4,300 

7,700 

12,000 

13,000 

9» 

108 

5,400 

5,000 

10,400 

11,000 

94 

109 

3,000 

4,000 

7,000 

8,000 

87 

no 

25,200 

2,500 

27,700 

29,000 

95 

III 

3,900 

9,000 

12,900 

15,000 

86 

112 

6,200 

9,800 

16,000 

16,000 

100 

113 

8,000 

16,000 

24,000 

27,000 

88 

114 

5,600 

9,500 

15,100 

12,000 

125 

115 

4,000 

5,000 

9,000 

10,000 

90 

116 

4,800 

6,000 

10,800 

10,000 

io8 

117 

1,600 

5,400 

7,000 

5,500 

127 

118 

2,000 

1,600 

3,600 

3»675 

97 

119 

9,000 

13,000 

22,000 

27,000 

81 

120 

8,000 

6,000 

14,000 

14,000 

100 

Totals         $3,758,600     $2/379,700     $5,838,300     $7,291,375  80 


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209 


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INDEX 


INDEX 


Absorption  of  taxes  on  rent, 

41-  .      . 

Access   to   land,   equalisation 

of,  9,  10. 

Adams,  H.  C,  on  rent  a 
social  product,  30. 

Adams,  John  Quincy,  build- 
ing on  site  of  home  of,  21. 

Agricultural    rent,    129,    171- 

173- 
Ames  Building,  Boston,  taxes 

on,  74- 

Ames  estate,  assessed  valu- 
ation of,  73. 

Amortisation,  principle  of,  47, 
48.  ,      . 

Andrews,  E.  Benjamm,  on 
taxation  of  rent,  12  (ftn.); 
on  rent  a  social  product, 
29;  in  the  Saratoga  dis- 
cussion, 102. 

Aquinas,  St.  Thomas,  on 
natural  law,  104. 

Assessed  valuations,  of  build- 
ings in  Massachusetts,  62; 
of  land  in  Massachusetts, 
62;  in  Suffolk  County, 
63;  in  twelve  cities  and 
towns,  63;  in  seventeen 
cities  and  towns,  64;  of 
Washington  Street,  Bos- 
ton, 67-68;  of  Ames  es- 
tate, Boston,  73;  of  build- 
ings and  land  in  Bos- 
ton in  1887,  73;  of  How- 

22 


land  Street,  73;  estate  at 
Cambridge  and  Charles 
streets,  73;  defined,  112; 
in  Lawrence,  Scituate, 
Clinton,  Whitman,  com- 
pared with  actual  rental 
values,  126,  127. 
Atkinson,  Edward,  on  the 
single  tax,  73;  on  ab- 
solute ownership,  100 ; 
opponent  of  the  Henry 
George  theory,  10 1,  102. 

Bascom,  John,  on  impossi- 
bility of  shifting  rent 
taxes,  34. 

Bastable,  C.  P.,  on  selling 
value  of  land  an  untaxed 
value,  47. 

Berkshire  farmers,  buildings 
and  land  of,  124 

Blackstone,  defines  land,  109. 

Boston,  ground  rent  of,  15- 
20;  gross  land  value  of, 
18;  life  of  buildings  in, 
21;  Hotel  Boylston,  22; 
assessed  valuations  of 
buildings  and  land  in, 
23;  total  taxes  in  1907, 
23,  26;  under  single  tax, 
27,  Qi-92;  appreciation 
of  values  in,  52;  demand 
for  land  in  52;  object  les- 
sons drawn  from,  55-65, 
66-78,      79-92;     Winter 

5 


126 


THE  A  B  C  OF  TAXATION 


Street,  55-65,  124;  land 
affected  by  subway  in,  57, 
71;  Shepard,  Norwell 
Company,  58;  Exchange 
Building,  59;  Tremont 
Building,  59;  Wash,!  ,^: 
ton  Street,  66-78;  num- 
ber of  buildings  in,  68; 
Old  Corner  Bookstore, 
69;  total  ground  rent 
of,  72;  estate  at  Cam- 
bridge and  Charles 
streets,  73;  Howland 
Street  valuations,  73;  as- 
sessed valuation  of  Ames 
estate,  73;  Sears  and 
Ames  buildings,  74; 
Boylston  Building,  75; 
Masonic  Temple,  75; 
Public  Library,  75; 
taxes  in,  76,  161-163; 
Cornhill  and  the  single 
tax,  79-92;  unassessed 
property  in,  85;  St.  Paul's 
Church,  86-88;  land 
values  and  taxes  in  161- 
163;  records  of  property 
sales  in,  190-192;  records 
of  rentals  in,  193-221. 

Boston  &  Maine,  railroad 
merger,  134,  135. 

Boston  Transit  Commission, 
land  taken  by,  57,  71. 

Boulevards,  Boston,  77. 

Boylston  Building,  Boston, 
destruction  of,  75. 

Boylston  Hotel,  Boston,  22. 

Bryan,  W.  J.,  on  unjust  tax- 
ation, 150. 

Buildings,  values  of,  in  Bos- 
ton, 16-17,  21-23;  taxa- 
tion of,  43,  44;  results  of 
decadence  of,  51 ;  values 
of,  compared  with  land, 


values,  55-64;  valuations 
of,  on  Winter  Street, 
Boston,  56-57;  59;  re- 
sults of  improving,  57; 
on  State  Street,  59;  on 
Tremont  Street,  59;  as- 
sessed valuations  of,  in 
Massachusetts,  62;  in 
Suffolk  County,  63;  tax- 
ation of,  unsatisfactory, 
65;  on  Washington  Street, 
66-68;  average  life  of, 
68;  economic  crop,  68; 
Boston's  cuticle,  68; 
number  of,  in  Boston,  68; 
worthlessness  of  Wash- 
ington Street,  70;  when 
to  replace,  75;  on  Corn- 
hill,  79-83;  condemna- 
tion of,  80;  of  insurance 
companies,  82;  in  Berk- 
shire farming  district, 
124. 

Bullock,  C.  J.,  on  rent  a 
social  product,  29. 

Burtsell,  Dr.  R.  L.,  in  the 
McGlynn  case,  183. 

Capital,  in  Winter  Street,  58; 
ready  and  watching,  77; 
investment  of,  retarded 
by  present  method  of  tax- 
ation, 82;  and  railroads, 
145;  proper  return  to,  in 
public  utilities,  146,  147. 

Capitalisation  of  the  land 
tax,  49,  III;  illustration 
of,  49-52. 

Capitalised  tax,  defined,  iii. 

Carlton,  F.  T.,  on  fertility  of 
land  an  individual  prod- 
uct, 128  (ftn.). 

Carnegie,  Andrew,  the  un- 
earned increment,  152. 


INDEX 


227 


Garret,  J.  R.,  author  of  tax 
formula,  72  (ftn.). 

Carver,  T.  N.,  on  selling  value 
of  land  an  untaxed  value, 
48;  on  plan  to  secure 
agreement  among  econ- 
omists, 189  (f  n.). 

Catholic  Church,  and  single 
tax,  105;  attitude  on  land 
question,   173-184. 

Cause  and  effect,  applied  to 
ground  rent,  5. 

Charles  Street,  Boston,  estate 
at  corner  of  Cambridge 
Street  and,  73. 

Clark,  John  B.,  on  rent  a 
social  product,  10;  in  the 
Saratoga  discussion,  102. 

Clews,  Henry,  on  evils  of 
syndicates  and  public  ser- 
vice corporations,  135. 

Clinton,  Mass.,  assessed  val- 
uations in,  126. 

Commission,  to  regulate  pub- 
lic utilities,  133,  135. 

Commodities,  tax  on,  trans- 
ferable, 34. 

Commons,  J.  R.,  on  fertility 
of  land  an  individual 
product,  128. 

Compensationists,  theory  of, 
120. 

Confiscation  vs.  taxation,  90: 
in  Boston,  91;  Henry 
George  on,  loi;  single 
tax  not,  116. 

Constitution  of  Massachu- 
setts, relation  to  single 
tax,  121. 

Cornhill,  Boston,  and  the 
single  tax,  79-92;  income 
from  buildings  on,  80; 
disproportionate  amount 
of  street  for  buildings,  81. 


Cost  of  living,  not  affected  by 

ground  rent  tax,  42. 
Cotting,  Uriah,  builder,  79. 


Dead  hands,  land  held  by,  52, 
against     the 


77-. 

Discrimination 
farmer,  124. 

Distribution,  favourably  af- 
fected by  rent  taxation, 
9,  II,  108,  148. 

Double  taxation,  76. 

Economic  Club,  discussion  of, 
on  the  single  tax,  91. 

Economic  rent,  defined  as 
ground  rent,  41;  applied 
to  public  expenses,  50; 
of  Old  Corner  Bookstore, 
70;  expression  of  so- 
cial activities,  151.  See 
also  Rent  and  Ground 
rent. 

Economists,  opinions  of:  on 
rent  a  social  product, 
28-30;  on  impossibility 
of  shifting  tax  on  rent, 
33-35;  on  selling  value 
of  land  an  untaxed 
value,  45-48;  dispropor- 
tionate treatment  of 
agricultural  rent  by,  171 - 
173;  plan  to  secure  agree- 
ment among,  187-190. 

Economy,  absence  of,  in  tax 
affairs,  15. 

Ely,  R.  T.,  answer  to  single- 
tax  argument,  48;  on  the 
principle  of  amortisation, 
48-49;  objections  of, 
considered,  49-52. 

England,  effect  of  abolishing 
land  tax  in,  45;  existing 
land  tax  in,  46. 


228 


THE  A  B  C  OF  TAXATION 


English  common  law,  on 
ownership  of  land,  103. 

Equal  opportunities,  and 
single  tax,  86. 

Equalisation  of  taxation,  the 
office  of  ground  rent,  9; 
relation  to  depreciation 
of  building  values,  21; 
and  distribution  of  wealth, 
86;  how  to  effect,  66, 116, 
117. 

Estate  in  land,  103. 

Estate,  rentals,  in  Boston,  17, 
193-221. 

Eviction,  tenant,  loi. 

Exchange   Building,    Boston, 

^59-. 

Exemption,     resulting     from 

the    single    tax,    24;    of 

assessed     values,     24-25; 

of    last     purchaser,     36; 

land  owners  and,  40-41. 

Farmer,  tax  on  economic  rent 
not  transferable  to,  35; 
functions  of,  compared 
with  landlord,  19;  and  the 
single  tax,  122-131;  wages 
of,  122;  his  own  munici- 
pality, 123;  classified, 
124;  doubly  discrimi- 
nated against,  124;  land 
and  buildings  of  Berk- 
shire, 124;  and  taxation 
on  fertility,  128. 

Farm  land,  assessed  valu- 
ations in  Massachu- 
setts, 129,  130.  See  also 
Land. 

Fertility,  taxation  of,  128. 

Feudal  tenure,  100. 

Ford  Amendment,  138,  142. 

Ford  Franchise  Act,  8,  141, 
154- 


Formula,  for  amount  of 
ground  rent,  18;  for  cost 
of  government,  72;  for 
valuation  based  on  in- 
come, 125. 

France,  kinds  of  taxes  in,  46. 

Franchise,  taxation  of,  8, 
Spy  ^37y  140;  place  in 
single  tax  theory  109; 
law  governing,  in  New 
York,  141;  compared 
to  land,  142,  187. 

Franchise  value,  defined,  no, 
142. 

Generic  peculiarities  of  land, 

^     3-30y  3i-35»   36-52,   155- 

George,  Henry,  doctrine  of 
followers  of,  48-50;  on 
error  concerning  land 
nationalisation,  95;  in- 
terpretation of  doctrine 
of,  96,  97;  on  confisca- 
tion of  land,  loi;  theories 
of,  opposed  by  Edward 
Atkinson,  102-103;  an 
omission  by,  104  (ftn.); 
on  method  of  securing 
single  tax,  107;  defines 
single  tax,  153;  on  equal 
right  to  use  of  land,  154; 
doctrine  of  taxation,  167, 
i68;Tolstoyand,  168-171. 

Germany,  municipal  housing 
of  the  poor  in,  77. 

GifFen,  Sir  Robert,  on  selling 
value  of  land  an  untaxed 
value,  45. 

Glasgow,  ownership  of  public 
utilities  in,  132. 

Graft,  extermination  of,  138. 

Gross  rent,  defined,  112.  See 
also  Rent. 

Gross  value,  defined,  112. 


INDEX 


229 


Ground   rent,  defined,  3,  31, 
70-71,  187,  188;  definition 
of,  as    applied    to   urban 
land,  3-4;   value  of  rights 
and  privileges   stipulated 
in  title  deed,  4,  156;    as 
defined    by    Mr.    Shear- 
man, 4-5;  relation  of,  to 
public    expenditures,    5; 
true      theory      of,      6-7; 
operation   of,    7-8;   office 
of,  9-1 1;  increase  of  tax 
on,  9;  private  appropria- 
tion of,  a  special  privilege, 
II;  and  land  values,  10- 
II;     cause      of,      Il-I4> 
156;    E.    Benjamin    An- 
drews  on,    12  (ftn.),  29; 
source    of,    14;    mainte- 
nance of,  14-15;  ^  social 
product,    15;   of  Boston, 
15-20;  volume  of,  16;  ex- 
emplification   of    income 
tax,  25;  Adam  Smith  on, 
28;  John  Stuart  Mill  on, 
29;  Adams  on,  30;  deter- 
mined   by    demand,  31; 
views   of  economists   on 
shifting    of,    33-35;    ^"^ 
the     landlord,     35,     47; 
cannot     be     shifted,    35, 
85,      157;     "what     land 
is   worth    for    use,"    38; 
a   governing    factor,    41 ; 
cannot    be    increased    or 
decreased,    41;    tax    on, 
affects  neither  wages  nor 
cost    of    living,    42;    the 
same  homogeneous  thing, 
42;  comparison  of  build- 
ing   rents    with,    61;    of 
Old    Corner     Bookstore, 
70;   of  Boston,    72,    130, 
161;    a    reflected    value, 


83;  of  St.  Paul's  Church, 
87;  evils  of  private  ap- 
propriation of,  99;  right 
of  landowners  to,  lOO; 
result  of  a  self-operating 
social  law,  115;  nature  of, 
115;  consideration  of  ag- 
ricultural, 130;  of  New 
York,  130;  of  United 
States,  130;  a  great  Mis- 
sissippi, 131;  relation  to 
unjust  fortunes,  152. 

Hoffman,  on  incidence  of 
rent  taxation,  34. 

House  lots,  what  is  involved 
in  purchasing,  37-3^; 
hypothetical  cost  of,  39, 
40.     See  also  Land. 

Houses,  hypothetical  pur- 
chase of,  43-45;  value  of, 
affected  by  mortgage,  43; 
rent  of,  not  affected  by 
taxation,  44;  for  the 
poor,  77;  taxation  of, 
159.     See  also  Buildings. 

Howland  Street,  Boston,  as- 
sessed valuations  of,  73. 

Income  tax,  a  form  of  single 
tax,  25;  discussed, 148-152; 
President  Roosevelt  on, 
151;  as  a  death  rate,  152. 

Increment,  future,  91. 

Incumbrances.  See  Mort- 
gage and  Taxes. 

Individual  and  the  state,  re- 
lation affected  by  the  sin- 
gle tax,  8. 

Immunity  from  taxation,  of 
landowners,  90. 

Inheritance  tax,  and  income 
tax,  148-152;  Congres- 
sional   plan    concerning, 


230 


THE  A  B  C  OF  TAXATION 


148;  evils  of,   151 ;  as  a 
death  rate,  152. 
Insurance    companies,    single 
tax  and,  82;  buildings  of, 
82. 

Johnson,  the  Rev.  R.  J.,  on 
the  relation  of  the 
Catholic  Church  to  the 
single  tax  proposal,  104- 
105. 

Labouchere,  on  taxing  land 
values,  170. 

Labour,  taxed  on  basis  of  its 
own  construction,  22. 

Land,  first  generic  peculiarity 
of,  3-30;  rights  and  privi- 
leges pertaining  to,  3,  4; 
economic  and  social  ad- 
vantages of,  4;  distinc- 
tion between  land  values 
and,  9;  indestructibility 
of,  II;  disposition  of 
taxes  on,  12;  second 
generic  peculiarity  of, 
31-35;  third  generic  pecu- 
liarity of,  36-52;  selling 
value  of,  an  untaxed 
value,  36-52,  155,  158, 
159;  sellmg  price  of,  39; 
relation  of  man  to  use 
of,  39;  inequality  of  tax- 
ation of,  in  United 
States,  49;  demand  for, 
in  Boston,  52;  on  Winter 
Street,  58;  title  to,  de- 
fined, 83;  unassessed,  in 
Boston,  85,  90;  private 
ownership  vs.  private 
possession  of,  96;  defined, 
109,  170;  source  of  all 
wealth,  109;  contrasted 
with    wealth,    no;   over- 


valuation of  agricultural, 
125;  under-valuation  of 
village  and  urban,  125; 
defined  in  the  Ford 
Franchise  Act,  141,  142; 
equal  rights  to  use  of, 
154;  a  public  franchise, 
154;  site  value  of,  a 
social  product,  155;  tax 
on,  cannot  be  shifted, 
155;  selling  value  of, 
defined,  188. 

Land  improvement  compa- 
nies, effect  of  single  tax 
on,  82. 

Land  nationalisation,  and 
single  tax,  89;  Henry 
George  on,  95. 

Land  owners,  exempt  from 
taxation,  36,  40;  bene- 
fited by  improvement  to 
buildings,  58;  of  Winter 
Street  property,  60 ;  jus- 
tice of  exemption  of, 
90;  not  entitled  to  all 
ground  rent,  98,  100,  103. 

Land  tax,  affected  by  change 
of  ownership,  36;  effect 
of  abolishing  in  England, 
45;  amount  of,  in  Eng- 
land, 46;  capitalisation  of, 
in  United  States,  49;  de- 
fined, II 2- II 3. 

Land  values,  affected  by 
public  improvements,  5; 
vs.  monopolies  and  spe- 
cial privileges,  8;  present 
and  past,  9-10,  12;  a 
social  product,  10,  28- 
30;  agencies  enhancing, 
13;  determinant  of,  14; 
in  Boston,  16-20,  23; 
gross,  in  Boston,  18;  and 
decay    of    buildings,    21, 


INDEX 


231 


22-23;  ^^  untaxed  value, 
36-52;  effect  of  mortgage 
interest  and  taxes  on,  37; 
relation  of  "rights  and 
privileges  thereto  per- 
taining" on,  38;  relation 
of,  to  building  values,  55; 
increase  of,  in  Winter 
Street,  59;  in  Washington 
Street,  67;  in  Massachu- 
setts towns  and  cities, 
87;  defined,  97,  170,  187; 
franchise  values,  no;  vs. 
«  new  values  in  Boston,  90; 

land  valuations,  in,  112, 
113,  114;  and  the  public 
schools,  118;  of  Boston 
and  the  Berkshires  com- 
pared, 124;  imperishable 
by  public  conservation 
152. 

Landlord,  function  of,  19; 
effect  of  ground  rent  on, 
20,  24,  33,  34,  35,  47; 
John  Stuart  Mill  on,  29; 
as  owners  of  both  houses 
and  land,  41  (ftn.);  in 
England,  46;  "no  bur- 
den" for,  59. 

Lawrence,  Mass.,  land  of, 
undervalued,  126. 

Legislative  regulation  of 
public  utilities,  134. 

Leo  Xin,  Pope,  Labour  En- 
cyclical, 104,  183. 

Long,  John  D.,  on  social 
discontent,  149. 

Management  of  public  ser- 
vice corporations,  145. 

Manhattan,  wealth  of,  152. 

Market  value  of  land,  how 
affected  by  taxation,  32. 

Masonic  Temple,  Boston,  75. 


Massachusetts,  land  valua- 
tions of  towns  and  cities 
of,  62,  87;  relation  of 
constitution  of,  to  single 
tax,  121;  valuations  of 
farm  lands  of,  129,  130. 
See  also  Boston,  Clinton, 
Lawrence,  etc. 

Massachusetts  Single  Tax 
League,  55,  56,  66  (ftn.). 

McGlynn,  the  Rev.  Edward, 
in  defence  of  single  tax, 
105-106,  173-184. 

Mill,  John  Stuart,  on  taxa- 
tion of  land  value  in- 
crement, 23;  on  rent  a 
social  product,  29;  on 
impossibility  of  shifting 
ground  rent  tax,  34;  on 
selling  value  of  land  an 
untaxed  value,  46,  47. 

Monopolies,  taxation  of,  7, 
8,  27-28,  no;  source  of 
evils  of,  135;  defined,  188. 

Mortgage,  effect  of,  on  selling 
value  of  land,  24  (ftn.), 
39,  43;  effect  of,  on  rent, 
32;  effect  of,  on  land,  37, 
39;  a  part  of  ground 
rent,  39;  paid  out  of 
gross  income,  40. 

Multiple  tax,  arguments  for,75. 

Murhard,  on  incidence  of 
rent  taxation,  34. 

Nationalisation  of  land.  See 
Land  nationalisation. 

Natural  resources,  taxation  of, 
8. 

Natural  tax,  natural  basis  for, 

83- 

Net  rent,  compared  with 
gross  rent,  16,  17.  See 
also   Rent,    Net    value. 


232 


THE  A  B  C  OF  TAXATION 


Net  value  vs.  gross  value,  112. 
See  also  Land  values. 

Nevtr  tax,  defined,  39  (ftn.); 
effect  of,  90. 

New  York,  Ford  Franchise 
Act,  8,  141,  154;  regu- 
lation of  public  utilities 
in,  133;  Ford  Amend- 
ment, 138,  142;  reduc- 
tion of  overcapitalisation 
in,  140;  Public  Utilities 
Commission  in,  141. 

Newton,  Mass.,  tax  rate  in, 
184;  letter  to  assessors 
of,  184-186. 

Nicholson,  J.  S.,  on  impos- 
sibility of  shifting  a  tax 
on  rent,  35. 

O'Connell,  Archbishop,  on 
social  discontent,  149. 

Old  Corner  Bookstore,  Bos- 
ton, 69. 

Old  tax,  defined,  39;  effect  of, 
on  price  of  land,  39. 

Overcapitalisation,  reduction 
of,  in  New  York,  140. 

Overvaluation  of  agricultural 
land,  125. 

Ownership  of  land,  defined, 
96,  97,  98,  III;  Henry 
George  on,  100.  See  also 
Land  and  Land  owners. 

Personal  property  should  be 
exempt  from  taxation, 
116. 

Philadelphia,  Pa.,  land  value, 
1686,9. 

Politics,  and  public  utilities, 
140. 

Population,  and  land  privi- 
leges, 4;  a  cause  of 
ground  rent,  13. 


Possession,    defined,    96,  97; 

vs.  ownership,  97. 
Post,  Louis  F.,  on  the  single 

tax,  154. 
Preuss,  Arthur,  on  the  Satolli 

decision  in  the  McGlynn 

case,  183. 
Private  appropriation  of  rent, 

explosion  of  theory  of,  9. 
Private  expenditure,  a  source 

of  rent,  13,  156. 
Private  ownership,  in,  144. 
Private  property    in  land,  95- 

107;  not  inconsistent  with 

single  tax,  96,  169,    174; 

definition  of,  97-98;  John 

Z.    White    on     the     two 

meanings   of,    99    (ftn.); 

abolition  of,  loi,  102. 
Privilege,  essence  of,  88,  148; 

one  part  of  wealth    goes 

to,  148;  taxation  of,  150. 

See  also  Special  privilege. 
Public  expenditure,  a  source 

of  rent,  13,  15. 
Public  franchise,  classified  as 

land,   142,    154;  defined, 

Public  functions  vs.  private 
functions,  138. 

Public  improvements,  and 
land  values,  5;  and 
ground  rent,  14-15. 

Public  Library,  Boston,  75. 

Public  ownership  of  public 
utilities,  132. 

Public  schools  and  land  val- 
ues, 118. 

Public  service  corporations, 
and  the  public,  136. 

Public  utilities,  regulation  by 
taxation  132-147;  public 
owership  of,  in  Switzer- 
land and  Glasgow,  132; 


INDEX 


233 


dangers  of  public  owner- 
ship of,  132;  regulation 
of,  in  New  York,  133, 
141 ;  true  system  of 
regulating,  133;  public 
regulation  of,  vs.  public 
ownership  of,  133;  regu- 
lation by  legislature,  134- 
135;  regulation  by  com- 
mission, 135-137;  the 
Boston  &  Maine,  134; 
Henry  Clews  on  regula- 
tion by  commission,  135; 
and  politics,  140;  regu- 
lation of,  by  rates  and 
taxation,  137-147;  defi- 
nition of,  138;  advan- 
tages of  regulation  of, 
141 ;  railroads,  145-146. 
Public  tjtilities  Commission, 
New  York,  141. 

Quasi-public  expenditure,  a 
source  of  rent,  13,  156. 

Railroads,  the  Boston  & 
Maine,  134,  I35;  reg- 
ulation of,  137,  138,  144- 
147;  and  schedule  rates, 

143- 

Rates,  regulation  of,  143,  144. 

Real  estate,  taxation  confined 
to,  20,  21.  See  also 
Land. 

Regulation  of  public  utilities. 
See  Public  utilities. 

Rent,  a  natural  tribute, 
7;  for  special  privileges, 
8;  socially  maintained, 
10;  relation  to  distribu- 
tion of  produce,  11 ; 
for  public  service  15; 
a  social  product,  29, 
30;      conditions      deter- 


mining amount  of,  35; 
agricultural,  129,  171- 
173;  described  as  flour 
coming  from  the  public 
mill,  151.  See  also 
Ground  rent.  Agricultu- 
ral rent.  Economic  rent. 

Rental  value,  distinguished 
from  capital  value,  3 
(ftn.). 

Rerum  Novarum^  the  Pope's 
Encyclical,  183. 

Ricardo,  David,  on  impossi- 
bility of  shifting  ground 
rent  tax,  33,  34;  law  of 
rent,  171. 

Right  of  way  to  buildings,  97. 

Rights  and  privileges,  title  to, 
97;  and  ground  rent,  156. 

Rogers,  Thorold,  on  im- 
possibility of  shifting 
a  tax  or  rent,  34. 

Roosevelt,  Theodore,  141,  150 
151.  152. 

Saratoga,  New  York,  dis- 
cussion at,  loi. 

Sartorius,  on  the  incidence 
of  rent  taxation,  34. 

Savings  banks,  and  the  single 
tax,  82  (ftn.). 

School  tax,  justice  of,  117, 
118. 

Scituate,  Mass.,  land  of, 
undervalued,  126,  127. 

Sears  Building,  Boston,  taxes 
on,  74. 

Seligman,  E.  R.  A.,  on  im- 
possibility of  shifting  a 
tax  on  rent,  34,  35;  on 
special  taxation  for  future 
increase  in  ground  rent, 
91-92;  in  the  Saratoga 
discussion,  102. 


^34 


THE  A  B  C  OF  TAXATION 


Selling  value  of  land,  con- 
trasted with  assessed 
valuations,  i6;  effect  of 
mortgage  on,  24  (ftn.), 
39,  43;  an  untaxed  value, 
36-52*  45-48,  1 88;  the 
"rump,"  85;  definition 
of,  188. 

Shearman,  Thomas  G.,  de- 
fines ground  rent,  4;  on 
impossibility  of  shifting 
a  tax  on  rent^  33;  on 
effect  of  present  taxation, 
108;  on  sufiiciency  of 
the  single  tax,  116;  on 
overvaluation  of  agri- 
cultural land,  125,  127. 

Shepard,  Norwell  Company, 
Boston,  improvement  in 
property  of,  58. 

Single  tax,  a  natural  tax,  4, 
41,  83,  115;  effect  of,  8; 
calculation  of,  for  Bos- 
ton, 18;  resulting  ex- 
emptions, 24;  as  an 
income  tax,  25-26;  ap- 
plied to  Boston,  27; 
Federal  action  on,  30; 
objections  to,  answered, 
48-52,  89-91,  119;  illus- 
trated, in  Winter  Street, 
Boston,  55-65;  effect  of, 
on  buildings,  57,  69  75, 
77,  80,  82;  illustrated, 
in  Washington  Street, 
Boston,  66-78;  Edward 
Atkinson  on,  73;  based 
on  a  scientific  principle, 
76,  84,  175;  not  really  a 
tax,  76,  113;  explained, 
76,  91,  153-163;  illus- 
trated, in  Cornhill,  Bos- 
ton, 79-92;  and  the 
"land  improvement  com- 


panies," 82;  cure  for 
special  privilege,  86;  not 
land  nationalisation,  89; 
defined,  91-92;  equal  free- 
dom under,  99;  origin  in 
justice,  102;  justice  of, 
108-121;  and  franchises, 
109;  and  wages,  113; 
effect  on  distribution, 
113,  176;  as  a  natural 
tax,  116;  and  socialism, 
118;  obstacles  to  a 
thorough  consideration 
of,  1 19-120;  and  the  Mas- 
sachusetts constitution, 
121;  and  the  farmer,  122- 
131 ;  Professors  J.  R. 
Commons  and  F.  T. 
Carlton  on,  128;  Credo, 
Argument,  Conclusion  of, 
153-163;  defined  by 
Henry  George,  153; 
doctrine,  catholic,  154, 
167;  legs  on  which  it 
stands,  155;  the  pole- 
star,  163;  ethics  of,  167, 
168;  loadstone,  168;  a 
religious  philosophy,  168. 

Smith,  Adam,  on  rent  a  social 
product,  28-29;  on  im- 
possibility of  shifting  a 
tax  on  ground  rent,  33. 

Social  discontent,  149. 

Social  product,  ground  rent  a, 
9,  II,  25-30;  land  values 
a,  10,  28-30. 

Socialism,  and  the  single  tax, 
118,  167. 

Socialisation  of  rent,  167-168. 

Special  privilege,  taxation  of, 
7,  8,  27,  86,  109,  150; 
renting,  8;  elimination  of, 
8;  value  of  9;  income 
from,  26;    absorbs  taxes. 


INDEX 


235 


27;  cause  of  unequal 
division  of  wealth,  84; 
single  tax  a  cure  for,  86; 
source  of  inequalities, 
109, 148;  result  of  abolish- 
ing, 114. 

Spencer,  Herbert,  on  private 
property  in  land,  ^5,  99. 

St.  Paurs  Church,  Boston, 
value  of  property,  87. 

St.  Thomas  Aquinas,  on 
natural  law,  104. 

Statutes  of  taxation,  inconsis- 
tency of,  30. 

Stowell  &  Company,  Bos- 
ton, rental  of  estate  of, 
61. 

Subway,  Boston,  land  taken 
for»  57;  affecting  land 
values,  65;  affecting 
Washington    Street,    69, 

Suffolk  County,  Mass.,  as- 
sessed valuations  in,  63. 

Supply  and  demand,  deter- 
mining interest,  50. 

Switzerland,  ownership  of 
public  utilities  in,  132. 

Taxation,  natural,  4,  41 ; 
source  of  rent,  5;  of 
special  privileges,  8,  27; 
equalisation  of,  9;  of 
ground  rent  and  access 
to  land,  10,  115;  and 
distribution,  11,  108,  148; 
absence  of  economy  in 
present  method  of,  15, 
74,  81;  of  real  estate  only, 
20i  imposed  by  time,  21; 
inequalities  in  present 
system,  23,  1 62;  com- 
pared with  mortgage,  24 
(ftn.),    and    the    income 


tax,  25;  of  monopoly,  27; 
proportionate  and  reason- 
able 27;  natural  law  of, 
30;  effect  of,  on  tenant's 
rent,  31;  does  not  de- 
termine ground  rent,  31 ; 
of  buildings,  43,  44,  65; 
effect  of,  on  building 
development,  58,  65,  70, 
75»  77,  80  82;  in 
Boston,  72;  for  Boston 
boulevards,  77;  natural 
basis  of,  83;  vs.  con- 
fiscation, 90;  relation 
to  property,  98;  and 
distribution  of  wealth, 
108;  double  discrimina- 
tion against  farmers, 
124;  on  regulation  of, 
132-147;  of  franchises, 
137,  140,  144;  the  hope 
of  graft  extermination, 
138;  of  incomes  and  in- 
heritances, 148-152;  Bos- 
ton's system  of,  160-163. 
Taxes,  defined  in  terms  of 
ground  rent,  4;  relation 
of  ground  rent  to,  5,  6; 
illustration  of  Missisippi 
River,  coffee  mill,  circu- 
lation of  the  blood,  6; 
increase  of,  on  ground 
rent,  9;  and  net  rent,  16; 
of  Boston,  18,  26,  72; 
effect  of,  on  deprecia- 
tion of  land,  23;  as  liens, 
24  (ftn.),  definition  of, 
31,  32;  effect  of,  on  net 
and  gross  rent,  32;  not 
transferrable  to  tenants, 
33;  shifted  to  tenants, 
41  (ftn,);  natural,  in 
Boston,  72;  unnatural, 
in   Boston,   72;   capitali- 


236 


THE  A  B  C  OF  TAXATION 


sation  of,  iii;  vs.  ground 
rent,  115;  justice  of 
school,  117,  118;  likened 
to  wheat  in  public  hopper, 
151;  and  unjust  fortunes, 
150. 

Tax  rate,  in  Boston,  90. 

Tenant,  taxes  and  rent  of, 
31;  how  affected  by 
ground  rent  tax,  33,  34; 
injustice  of  taxation  to, 
59;  eviction,  loi. 

Title  deed,  stipulation  of,  4. 

Tolstoy,  on  private  property 
in  land,  99;  his  single 
tax  doctrine,  168-171. 

Tremont     Building,     Boston, 

59- 
Tremont  Street,   Boston,   86. 

Undervaluation  of  urban  land, 
124,  125. 

Unequal  distribution  of 
wealth,  108,  109;  John 
D.  Long  on,  149;  Arch- 
bishop O'Connell  on, 
149. 

United  States,  unequal  taxa- 
tion in,  49. 

Unprivileged  fortunes,  151. 

Unprivileged  men,  149. 

Urban  land.     See  Land. 

Usufruct,  III. 

Vacant  land,  81.  See  also 
Land. 

Valuation.  See  Value  and 
Land  values. 

Value,  assessed  and  selling, 
contrasted,  16;  of  land 
and  buildings,  compared, 
62-64;  and  valuation,  56- 


57,    III;   net,    112.     See 
also  Land  values. 
Vested  right,  91. 

Wages,  increased  by  just  taxa- 
tion,   II,    113,    122;   not 
affected  by  tax  on  ground 
rent,  42;  the   single    tax 
tenet,    86,    113;    of  the 
farmer,    122;    a    part   of 
wealth,  148. 
Walker,   Francis  A.,   on   im- 
possibility     of     shifting 
ground  rent  tax,  34. 
Washington    Street,    Boston, 
and   the    single   tax,   66- 
78;     assessed     valuatioi 
of,  67. 
Wealth,  equalisation  of  tax- 
tion  and,  86;  divisior 
108;  land  the  source 
no;  divided   into  w? 
and   privilege,    148; 
rived  from  savings,  i 
evils    of   unearned,    i 
150;  of  Manhattan,  i 
White,  John  Z.,  on  the  mean- 
ing of  "private  property 
in  land,"  99  (ftn.). 
Whitman,     Mass.,     land     of, 

undervalued,  127. 
Wilson,  Woodrow,  on  the 
right  attitude  of  corpora- 
tions toward  the  public, 
135;  on  legislators  and 
executive  regulations,  137. 
Winn,  Henry,  on  the  multiple 

tax,  75. 
Winter    Street,    Boston,    and 
the     single     tax,     55-65; 
diagram  of,  55;  improve- 
ment of,  57-58. 


THIS  BOOK  IS  DUE  ON  THE  LAST  DATE 
STAMPED  BELOW 

AN     INITIAL     FINE     OF     25    CENTS 

WILL   BE   ASSESSED    FOR    FAILURE  TO    RETURN 
THIS    BOOK  ON    THE   DATE  DUE.     THE   PENALTY 
WILL  INCREASE  TO  SO  CENTS  ON  THE  FOURTH 
DAY    AND    TO     $1.00    ON     THE    SEVENTH     DAY 
OVERDUE. 

MAR  29    1933 

MAR  30  m 

;3                mM 

MAR  31  1933 

1 

.       MAY  14  1934 

M 

•DEC  2  9 1986 

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YB   19487 


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